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Abstract 
This thesis comprises three independent chapters, spanning the range of my interests. 
The first chapter provides estimates of the causal effects of social ties on aggregate, 
firm level and individual level economic outcomes. The second chapter is a first 
step at understanding the joint determination of language change and economic 
structural change which seems to have occurred over the past centuries and probably 
continues today. A joint theme in these papers is the attempt to contribute to our 
understanding of the extent to which cultural and social factors can impact market 
outcomes. The second paper is as well interested in a specific channel through which 
economic outcomes can feed back on a cultural aspect of societies. The third paper 
seeks to contribute to our understanding of a more traditional economic question, 
namely individual behaviour in strategic situations. In particular it uses a novel 
experimental design to investigate individual behaviour in unprecedented strategic 
situations and estimate the parameters of a structural non-equilibrium model of 
behaviour. I like to belief that the chapters of this thesis, especially the second and 
third chapter, tie up closely the theoretical and empirical work and make a humble 
contribution to our understanding of economic behaviour and market functioning. 
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Preface 
This thesis comprises three independent chapters, spanning the range of my in-
terests. The first chapter provides estimates of the causal effects of social ties on 
aggregate economic outcomes. Little causally interpretable evidence on this topic is 
available, the reason being that social ties are generally determined jointly with or 
by economic outcomes. The chapter shows that at the time of the German Reuni-
fication there was substantial variation across West German regions in the share of 
individuals with ties to East Germany. We argue that there is an exogenous reason 
for this pattern and we make this explicit in our empirical strategy. We find that 
regions in which a higher share of the population had ties to East Germany experi-
enced a significantly higher growth in income per capita in the 6 years subsequent 
to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Further we find that firms from these regions are more 
likely to hold subsidiaries or branches in East Germany even today and that the 
share of entrepreneurs in these regions increased differentially. Lastly, we find that 
individuals with ties to East Germany experience a significant rise in their income. 
However, the sum of the individual level effects is smaller than the regional level 
effects, suggesting some form of regional spill-over effects to individuals who them-
selves do not have ties to East Germany, but live in a region where a high fraction of 
the population has ties. We believe the most plausible interpretation of the sum of 
our results is that West German households which had social ties to East Germany 
in 1989 had a comparative advantage in seizing the new economic opportunities in 
the East. This comparative advantage resulted in a persistent rise in their indi-
vidual household incomes but also appears to have generated a social surplus at 
the regional level in the form of higher growth in income per capita and increased 
returns to entrepreneurial activity. Part of this social surplus may be explained if 
firms owned by a household with social ties to the East (or firms who had access to 
a local labor force with such ties) had a comparative advantage in investing in East 
Germany. 
The second chapter of this thesis is an attempt at contributing to our under-
standing of the co-evoluation of linguistic heterogeneity and economic structural 
change. Today, linguistic heterogeneity at the national level, which is a widespread 
phenomenon, correlates negatively with the level of GDP and the fraction of the 
population which is working in manufacturing and services. Historically, much of 
the now highly industrialized world was home to much greater linguistic variety, too, 
but the usage of many locallanaguages declined at around the time and subsequent 
to the industrial revolution. These facts give rise to the sense that the evolution 
of language heterogeneity, economic growth and structural change in the economy 
might be connected. The chapter aims to provide a framework which helps to un-
derstand the two-way relation of language knowledge and the sectorial composition 
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of the economy and economic growth. In particular, it formalizes how the stock 
of language knowledge restricts the set of feasible joint economic activities, and 
how these in turn shape the incentives for language change. The model highlights 
two key structural parameters which can be interpreted as answering the questions: 
'How important is a common language for economic activity?' and 'How important 
are economic incentives for language change?' The model's structural equations 
are used to estimate these parameters. I calibrate the model's remaining parame-
ters with 1926 data from French departements and simulate the general equilibrium 
model to obtain predictions on language heterogeneity and sectoral composition 
across departments in 1946. I show that the model of language change and sectorial 
change explains at least 7% of the variation in the sectorial composition. 
The third chapter investigates individual behaviour in unprecedented strategic 
situations. Previous experimental evidence shows that equilibrium predictions often 
fail to explain behaviour in one shot games, which are meant to represent unprece-
dented strategic situations. A leading explanation for the failure of equilibrium 
concepts to explain and predict behaviour in one shot games is that players may not 
believe that other players choose an equilibrium strategy. This explanation appears 
particularly pertinent in unprecedented strategic situations, where learning cannot 
cause a convergence of beliefs and strategies to equilibrium. The level-k model of 
reasoning postulates the following alternative belief structure: There exist so-called 
level-O players, who do not play strategically. The model defines level-l players to 
best respond to what they believe level-O players do. Level-2 players form a belief 
about the fractions and strategies of lower level players and best respond to this. 
This process continues for higher level players. Hence the model assumes a hierar-
chy of types who best respond to non-equilibrium beliefs, referred to as levels. They 
distinguish themselves by the number of iterated best responses to the distribution 
of level-O actions. While there are various experimental studies which aim to es-
timate the distribution of strategic players, little in known about the existence of 
non-strategic players and their behaviour. The third chapter aims to contribute to 
our understanding of these questions. It presents a novel experimental design which 
allows to obtain incentivised written accounts of individuals' reasoning. Contrary to 
commonly held beliefs, we show that around one third of the participants play non-
strategically. And while the non-strategic actions are not uniformly distributed, 
higher level players, somewhat surprisingly, correctly anticipate the non-uniform 
distribution of non-strategic actions. 
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1 The Economic Impact of Social Ties: 
Evidence from German Reunification 1 
1.1 Introduction 
There are important theoretical reasons to believe that social ties between individ-
uals impact economic development. Social ties might facilitate communication and 
thereby reduce informational frictions and asymmetries (Granovetter (1973), Varian 
(1990), Stiglitz (1990)). Furthermore, the threat of severing social ties may serve 
as a form of 'social' collateral and thereby sustain a large range of credit, insurance 
and trade contracts that would not otherwise be feasible (Besley and Coate (1995)). 
Although both of these channels may fundamentally affect the ability of individuals 
to engage in economic transactions, there exists virtually no evidence to date on the 
relevance of social ties for aggregate economic outcomes, such as economic growth 
and the scale and success of entrepreneurial activity. In this paper we estimate the 
relevance of social ties between individuals for regional economic development and 
trace the economic impact of social ties to firm investment and household income. 
The main obstacle to estimation of the causal effect of social ties on economic 
outcomes is that social ties are endogenous to economic activity. At the microe-
conomic level, individuals may form social ties in anticipation of future economic 
benefits, or as a result of economic interaction. At the aggregate level, the regional 
distribution of social ties is a result of decisions of individuals about where to live, 
and these decisions are endogenous to economic incentives. Identifying a causal link 
between social ties and economic outcomes thus requires (i) the identification of 
'real friends', i.e. social ties that formed without regard to future economic benefits, 
and (ii) some exogenous variation in the regional distribution of these exogenously 
formed social ties. In this paper we use the fall of the Berlin Wall as a natural ex-
periment, which enables us to overcome both of these difficulties by exploiting two 
peculiar features of Germany's post-war history. First, the partition of Germany 
was generally believed to be permanent, so that individuals maintaining social ties 
across the inner-German border must have done so for purely non-economic reasons. 
Second, the pattern of wartime destruction in West Germany made it temporarily 
much more difficult to settle in some parts of West Germany than in others, pre-
cisely during the period during which millions of refugees and expellees from the 
East arrived in the West. 
We find that West German regions which (for exogenous reasons) received a 
larger inflow of expellees from East Germany before the construction of the Berlin 
Wall have significantly stronger social ties to East Germany in 1989 and exhibit sub-
IThe work in this chapter was carried out jointly with equal share by Tarek A. Hassan and me. 
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stantially higher growth in income per capita after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This 
economic expansion is associated with a rise of the returns to entrepreneurial activity 
and with an increase in the share of the population who are entrepreneurs. More-
over, firms which are headquartered in West German regions which have stronger 
social ties to East Germany in 1989 are more likely to operate a subsidiary or a 
branch in eastern Germany today. In addition, West German households who have 
a relative in East Germany in 1989 experience a persistent rise in personal income 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The household level effects explain only around one 
sixth of the aggregate level effects, suggesting strong spill-over effects. We interpret 
these findings as evidence of a causal link between social ties and regional economic 
development in West Germany. 
The first key advantage of the natural experiment surrounding German reuni-
fication is the fact that the fall of the Berlin Wall was largely unexpected. After 
the physical separation of the two German states in 1961, private economic ex-
change between the two Germanys was impossible.2 Social ties that West Germans 
maintained with East Germans during this period were then kept up for purely 
non-economic reasons, as individuals on both sides of the border did not expect an 
economic re-integration. On November 9th 1989, these social ties suddenly took on 
economic value: after the fall of the Berlin Wall, trade between the two Germanys 
became feasible, following more than three decades of isolation. The result was a 
boom in economic exchange between West and East.3 In this situation, East Ger-
mans had valuable local information about demand conditions and about the quality 
of the assets that were offered to investors. However, they were largely unable to 
borrow (indeed, until the mid-1990s many did not know whether they owned their 
own homes) and lacked experience of the rules and norms of behavior in a capitalist 
economy. West Germans, on the other hand, had these capacities but lacked the 
requisite local knowledge. To the extent to which social ties facilitate economic ex-
change, social ties between East and West Germans thus suddenly took on economic 
value on the day of the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
In our analysis we work with aggregate data on the share of individuals with 
social ties to East Germany.4 This dataset shows that there was substantial vari-
ation in the share of individuals with social ties to the East across West German 
regions. The second key advantage of the natural experiment surrounding German 
reunification is that much of this variation has its roots in the idiosyncrasies of Ger-
2In fact it had been highly restricted as far back as the late 1940s. 
3 Moreover, almost the entire East German capital stock was sold to private investors between 
1990 and 1994. This boom was fueled by large transfers from West to East. These included both 
direct and indirect government transfers. For example, the East German Mark was converted to 
the Deutsche Mark at several times its market value. See (Sinn and Sinn, 1992, p. 51) and Lange 
and Pugh (1998), respectively. 
4This measure of social ties thus captures bilateral ties. We are therefore not able to test 
network-theoretical models of social ties. 
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many's post-war history. Indeed, we show that West German regions which received 
a large inflow of refugees and expellees from East Germany between 1945 and 1961 
tend to have significantly stronger social ties to the East in 1989.5 However, the 
assignment of refugees and expellees from the East to West German regions might 
not be random, as individuals may have moved to those regions in which they saw 
the best prospects for themselves and their families. In particular, an overwhelming 
concern for those arriving from the East after 1945 was the acute housing crisis 
in West Germany, which persisted until the early 1960s. This crisis resulted from 
the fact that during World War II, 32% of the West German housing stock was 
destroyed. The expellees and refugees arriving from the East were thus channeled 
predominantly into areas in which there was relatively more intact housing, i.e. to 
the areas that were least destroyed during the war. 
Variation in wartime destruction which temporarily made it more difficult to 
settle in some parts of West Germany than in others thus provides the exogenous 
source of variation in the regional distribution of social ties which we need in order 
to identify a causal effect of social ties on regional economic outcomes. In particular, 
we use the degree of wartime destruction in 1945 as an instrument for the share of 
expellees settling in a given West German region. The main identifying assumption 
for our region-level results is thus that the degree of wartime destruction in 1945 
(or any omitted factors driving it) affected growth in income per capita after 1989 
only through the settlement of refugees and expellees post World War II; and that 
these groups indeed affect growth post-1989 exclusively due to their social ties to 
East Germany. 
We devote a great deal of care to corroborating this identifying assumption in 
various ways. For example, we show that wartime destruction is uncorrelated with 
pre-war population growth, that it affects post-war population growth only until the 
1960s, and that it has no effect on the growth of income per capita in West German 
regions in the years before 1989. Moreover, all of our specifications are robust to 
controlling for the growth in income per capita in the years prior to 1989. Finally, 
we show that our results are particular to expellees arriving from East Germany 
rather than to other expellees who arrived directly to West Germany, i.e. without 
settling in East Germany for some time. 
Based on this identifying assumption, we show a strong causal relationship be-
tween the intensity of social ties to East Germany and post-1989 growth in income 
per capita among West German regions: a one standard deviation rise in the share 
5'Rej'l.l.gees' are individuals who in 1939 had their primary residence in the territory that became 
the Soviet sector post-World War II and who then fled to West Germany between 1945 and 1961. 
'Expellees' are individuals who in 1939 had their primary residence in areas of the German Reich 
which became part of Poland, Russia or another country from which ethnic Germans were expelled 
post-World War II. We focus on the group of expellees who held a residence in the Soviet sector 
after the war, but migrated to West Germany between 1945 and 1961 (as did the vast majority of 
expellees who were originally allocated to the Soviet sector). 
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of expellees from East Germany settling in a given West German region in 1961 is 
associated with a 4.6% rise in income per capita over the six years between 1989 
and 1995. This is a sizable effect, amounting to around 0.7 percentage points higher 
growth per year.6 While the regional growth effect diminishes after 1995, there is no 
evidence of a subsequent reversal, so that the pattern of social ties to the East which 
existed in 1989 may have permanently altered the distribution of income across West 
German regions. 
In an effort to shed light on the mechanism linking social ties to regional eco-
nomic growth we estimate separate effects for the incomes of entrepreneurs and 
non-entrepreneurs. While both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs who live in 
regions with strong social ties to the East experience a significant rise in their in-
comes, the incomes of entrepreneurs increase at more than twice the rate of those 
of non-entrepreneurs. Consistent with this observation, the share of the population 
engaged in entrepreneurial activity rises in regions with strong social ties. 
To trace this effect of social ties on entrepreneurial activity to the behavior of 
firms, we use data on the cross-section of West German firms in 2007. We show 
that West German firms which are headquartered in a region which had strong 
social ties to the East in 1989 are more likely to operate a subsidiary or a branch 
in East Germany in 2007. In particular, a one standard deviation rise in the share 
of expellees from East Germany settling in a region before 1961 is associated with 
a 3.4% increase in the likelihood that a given firm within that region operates a 
subsidiary or branch in East Germany in 2007. Interestingly, this effect seems to 
be concentrated in the services sector, which is consistent with the view that social 
ties are particularly important in industries which rely heavily on local information. 
While social ties to East Germany predict a higher probability of investing in East 
Germany, they do not predict a higher probability of investing anywhere else in the 
world, except for a small rise in the probability of investing in Poland. This latter 
finding is notable as many of those arriving in West Germany from East Germany 
before 1961 were originally expelled from present-day Poland in 1945, then lived in 
East Germany for up to 16 years and arrived in the West before the construction of 
the Berlin Wall in 1961. 
We then estimate the effect of social ties at the household level. We show that 
West German households who report having relatives in East Germany in 1989 
experience a persistent rise in their income after the fall of the Berlin Wall: the 
income of households with at least one relative in the East rises on average by 
4.9% over the six years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. This rise in income 
again occurs immediately after 1989 and is robust to controlling for possible omitted 
6This result is robust to several different variations in the estimation strategy and cannot be 
explained by likely alternatives, such as migration from East to West in 1989 or by a decline in 
West German heavy industry in the 19908. 
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variables, such as the age, level of education, or capital income of the household head. 
Especially households headed by individuals below the age of 40 (lowest quartile of 
the age distribution) and above the age of 52 (top two quartiles) seem to profit from 
their social ties to East Germany. We also show that households profit from their ties 
to East German relatives regardless of their level of capital income in 1989, which 
is consistent with the view that households used their ties to the East primarily as 
conduits for information, rather than to facilitate borrowing. 
We interpret our results as evidence that social ties to East Germany indeed 
took on significant economic value after the fall of the Berlin Wall: West Germans 
who had ties to the East were better able to take advantage of the new economic 
opportunities in the East, possibly because they were better informed about in-
vestment opportunities than their peers. The rise in regional income seems to be 
driven primarily by an increase in entrepreneurial activity and by an increase in 
the number of entrepreneurs. Moreover, firms which had access to a workforce with 
strong social ties seem to have had a comparative advantage in investing in the East. 
Comparing the quantitative implications of our household-level and our region-level 
results suggests that there were significant spill-overs, through which households 
living in regions with strong ties to the East experience rising incomes, even if they 
themselves do not have direct personal ties to the East. 
While we believe that this paper convincingly demonstrates the relevance of 
social ties for regional economic development, there are two important caveats to 
the interpretation of our results. First, it is unclear how our results generalize beyond 
the context of a large economic transition, such as the economic re-integration of 
Germany. Social ties may be particularly useful in an environment in which markets 
are established rapidly and informational asymmetries are large. Second, we cannot 
be sure whether social ties led to an increase of economic activity at the country 
level or whether they merely resulted in a re-distribution of rents from regions with 
weaker social ties to regions with stronger social ties. However, the fact that we 
find positive spill-overs rather than crowding out at the regional level suggests that 
Germany as a whole was better off for its access to individuals with social ties. 7 
Finally, some of the patterns that we document may be explained if there remain 
unobserved cultural differences in 1989 between 'native' West Germans and the 
population of expellees and refugees who settled in West Germany post-World War 
II. We do not emphasize this interpretation, as Germans of all parts were fairly 
homogenous before the separation, sharing a common language and culture. The 
integration of the new arrivals into West German society is commonly regarded as 
one of the preeminent achievements of post-war Germany, such that people would 
71n the main part of the paper we only estimate the effects for West German districts - mainly 
due to a lack of East German data before 1989. If some of the surplus generated by social ties 
accrued to East Germans, our estimates likely underestimate the total growth effect of social ties. 
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typically not know (or care) whether their neighbors were descendants of expellees 
or refugees after the war. 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to identify the effect of social ties on 
aggregate economic outcomes and the first to trace this effect from the households 
and firms to regional economic development. Our results relate to a large literature 
which links social networks and social ties to a broad set of micro economic outcomes, 
ranging from employment (Munshi (2003), Laschever (2007), and Beaman (2008)) 
and informal insurance (e.g. Weerdt and Dercon (2006)) to performance in the fi-
nancial industry (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and 
Lu (2007), and Kuhnen (2009)) and agricultural yields (Conley and Udry (2009)). 
Since social ties have been documented to influence such a wide range of microeco-
nomic outcomes, an obvious question to ask is whether they also influence aggregate 
economic variables. While there are number of models that predict such aggregate 
effects (e.g. Rauch (1999), Rauch and Casella (2003), Kranton and Minehart (2001), 
and Ambrus, Mobius, and Szeidl (2010)), we believe our paper to be the first to pro-
vide causally interpretable evidence on this matter. 
Most closely related to our empirical work is the paper by Fuchs-Schiindeln and 
Schiindeln (2005) who use the reunification of Germany to identify the role of risk 
aversion in occupational choice. A number of other authors have used the parti-
tion of Germany as natural experiment. Redding and Sturm (2008) estimate the 
effect of market access on city growth, Alesina and Fuchs-Schiindeln (2007) esti-
mate the effect of the East German regime on voter preferences, and Bursztyn and 
Cantoni (2009) estimate the effect of exposure to West German media on consumer 
preferences. 
In using the effect of wartime destruction on the settlement of expellees in West 
Germany, we also relate to a number of papers which quantify the effect of wartime 
destruction on long-run economic development. At the aggregate level, Brakman, 
Garretsen, and Schramm (2004) find that the pattern of wartime destruction had no 
long-run impact on city growth in West Germany. Davis and Weinstein (2002) and 
Miguel and Roland (2011) show similar results for Japan and Vietnam, respectively. 
At the individual level, Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) documents a detrimental effect of 
wartime destruction on the education and health of school-age children who grew 
up in the most affected areas. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 reviews the 
historical background of wartime destruction, the partition of Germany, and the 
settlement of expellees and refugees in West Germany. Section 1.3 discusses the 
data and its construction. Section 1.4 establishes the basic relationship between 
wartime destruction and social ties to the East, and uses this relationship to identify 
a causal effect of social ties on growth in income per capita post-1989. Section 1.5 
provides evidence which suggests that entrepreneurial income and activity being the 
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main driver of aggregate income growth. In particular, section 1.5.2 documents the 
influence of social ties on the ownership structure of German firms today. Section 
1.6 looks at the relationship between social ties and income growth at the household 
level. Section 1.7 discusses possible mechanisms by which social ties might affect 
economic activity. Section 1.8 discusses our results, while the appendix contains 
additional robustness checks and details on the construction of our dataset. 
1.2 Historical Background 
1.2.1 Destruction of Housing Stock during World War II 
German cities and towns were heavily destroyed after World War II. This was mainly 
the result of Allied air raids, which began in 1940 and intensified until the final days 
of the war in 1945. These left around 500,000 dead and resulted in the destruction of 
a third of the West German housing stock, making it the most devastating episode 
of air warfare in history. 8 
In the early days of the war the Royal Air Force attempted to slow down the 
advance of the German army into the Soviet Union by destroying transport infras-
tructure. This strategy was an abject failure and was quickly abandoned, as the 
available technology at the time did not permit targeted raids. At best, the pilots 
flying the nighttime raids were able to make out that they were above a city (and 
they were often even unsure which city lay below). This led to the adoption of the 
doctrines of 'moral bombing' (1941) and of 'fire and carpet bombing', which were 
aimed at destroying the Germans' morale and ability to resist by destroying cities 
and towns (Kurowski (1977)). By the end of the war, 50% ofthe 900,000 metric tons 
of bombs deployed had hit settlements, while 17% had hit industry or infrastructure. 
The cities destroyed most during the early years of the war were those that 
were close to the British shore and easy to spot from the air, e.g. Hamburg and 
Cologne. After 1944, utilizing recent technological advances, the allies were able to 
implement fire storms, which were easiest to create in cities with highly flammable, 
historical centers, such as Darmstadt, Dresden, or Wuerzburg. Fire storms could 
typically not be implemented in cities which had already been hit by a large number 
of explosive bombs, as the rubble from earlier raids would have prevented the fire 
from spreading. This is why the cities that were attacked relatively late in the war 
(often strategically the least important) were among the most heavily destroyed. 9 
Figure 6 shows the varying intensity of destruction in West German regions. 
Note that none of our empirical results rely on this pattern being random or driven 
by certain factors. Instead, our identification strategy relies on the assumption that 
8The information presented in this section is from U.S. Govt. Print Office (1945), Kurowski 
(1977), and Friedrich (2002). 
9During a fire storm, a large section of a city catches fire, creating winds of up to 75 meters per 
second, depriving those exposed of oxygen and often sucking them into the fire. 
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the pattern of wartime destruction or any omitted factors driving it have no direct 
effect on growth in West German regions 45 years later, post 1989. 
1.2.2 The Partition and Reunification of Germany 
In 1944, as World War II entered its final phase, the UK, the US and the Soviet 
Union agreed on a protocol for the partition of pre-war Germany: The areas to the 
east of the rivers Oder and N eisse were to be annexed by Poland and by the Soviet 
Union, and the remaining territory was to be divided into three sectors of roughly 
equal population. The UK would occupy the Northwest, the US the South, and the 
Soviet Union the East. The capital, Berlin, would be jointly occupied. At the end 
of the war, the three armies took control of their sectors, and the US and Britain 
carved a small French sector out of their territory.l0 In 1949, with the onset of 
the Cold War, the three Western sectors formed the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany), and the Soviet sector became the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany). Economic exchange between the two parts of Germany became 
increasingly difficult as the East German government immediately introduced central 
planning. Only three years later, in 1952, the border was completely sealed, cutting 
any remaining legal or illegal trade links between East and West,u 
Until the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 there remained the 
possibility of personal transit from East to West Berlin, which was the last remain-
ing outlet for refugees fleeing from East to West Germany. After 1961, migration 
between East and West virtually ceased. In the following years the partition of 
Germany was formally recognized in various international treaties, and was, until 
the summer of 1989, generally believed to be permanent.12 
In September of 1989 it became apparent that a critical mass of East Germans 
had become alienated from the socialist state, its declining economic performance, 
and the restrictions it placed on personal freedom. Increasingly large public demon-
strations led to the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9th, 1989. The first 
free elections in East Germany were held in March of 1990, followed by the rapid 
political, monetary, and economic union between East and West Germany by the 
end of the same year. 
lOThis entailed a significant withdrawal of the British and US forces, who had captured much 
more territory than expected (Sharp (1975)). 
lIThe only remaining trade between the two countries was the 'Interzonenhandel' which was 
arranged between the two governments. In this system the East German government would trade 
goods and services by the barter system. In 1960 its total volume came to the equivalent of $178 
m. See Holbik and Myers (1964) for a detailed description of the Interzonenhandel. 
12The most important of these treaties was the 'Grundlagenvertrag' of December 1972 between 
East and West Germany in which both countries recognized 'two German states in one German 
nation.' Following this treaty East and West Germany were accepted as full members of the United 
Nations. 
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1.2.3 Refugees and Expellees in Western Germany, 1945-1961 
In 1945 the Polish and Soviet authorities expelled all German nationals from the 
annexed territory, so that areas which used to be German before 1939 could be 
inhabited by Polish (and Russian) nationals after 1945. While many Germans in 
these regions had fled the advancing Soviet Army, those that remained were marched 
or transported out of the annexed territories towards the four sectors. We refer to 
this group of people as 'expellees'. Germans that either originally lived in or moved 
to the countries occupied by the German army during war were also expelled in 
many cases, particularly from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. 
Expellees were registered and then assigned one of the four sectors in which to settle, 
according to quotas fixed in the Potsdam accord. 13 The authorities in turn allocated 
the expellees to the (later to become federal) states within their jurisdictions and 
assigned them quarters wherever they could find intact housing stock. 
The first wave of 5.96 million expellees arrived in the three Western sectors 
by 1946. We refer to this group as 'direct expellees'. As it became increasingly 
apparent that the division of Germany would become permanent, most of the 3.04 
million that had originally been allocated to the Soviet sector left for the West. 
These 'expellees via the Soviet sector' are critical to our empirical analysis as they 
had the opportunity to form social ties to East Germans before migrating on to 
West Germany. By 1960, the total number of expellees in West Germany had risen 
to 9.697 million, of which roughly one third were expellees via the Soviet sector.14 
In parallel, an increasing number of native residents of the Soviet sector who were 
dissatisfied with the political and economic prospects of the fledging East Germany 
fled to the West. This flow of 'refugees' peaked in the years before the construction 
of the Berlin Wall, with on average around 300,000 individuals illegally crossing 
the Border in each year between 1957 and 1961 (Hunt (2006)). By 1961 the total 
number of East German refugees settling in West Germany was 3.5 million. 
While the authorities in the western sectors, and later the West German author-
ities, had an explicit policy supporting expellees, supplying them with housing and 
various subsidies, there was very little support for refugees. In fact, as late as 1950 
the authorities actively tried to discourage refugees from entering West Germany 
on the grounds that they would exasperate an already catastrophic situation in the 
housing market and for fear of the political consequences of a de-populating East 
Germany. In practice, however, the authorities never attempted to deport refugees 
back to the East, and so refugees often made their own way in West Germany, 
13The official plan adopted by the allies in November 1945 was to expel 6.65 million Germans. 
2.75 million, were to be allocated to the Soviet sector and 2.25 million, 1.5 million, and 0.15 million 
to the American, British, and French sectors, respectively (Bethlehem (1982), p.29). 
14We are unable to determine exactly how many expellees remained in East Germany, as the 
communist government declared after 1950 that the expellees had been fully integrated into East 
German society and banned the concept from subsequent government statistics (Franzen (2001)). 
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without registering with the authorities. 15 The severe housing crises that resulted 
from the inflow of millions of migrants into the heavily destroyed Western sectors 
remained the principal determinant in the allocation of expellees and refugees to 
West German cities and towns until the late 1950s.16 
1.3 The Data 
We use data at the household, firm, district (Landkreis), and regional (Raumord-
nungseinheit) level. Districts are the equivalent of US counties. Regions are the 
union of several districts, and each district belongs to one such unit. Regions do not 
have a political function but exist exclusively for statistical purposes; in this sense 
they are analogous to metropolitan statistical areas in the US, but also encompass 
rural areas. All of our aggregate data is available at the district level, except for 
income per capita before 1995, which is available only at the regional level. Our 
primary units of analysis are thus the 74 West German regions. When we use ag-
gregate controls in our firm and household level analysis we always use data at the 
lowest level of aggregation available. 
1.3.1 Region Level Data 
Our primary proxy of social ties to the East at the region level is the share of expellees 
via the Soviet sector in 1961. The 1961 census reports the number of inhabitants 
and the number of expellees in each West German district. The census presents the 
data separately for expellees who arrived directly in West Germany in or after the 
war and those who arrived in West Germany after having registered a residence in 
the Soviet sector. From this data we created the variables Share Expellees (Direct) 
'61 and Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61.17 
For our instrumental variables strategy we coded two measures of wartime de-
struction: the share of dwellings that were destroyed in 1946, labeled Share Housing 
Destroyed '46, and the amount of rubble in cubic meters per inhabitant, labeled 
15See Bethlehem (1982, chapter 3). 
161n the early years the availability of housing was the only determinant of where the expellees 
were sent (Bethlehem, 1982, p. 29, pp.49). After 1949 economic considerations started playing a 
more important role in the allocation process and the West German government also initiated a 
number of programs encouraging migration to areas in which there was a relatively higher demand 
for labor. However, these programs remained relatively limited, with less than one in ten expellees 
participating in them. 
17This data was collected at the 1961 district level. Some West German district boundaries have 
changed between 1961 and 1989. Our analysis uses the 1989 district boundaries. To calculate 
the district level share of expellees on the basis of the 1989 district boundaries, we proceeded as 
follows: We first tracked (using Arc GIS) which share of the area of each 1961 district became part 
of which 1989 district. For example, we calculated that 71 % of what used to be district 'Mainburg' 
in 1961 became part of a district called 'Kelheim' in 1989, and the remaining 29% became part 
of the 1989 district 'Freising'. Assuming that the expellees were distributed homogenously across 
space within districts in 1961, we calculate the number of expellees living in each 1989 district. 
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Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.). Both measures are from the 1946 edition of the annual sta-
tistical publication of the German Association of Cities. This data is reported at 
the city level for the 199 largest West German cities and towns. We also coded the 
number of inhabitants of these towns in 1939 and 1946 from this volume. We aggre-
gated the data on wartime destruction by calculating the mean destruction across 
cities in a district or region, weighted by the cities' population in 1939. Additional 
details on the data sources used are given in Appendix A.3. 
Our data on income per capita is from the German 'Mikrozensus', an annual, 
obligatory random survey of one percent of the population. We aggregated the 
individual income data to the region level for every second year between 1985 and 
2001. Income per capita at time t is labeled Income t (p.c.). As the 'Mikrozensus' 
does not identify districts prior to 1995, an aggregation to districts was not possible. 
We also used the 'Mikrozensus' to construct the average income of entrepreneurs 
(Income (p.c.) Entrepreneurs t), the average income of all others (Income (p.c.) 
Non-Entrepreneurs t), as well as the share of entrepreneurs amongst the respondents 
(Share Entrepreneurs t) for each region. From the same source we obtained data 
on the share of the population working in the manufacturing sector in 1989 (Share 
Working in Manufacturing '89) and the share of the population that migrated to the 
region from the East in the years 1991, 1993 or 1995 (Migration from East '91- '95). 
As an additional control we calculated the distance of the center of each district or 
region to the former inner German border from GIS data (Distance to East (1 00 
km)). 
1.3.2 Firm Level Data 
Our firm level data is from the 2007 edition of the ORBIS dataset. This source 
contains data on some 750,000 firms in West Germany and their subsidiaries and 
branches both in Germany and abroad, including information on the postal code 
of the firms' headquarters and of their associated subsidiaries and branches. We 
used this information to match each firm to the West German district in which its 
headquarters are located. We selected all firms which have at least one subsidiary 
or branch in a West German district other than the district of the headquarters 
(N = 19,420). As a simple measure of firms' investment activity in different parts 
of the world, we created a dummy variable for whether the firm has a subsidiary or 
branch in location x (S. f1 B. in x (Dummy)), made up of separate variables for 
'East Germany', 'Poland', the 'Old EU Countries', the 'New EU Countries (exclud-
ing Poland)' and for 'Non-EU Countries' ('Old EU Countries' refers to the 14 EU 
member countries other than Germany prior to enlargement in 2004). For the same 
set of firms we computed the share of firm's subsidiaries and branches in location x 
as a fraction of its total number of subsidiaries and branches in location x and West 
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Germany (Share of Total S. & B. in x). As proxy for the size of the firm we use the 
number of subsidiaries and branches it operates in West Germany (S. & B. in West 
Germany). Finally, we used the NACE code given in the ORBIS dataset to define 
four sectoral fixed effects (agriculture, manufacturing and construction, trade and 
service, and government). 
1.3.3 Household Level Data 
Our household level data is from the German Socia-Economic Panel (SOEP), which 
is an annual panel of German households. From the panel we selected households 
which participated in the 1985, 1989, and 1995 waves, and used information on 
household income in the years 1985-2001 (Income (SOEP)), the amount of capital 
income in 1989, and the age and years of education (including professional education) 
of the household head. We also created dummies for the primary occupation and 
gender of the household head. IS 
Importantly, the SOEP questionnaire asked in 1991 whether the respondent had 
any relatives in the other part of Germany. From this information we constructed 
our measure of social ties at the household level (Ties to Relatives '91), which is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one individual in the household had a relative 
in the other part of Germany. We also aggregated this variable to the region level by 
calculating the share of households with ties to East Germany in each West German 
region (Share Ties to Relatives '91), which we use as a secondary measure of social 
ties. Lastly, we created a dummy variable indicating households whose household 
head was an entrepreneur in 1989 (Entrepreneur '89). 
1.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Panel A of Table 1 presents the data on West 
German regions; here, the second and third columns divide the sample into regions 
with a higher and lower share of housing destroyed in 1946 than the median region. 
The first row of column 1 gives the mean and the standard deviation of the share 
of expellees via the Soviet sector in 1961, while the second column gives the mean 
and standard deviation for regions with below median levels of wartime destruction. 
Expellees via the Soviet sector made up 4.8% of the 1961 population in the average 
region. Similarly, expellees that came directly to West Germany made up 11.9% 
of the average region's population in 1961 (row 2), and 22.3% of the population 
report having relatives in East Germany in 1991 (row 3). In all three cases, these 
shares are higher in regions that suffered lower levels of wartime destruction. The 
variation in wartime destruction is considerable, with 15.4% of housing on average 
18Details of how we aggregated data on individuals to the household level are given in Appendix 
A.3. 
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destroyed in regions with low destruction and 49.3% in regions with high destruction 
(row 4). Moreover, regions which are closer to the inner-German border tended to 
be less destroyed than those that are further away (row 6). The pattern in income 
per capita is interesting: while regions with lower wartime destruction are slightly 
poorer in 1985 and 1989, they are slightly richer than the average region in 1995. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the data on West German firms in 2007, split up 
by regions above and below the median level of wartime destruction. On average, 
firms in regions with lower wartime destruction are slightly smaller as measured by 
the number of subsidiaries they operate in West Germany (row 1). Nevertheless 
they are also more likely to operate a subsidiary or branch in the East (8.3% versus 
7.2%). On average, 7.7% of the firms in our sample operate a subsidiary or a branch 
in East Germany (row 3) and 1.8% operate in non-EU countries. 
1.4 Social Ties and Regional Economic Growth 
We first explore the effect of social ties between West and East Germans on income 
growth in West German regions. The structural equation of interest is 
( 
Yr,t ) , log -- = /3sr,1989 + ¢ log Yr,1989 + Z/: + Cr 
Yr,1989 
(1) 
where Yr,t is income per capita in region r in year t, t E {1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001}. 
The left hand side variable is thus the growth in income per capita between 1989 
and subsequent census years. Sr,1989 denotes our measure of social ties in region r. 
Zr is a vector of controls, which always contains a constant term, a complete set of 
federal state fixed effects, and the distance between district r and the inner-German 
border. The coefficient of interest is /3, which measures the effect of social ties on 
growth in income per capita after 1989. In all specifications we control for income 
per capita in 1989. The coefficient ¢> thus measures the degree of mean reversion in 
income per capita between West German districts. In our standard specification we 
also control for the pre-existing growth trend by including the log of growth between 
1985 and 1989, log (Yr,1989/Yr,1985)' In these specifications the coefficient /3 thus esti-
mates the differential change in the growth rate of income per capita after 1989 for 
regions with different levels of intensity of social ties to the East. The assumption 
that the relationship between growth in income per capita and social ties is linear 
is made for simplicity. The error term Cr captures all omitted influences, including 
any deviations from linearity. Throughout, standard errors are calculated using the 
Huber-White correction to ensure robustness against arbitrary heteroscedasticity. 
Equation (1) will consistently estimate the parameter of interest if Cov (Sr,1989, cr) = 
O. This covariance restriction may not, however, hold in practice, since the settle-
ment of expellees in West Germany prior to 1961 (and thus the strength of social ties 
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to East Germany) may be correlated with persistent differences in growth prospects 
across regions. Although we show results of Ordinary Least Squares estimates of 
equation (1) for reference and comparison, we primarily rely on an instrumental 
variables strategy, which uses only the variation in Sr,1989 that is attributable to 
variation in wartime destruction across regions in 1946. Our first-stage specification 
is 
(2) 
where Wr is our measure of wartime destruction and (2) contains the same covariates 
as (1). Our key identifying assumption is that Cov (wn cr) = o. It states that, 
conditional on the covariates we control for, (i) wartime destruction in 1946 has no 
effect on changes in growth in income per capita after 1989 other than through the 
settlement of expellees via the Soviet sector and (ii) there is no omitted variable 
which drives both wartime destruction and differential changes in income growth 
post-1989. 
1.4.1 The First-Stage Relationship 
Panel A of Table 2 shows our basic first-stage regressions, using the share of expellees 
via the Soviet sector in 1961 as a proxy for social ties in 1989. Column 1 is the 
most parsimonious specification as shown in equation (2). It regresses the share 
of expellees via the Soviet sector on the share of housing destroyed in 1946, while 
controlling for the distance to the inner-German border and for income per capita in 
1989. The coefficient estimate of -0.019 (s.e.= 0.004) is statistically highly significant 
and suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the share of housing destroyed 
in 1945 (s.d.= 0.21) is associated with a 0.4 percentage point drop in the share of 
expellees via the Soviet sector in 1961. (This corresponds to 8% fewer expellees via 
the Soviet sector relative to the mean share of expellees via the Soviet sector across 
regions.) 19 
As expected, the share of expellees in 1961 falls with the distance to the inner-
German border. The coefficient on income in 1989 is positive and significant, sug-
gesting that expellees tended to settle in districts that were richer in 1989, which 
is most likely attributable to persistent differences in income per capita between 
regions which existed prior to 1961.20 
19We do not have reliable data on the settlement patterns of refugees arriving from the Soviet 
sector during the same period. However, since both groups faced similar constraints regarding the 
shortage of housing, the settlement pattern of refugees across West German regions was likely very 
similar to that of expellees arriving from the Soviet sector. As both groups were roughly of the 
same size (around 3.5 million) we may speculate that a one standard deviation increase in wartime 
destruction may be associated with a drop in the total share of migrants from the East settling in 
a given West German region which is around twice as large. 
20Income per capita in 1989 is included in all specifications to present the first stage corresponding 
to the instrumental variables results discussed below. If we drop all controls from the regression, 
the estimated coefficient is identical, -0.019, s.e.=0.OO7. 
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The specification in column 2 is our standard specification. It adds income 
growth in the five years prior to 1989 as an additional control. The coefficient 
of interest remains virtually unchanged at -0.020 (s.e.= 0.005). The coefficient 
on income growth is statistically indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the 
pattern of settlement of expellees via the Soviet sector in 1961 is not correlated with 
income growth in the years prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Figure 1 plots the conditional relationship estimated in this column and shows 
that the first-stage relationship is not driven by outliers. Columns 3-6 of Panel 
A of Table 2 show the first-stage regressions corresponding to robustness checks 
performed in the instrumental variables estimation. In column 3 we use the volume 
of rubble per capita in 1946 as an alternative measure of wartime destruction, which 
again yields a negative and significant coefficient. In column 4 we replace our control 
for the distance to the inner-German border with a fixed effect for each distance 
quartile and in column 5 we add the share of the workforce employed in agriculture, 
manufacturing, services, and government in 1989 (in both cases we do not report 
the coefficients on these variables for expositional clarity). Finally, column 6 adds 
the extent of migration after reunification as an additional control. In each case the 
coefficient of interest remains virtually unchanged and statistically significant at the 
1 % level. 
Panel B of Table 2 repeats the same specifications as in Panel A, using the share 
of households with ties to relatives in East Germany in 1991 from our household level 
dataset as an alternative proxy for social ties in 1989. In the interest of preserving 
space we show only the coefficient of interest. All estimates are negative and all 
except the ones in column 3 and 4 are statistically significant at the 5% level (the 
latter is significant at 10%). The coefficient in column 1 is -0.099 (s.e.= 0.042). It 
implies that a one standard deviation rise in the share of housing destroyed in 1945 
is associated with a 2.08 percentage point drop (or alternatively a 9.3% drop relative 
to the average) in the share of respondents that have a relative in East Germany in 
1991. Similar results (not shown) hold for the share of respondents that report to 
be in contact with friends in East Germany. In the remainder of the paper we use 
the share of expellees via the Soviet sector in 1961 as our main proxy for social ties 
since, coming from a comprehensive census, we expect it to be measured with less 
error than the variables generated from our household level dataset. Needless to say, 
the correlation between the two proxies is very high (64%), as shown in Figure 2. 
1.4.2 The Reduced Form Relationship 
As a prelude to our instrumental variables estimates, Panel C shows the reduced 
form relationship between growth in income per capita after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and wartime destruction. All specifications (except the one in column 3) are 
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again identical to the ones in Panels A and B, with the left hand side variable now 
being the growth in income per capita between 1989 and 1995, log (Yr'1995). The 
Yr,1989 
coefficient of interest is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in all 
columns except in column 1, where it is significant at the 10% level. The estimate in 
column 2 is -0.048 (s.e.= 0.020), suggesting that regions which were least destroyed 
during the war experienced a significantly higher increase in the growth rate of 
income per capita post 1989 than regions which were most destroyed during the 
war. A one standard deviation drop in the share of housing destroyed in 1946 is 
associated with a 1.5 percentage point higher growth in income per capita over the 
six years following German reunification. The size of the estimated coefficient is 
stable across columns 1, 2 and 4-6, with point estimates ranging from -0.042 in 
column 1 to -0.052 in column 4. Figure 3 depicts this relationship graphically in 
a conditional scatter plot, where the slope shown corresponds to the estimate in 
column 2.21 
As a first test of the mechanism by which wartime destruction could suddenly 
affect economic growth 50 years later, the specification in column 3 includes both 
the share of housing destroyed in 1946 and rubble per capita in 1946. The results 
are encouraging for our identification strategy: while the coefficient on the share 
of housing destroyed remains negative and significant at -0.060 (s.e.= 0.027), the 
coefficient on rubble per capita is positive and insignificant. This pattern suggests 
that it is primarily the lack of housing in 1946 and not wartime destruction per se 
that affects economic growth post 1989. 
1.4.3 Instrumental Variables Results 
In our instrumental variables estimation we explicitly test the main hypothesis of 
this paper: that the intensity of social ties between East and West Germans in 1989 
is causally related to a rise in the growth rate of income per capita after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall. In Table 3, we estimate (1) using only the variation in the social 
ties in 1989 that is due to variation in wartime destruction, by instrumenting for 
the share of expellees via the Soviet sector in 1961. In column 1 we instrument with 
the share of housing destroyed in 1946. The coefficient estimate for the share of 
expellees is 2.169 (s.e.= 0.947), suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in 
the share of expellees in 1961 (s.d.= 0.019) is associated with a 4.3% rise in income 
per capita over the six years following 1989 (or roughly a 0.7 percentage point higher 
21In the plot, Wilhelmshaven looks like a significant outlier. Dropping Wilhelmshaven from the 
sample reduces the coefficient estimate to -0.033 (s.e. = 0.016). As a more systematic check for 
the effect of outliers, we run a robust regression (according to the terminology used by STATA) in 
which observations with a Cook's D value of more than one are dropped and weights are iteratively 
calculated based on the residuals of a weighted least squares regression. The robust estimate is 
-0.032 (s.e. = 0.014). 
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rate of growth per annum).22 The coefficient on income in the base year, 1989, is 
negative and significant, which suggests mean reversion in income per capita across 
West German districts. Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on the distance to 
the inner-German border is positive, which suggests that the districts closest to the 
inner-German border did not immediately profit from the opening of the border 
(which is in line with a similar observation in Redding and Sturm (2008), that the 
population of West German cities close to the inner-German border grew relatively 
little between 1989 and 2002). 
Column 3 gives our standard specification in which we control both for the level 
of income in 1989 and for income growth in the five years preceding 1989. The 
coefficient of interest rises slightly to 2.442 (s.e.= 0.880) and is now significant at 
the 1 % level. 23 The fact that we control for both for the pre-existing income level 
and for pre-1989 income growth means that this estimate is specific to the period 
after the fall of the Berlin wall: It can neither be explained by mean reversion in 
income growth nor by a pre-existing trend. 24 
The results of column 3 are almost unchanged when we simultaneously instru-
ment the share of expellees with both the share of housing destroyed and with rubble 
per capita (shown in column 4). Column 2 shows the OLS estimate of our standard 
specification for comparison. It is only about one half of a standard error lower at 
1.963 (s.e.= 0.574), suggesting that the endogenous assignment of expellees to West 
German districts induces only a relatively mild downward bias in the OLS estimate. 
A Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis that Cov (Sr,1989,Cr) = o. 
1.4.4 Validity of the Exclusion Restriction 
While the endogenous assignment of expellees to West-German districts does not 
seem to have a large impact on our results, our identifying assumption, that the 
degree of wartime destruction in 1945 affected growth in income per capita after 
1989 only through its effect on the intensity of social ties in 1989, cannot be tested 
directly. Nevertheless, we can perform a number of falsification exercises to assess 
its plausibility. There are two types of potential challenges and corresponding tests. 
22The F -statistic against the null that the excluded instrument is irrelevant in the first-stage 
regression is 22.56 (this is the squared t-statistic from Table 2). 
23We do not cluster the standard errors at the federal state level as there are only 10 federal 
states. However, the results presented throughout this section are generally robust to doing so. For 
our standard specification the clustered standard error is 1.288, which implies that the coefficient 
of interest remains statistically significant at the 10% level. 
24Since our model contains a lagged dependent variable there may be a mechanical bias in the 
coefficient of interest. In principle we can instrument for the lagged dependent variable as suggested 
by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). However, we do not have sufficient pre-1989 data to do this for the 
specification in column 3. However, we can use income in 1985 as instrument for income in 1989 
in the specification of column 1. The coefficient estimate increases slightly to 2.289 (s.e.=0.984) 
and remains significant at the 5% level. 
1 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOCIAL TIES 31 
Simple Challenge The 'simple' challenge to our identifying assumption is that 
wartime destruction (or an omitted variable driving it) may have had a lasting 
effect on income growth in West German regions which persisted for more than half 
a century (until 1995). We believe that we can convincingly discard this 'simple' 
challenge. 
First, our standard specification controls for the growth rate of income pre-1989 and 
thus identifies changes in the region-specific growth trajectory that occur after 1989. 
Second, the conventional view in the literature is that wartime destruction had 
no lasting impact on West German growth post 1960 (Brakman, Garretsen, and 
Schramm (2004)). Figure 4 replicates part of this result. It shows coefficient esti-
mates of regressions relating the population growth in West German cities to wartime 
destruction in 1946 for various years since 1929. Not surprisingly, wartime destruc-
tion had a strong and significant negative effect on population growth during the 
war (between 1939 and 1945). During the period of reconstruction between 1946 
and 1960 the cities most heavily destroyed grew fastest. However, from 1960 on-
wards there is no statistically significant effect of wartime destruction on population 
growth and the coefficient estimates are virtually zero. To the extent that popula-
tion growth is correlated with income growth, this result suggests that the effects of 
wartime destruction on income growth were short lasting. 
Third, for the short period pre-1989 for which we have income data we find that 
growth in income per capita is uncorrelated with wartime destruction and with the 
settlement of expellees. Panel B of Table 3 shows a placebo experiment in which we 
use income growth between 1985 and 1989 as the dependent variable rather than 
as a control. All specifications are parallel to those in Panel A (except that we now 
control for log income per capita in 1985 rather than in 1989 and no growth trend, 
since we do not have the data). In all specifications in the panel the coefficient 
of interest is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Wartime destruction thus 
becomes relevant for economic growth only post 1989. In Table 14 we pinpoint the 
timing of the effect at a higher frequency by regressing log income per capita for 
each district and year post-1985 on the interaction of year fixed effects with the 
share of expellees in 1961. The table shows no effect of the settlement of expellees 
on income growth rates prior to 1989, a positive effect in all years post 1989 and 
a statistically significant effect on growth between 1989 and 1993 and later years. 
The timing of the effect is thus highly supportive of the view that variation in the 
degree of wartime destruction only became relevant after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Sophisticated Challenge The more 'sophisticated' challenge to our identifying 
assumption is that the pattern of wartime destruction (or some omitted variable 
driving it) affected income growth through some other channel which only switched 
on post-1989. 
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One such possibility is that the allies may have bO{fibed areas that were highly 
industrialized and the manufacturing sector may have experienced a relative decline 
in those areas after 1989. To address this potential concern, the specification in Table 
3 column 5 controls for the sectoral composition of the workforce in 1989. Indeed, 
the estimated coefficient on the share of the workforce employed in manufacturing is 
negative, but it is not statistically significant and the coefficient of interest rises only 
marginally to 2.772 (s.e.=O.854). Any variation in income growth post 1989 due to 
the relative decline of manufacturing is thus unrelated to the variation in income 
growth post-1989 due to the settlement of expellees in West Germany. In addition, 
Figure 4 shows that wartime destruction was uncorrelated with pre-war population 
growth. To the extent that we can take pre-war population growth as an indicator 
for economic growth more generally, this would suggest that allied bombings during 
World War II were not specifically targeted at destroying cities which were on a 
higher or lower growth trajectory. 
Another potential concern is that after 1989 highly skilled workers from East 
Germany may have migrated to the same districts in which their relatives settled 
before 1961, and that this migration may have increased the average wage paid in 
these districts. In column 6 we control for the flow of migration from East to West, 
and again there is little effect on the coefficient of interest.25 
While neither of these two channels appear to be driving our results, there might 
be other omitted variables which are correlated with the pattern of wartime destruc-
tion and post-1989 deviations from the existing growth trajectory. Alternatively, we 
may be misinterpreting our results in that expellees may affect income growth af-
ter 1989 through some channel other than social ties, which switches on post-1989. 
In particular, expellees might have been somehow different from other Germans, 
and these different traits (a higher propensity to become an entrepreneur,different 
preferences, etc.), may have put them in an advantageous position to earn higher 
incomes post 1989 for reasons unrelated to social ties to the East. We are able 
to provide evidence on this, and the entire class of 'sophisticated' challenges, by 
comparing the expellees via the Soviet sector with expellees who arrived directly 
from the annexed parts of pre-war Germany. The direct expellees migrated from 
the same areas in Eastern Europe, they look very similar to expellees via the So-
viet sector on observable characteristics, and their settlement pattern was affected 
by wartime destruction in a similar way. The only relevant difference between the 
two groups is that expellees who arrived directly from the annexed areas did not 
spend any significant time living (and forming social ties) in East Germany. If we 
misinterpret our results and the effects we document are driven by some omitted 
25When we use the flow of migration from East Germany as the dependent variable, the coefficient 
on expellees is not significant, which is comforting for our interpretation of the results. A related 
result in the literature is that high-skilled workers from the East were actually less likely to migrate 
to the West than low-skilled workers up until 1996 (Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2009». 
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variable which determined both wartime destruction and post 1989 income growth, 
or if there was something special about expellees per se that gave them access to 
business opportunities post-1989, we would expect to find the same effects for both 
the expellees via the Soviet sector and the direct expellees.26 
As a prelude to our placebo test, Table 15A compares both groups of expellees 
using data from the 1971 census, the last census in which the two groups are sepa-
rately identified. The table gives the average income, the average number of years 
of schooling, and the occupational structure of both groups of expellees and of the 
'native' West German population. While both groups of expellees look different 
from native West Germans (they are slightly poorer, slightly less educated, and 
significantly less likely to be entrepreneurs), they look remarkably similar to each 
other. Expellees via the soviet sector have an average income of DM 777.8 and 
on average 9.69 years of schooling, direct expellees an average income of DM 764.4 
and on average 9.63 years of schooling; Both groups have an identical share of en-
trepreneurs among them (3%) and a very similar occupational structure. Expellees 
via the Soviet Sector and direct expellees are thus extremely similar on observable 
characteristics. 
In Appendix Table 15B we show that the same is true for the 1989 character-
istics of the regions in which the two groups of expellees settle. The table reports 
regressions of district characteristics in 1989 on the share of both groups of expellees 
in 1961 and our standard region level controls (distance to east, income in 1989, in-
come growth between 1985 and 1989, and state fixed effects). Each line of the table 
corresponds to one regression. It reports the dependent variable, the coefficients 
on the two groups of expellees, as well as the p-value corresponding to the null hy-
pothesis that the two coefficients are equal. We cannot reject this hypothesis at the 
5% level in any of the seven specifications. However, it appears that regions with 
a larger share of direct expellees also tend to have a somewhat larger share of the 
workforce emplyed in the agricultural sector (here the p-value is 5.9%). With this 
possible caveat, there do not appear to be any systematic differences between the 
regions in which the two groups settle. 
In our placebo experiment we relate growth in income per capita post 1989 
simultaneously to the share of expellees via the Soviet Sector and to the share of 
direct expellees, again conditinal our standard region level controls. The results are 
in Table 4. Column 1 gives the results from an OLS regression. While the coefficient 
on expellees via the Soviet Sector is positive, statistically significant at the 1 % level, 
and very similar to the estimates from Table 3 (2.131, s.e.=0.706), the coefficient 
on the share of direct expellees is negative and statistically indistinguishable from 
26Recall from our discussion in section 1.2 that expellees were allocated to the four sectors 
according to quotas and that, as far as we can tell from the statistics published in East Germany, 
the vast majority of expellees who were allocated to the Soviet sector migrated to the West before 
1961. 
1 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOCIAL TIES 34 
zero. In columns 2 and 3 we add additional controls for the share of the population 
in agriculture (column 2) and for the share or the population employed in the other 
three sectors (column 3), which makes little difference to the results. 
In columns 4-6 we repeat this exercize using our instrumental variables strategy. 
To compare the causal effect of direct expellees and expellees via the Soviet sector 
on income growth post 1989 we require two instruments which give us differential 
leverage in identifying the exogenous components in the settlement patterns of both 
groups. In Panels Band C we re-run our standard first-stage regression from Table 2 
column 2, but include both the share of housing destroyed and the volume of rubble 
per capita in 1946. (We again do not report covariates in the interest of space.) 
Panel B gives the results for expellees arriving via the Soviet sector and Panel C 
gives the results for expellees arriving directly in West Germany. In the case of the 
former, the share of housing destroyed is significant with a negative sign and rubble 
is insignificant across all three specifications. In the case of the latter, the size of the 
effect of the share of housing destroyed is roughly preserved, though it is less precisely 
estimated. Importantly for us, the coefficient on the amount of rubble is negative 
and significant. Our two measures of wartime destruction thus give us differential 
leverage in identifying the exogenous components in the settlement patterns of both 
groups. We believe that this feature of the data is related to the timing of the 
arrival of the two groups of expellees. The direct expellees arrived immediately 
after the war, whereas the expellees via the Soviet sector arrived between 1945 and 
1961. We therefore suspect that rubble per capita measures a dimension of wartime 
damage which was more important in the immediate aftermath of the war but was 
then cleared away relatively quickly, while the destruction of the housing stock had 
longer-lasting effects. 27 
Using both instruments, we are thus able to separately estimate the causal effects 
of expellees via the Soviet sector and of direct expellees on differential income growth 
after 1989. Columns 1-3 of Panel A present the results. While the coefficient on 
the share of expellees who arrived via the Soviet sector is again positive, similar in 
magnitude to the estimates obtained earlier (3.422, s.e.= 1.809 in column 1), and 
statistically significant at the 10% level, the coefficient on the share of direct expellees 
is close to zero and statistically insignificant. The growth effects we document are 
thus particular to expellees who had lived in the Soviet Sector and thus particular to 
the group which uniquely had the opportunity to form social to East Germans before 
moving to the West. As the two groups of expellees look extremely similar in other 
dimensions, we view these results as strong support in favor of our interpretation. 
27M any German cities famously have 'rubble mountains' which were piled up in the first two to 
three years after the war. 
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1.4.5 Remaining Caveats 
A remaining caveat to our results is that they are also consistent with two prox-
imate interpretations which we do not emphasize due to our reading of German 
history. First, the results might document the value of 'local knowledge' about East 
Germany. In principle, the effects we document could be driven by individuals who 
lived in East Germany during their youth, do not have personal contact with any-
one there, but remember enough details about the local economy to earn rents after 
reunification. We do not emphasize this interpretation as the conventional view is 
that economic conditions in East Germany have changed dramatically between 1961 
and 1989, so that local knowledge acquired before the division of Germany would 
be useless after 40 years of socialist rule. Moreover, our individual-level results show 
that even households headed by individuals who were too young to remember liv-
ing in East Germany experience a rise in their personal income after 1989 if they 
have a relative in the East, providing some partial evidence against this alternative 
interpretation. 
Second, some of the rise in household and regional income may be driven by 
restitutions and payments of compensation to those whose property had been ex-
propriated in East Germany. Under the reunification treaty, former owners of firms 
and real estate could apply for restitution providing that they had not received 
compensation from the East German government and the assets they were claiming 
still existed at the time of filing a claim. This meant that practically all individual 
claims made related to buildings and land. While there were a large number of 
claims filed (around 2 million), we do not believe that restitution or compensation 
payments could be responsible for the patterns we document in the data. 
The administrative backlog created by the task of tracing ownership rights over 
a period of 50 years was so enormous that it was not sufficiently cleared in time 
to confound the effects we document (in fact, the authorities and courts are still 
processing claims to the present day). The first compensation payments were not 
set to begin until 1996, whereas the effects we document begin immediately after 
1989 (Southern (1993)). The only real concern is thus the existence of cases in which 
the filing of a claim resulted in the restitution of a property prior to 1995, and the 
restitution of this property resulted in a rise in income. The early restitutions were 
mainly of firms, as the establishment of safe property rights for productive assets 
was a political priority (although even these were the subject of protracted legal 
battles, so that in 1992, 90% of claims concerning firms were still on hold due to 
litigation; see Sinn and Sinn (1992)). 
We address this concern by calculating an upper bound for the value of all resti-
tutions that could possibly have been made in the period in question and comparing 
it to the magnitude of the effects that we attribute to social ties. According to the 
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government agency handling restitutions, half of all approved claims had been set-
tled by restitution, and the total sum of compensation payments made between 1990 
and 2009 was EUR 1.4 bn.28 These compensation payments were made at about 
50% of market value, and so a reasonable estimate of the value of all restitutions is 
therefore EU~.!.4bn =EUR 2.8bn. Assuming that all restitutions had been completed 
before 1995 (which they were not) and assuming that the new owners immediately 
sold the returned assets on (which they were often legally prevented from doing), 
aggregate income in West Germany could thus have risen at most by EUR 2.8bn. 
This number is an order of magnitude smaller than the total effect implied by our 
regional level results (around EUR 74.0 bn in 1989 equivalents of Euros). 
1.5 Understanding the Effect on Regional Economic Growth 
1.5.1 Entrepreneurial Activity 
In an effort to shed light on the channel linking social ties to regional economic 
growth, we disaggregate regional income per capita into the average income of house-
holds whose primary income derives from entrepreneurial activity (entrepreneurs) 
and the average income of all other individuals (non-entrepreneurs) for each year.29 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 we re-run our standard specification from column 3 
in Table 3 with the growth rate in the average income of entrepreneurs and non-
entrepreneurs as the dependent variables. Both specifications include the same 
covariates as our standard specification, but add the (log of the) average income 
of entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in 1989, respectively, as an additional con-
trol. The coefficient estimate is 4.008 (s.e.= 2.096) for entrepreneurs (column 1) 
and 1.755 (s.e.= 0.735) for non-entrepreneurs (column 2); suggesting that a one 
standard deviation rise in the share of expellees via the Soviet sector is associated 
with a 7.6% rise in the average income of entrepreneurs, but only a 3.3% rise in 
the average income of non-entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs who lived in a region with 
strong social ties to the East thus experienced a much steeper rise in their average 
income than non-entrepreneurs living in the same region.3o 
This strong effect on the income of entrepreneurs is mirrored by an increase in the 
number of entrepreneurs. In column 3 we re-run our standard specification but use 
28Personal correspondance with Dr. Handler, press liaison of the Bundesamt fuer zentrale Dien-
ste und offene Vermogensfragen. 
29In the German Mikrozensus these are households whose household heads declare that their 
primary occupation is 'entrepreneur' (Selbststaendiger mit oder ohne Beschaeftigte). 
30In order to determine whether these two coefficients are significantly different from each other 
we re-estimate the two equations as well as the first stage jointly with a 3SLS estimator. In this 
case the coefficient of interest in column 1 rises to 4.920 (s.e.= 1.657) and is significant at the 1% 
level. In column 2 the coefficient of interest is estimated to be 1.451 (s.e.= 0.665) and significant at 
the 5% level. In these specifications we control for the (log of the) average income of entrepreneurs 
and non-entrepreneurs in 1989 in both structural equations of interest and the first stage. The null 
of equality of these coefficients is rejected at the 5% level. 
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the share of the population that are entrepreneurs in 1995 as the dependent variable, 
where we again add the share of the population that are entrepreneurs in 1989 as 
an additional control. The coefficient of interest is 0.322 (s.e.=0.163), suggesting 
that a one standard-deviation rise in the share of expellees in 1961 (0.019) induces 
a 0.61 percentage point rise in the share of the population which are entrepreneurs. 
This is a sizable effect, corresponding to a 14.2% rise relative to the mean share of 
entrepreneurs in 1989 (0.043). 
1.5.2 Firm Investment 
The strong rise in entrepreneurial income in regions with strong social ties to the 
East suggests that firms which were based in these regions generated higher profits 
in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall. One possible reason for such a 
rise in profitability is that locating in a region with strong social ties to the East 
may have generated a comparative advantage in investing in the East. Firms who 
had access to a workforce or to an owner with strong social ties to the East may 
have been in a better position to assess the value of East German firms that came 
up for sale or may have been better able to gage demand for Western products and 
services. We explore this possibility by examining the holdings of subsidiaries and 
branches of West German firms in the East. 
Our firm level data is from 2007, which is the year in which the ORBIS dataset 
expands coverage to small and medium sized German firms. We have data on 19,402 
firms whose headquarters are located in West Germany and who operate at least 
one subsidiary or branch. For these firms we calculate a dummy variable which is 
one if the firm operates a subsidiary or branch in East Germany and zero otherwise. 
Since West German firms could not own assets in East Germany prior to the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, any subsidiaries or branches that they operate in 2007 must have 
been acquired after 1989. Our dummy variable is thus informative both about the 
investment behavior of West German firms in East Germany since 1989 and about 
a possible long-lasting effect of social ties in 1989 on the economic structure of West 
Germany. 
The structural equation of interest is 
bkdr,2007 = {3! Sdr,1989 + qi log Yd,1989 + Z~dr( f + C{dr (3) 
where bkdr,2007 stands for the dummy indicating whether firm k in West German 
district d and region r operates a subsidiary or a branch in East Germany in 2007. 
Sdr,1989 is again our measure of social ties between the residents of district d in 
region r and East Germany in 1989; Yr,1989 stands for income per capita in region 
r in 1989; and Zkdr is a vector of firm and district level controls which contains a 
complete set of federal state fixed effects, a fixed effect for the sector in which the 
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firm has its primary operations, the log of the number of subsidiaries and branches 
that firm k operates in West Germany, and the distance between district d and the 
inner-German border. Note that income per capita in 1989 is available only at the 
regional level and not at the district level. 
The coefficient of interest is {3! which measures the effect of the intensity of 
social ties to the East in a given West German district in 1989 on the probability 
that a firm headquartered within that district operates a subsidiary or branch in 
East Germany in 2007. As in section 1.4, we account for the possibility that our 
measure of social ties (the settlement of expellees via the Soviet sector in West 
Germany) is jointly determined with income growth by instrumenting Sdr,1989 with 
the share of housing destroyed in 1946. The first stage of our instrumental variables 
strategy is thus the analog to (2). We cluster all standard errors at the district level 
to account for likely spatial correlation. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows reduced form estimates, relating the share of housing 
destroyed in 1946 directly to the probability that a given firm operates a subsidiary 
or branch in East Germany in 2007. In column 1, we regress our dummy variable 
on the share of housing destroyed in the district and the log of the number of 
subsidiaries and branches that the firm operates in West Germany in 2007, which 
we use as a simple control for the size of the firm.31 The coefficient of interest is 
-0.030 (s.e.=O.Oll) and statistically significant at the 1 % level. The estimate implies 
that a one standard deviation rise in the extent of wartime destruction within a given 
West German district is associated with a 0.7% drop in the probability that a firm 
based in that district operates a subsidiary or branch in East Germany in 2007.32 
Unsurprisingly, the coefficient on our size control is positive and significant, refecting 
the fact that larger firms also are more likely to operate in East Germany. Columns 
3-6 add all of the now familiar district and region level covariates from section 
1.4, and column 3 gives the analog of our standard specification. Throughout, the 
coefficient of interest remains in a tight range between -0.029 and -0.031 and is 
statistically significant at 1%. 
Panel B shows our instrumental variables estimates of equation (3), which use 
the variation in wartime destruction to quantify the causal effect of social ties in 
1989 on the investment behavior of West German firms. All specifications contain 
the same covariates as those in Panel A. The estimates in all columns are positive 
and all are statistically significant at the 5% level. The estimate from our standard 
specification in column 3 is 1.556 (s.e.= 0.693), which implies that a one standard 
deviation rise in the share of expellees in a West German district is associated with 
a 3.4% increase in the probability that a firm based in that district will operate a 
31The raw correlation between our dummy variable and the share of housing destroyed is -0.019 
(s.e.=0.012) and statistically significant at the 10% level. 
32The standard deviation of the share of housing destroyed at the district level is 0.24. 
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subsidiary or a branch in East Germany in 2007.33 This link between the pattern 
of social ties in 1989 and the investment behavior of West German firms offers a 
potential explanation for why residents of districts with strong social ties to the 
East, and entrepreneurs in particular, may have experienced a rise in their incomes. 
The increased firm level activity also suggests potential spill-over effects of social 
ties, i.e. residents of districts with strong social ties to the East might experience a 
rise in income even if they themselves did not have social ties to the East. We return 
to this issue in the following section where we calculate the size of such potential 
spill-over effects. 
The remaining panels of Table 6 show the results of a number of falsification 
exercises. If the pattern in holdings of subsidiaries and branches prevailing in 2007 
is truly attributable to the intensity of social ties to East Germany in 1989, and 
not to some other factor, our measure of social ties to East Germany should predict 
investment in East Germany but not in other areas of the world.34 Panels C-F 
repeat the same specifications as in Panel B, but with a dummy variable indicating 
whether a firm has subsidiaries or branches in Poland, in the 'old' EU countries 
(the 14 member countries other than Germany prior to the enlargement in 2004), 
in the 'new' ED countries (the 9 countries, other than Poland, which joined the 
EU in 2004), or in non-ED countries as the dependent variable. As expected, all 
estimated coefficients in Panels D, E and F are statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. Firms which are based in districts with a high share of expellees are thus not 
more likely to operate subsidiaries or branches in areas other than East Germany. 
Interestingly, however, the only exception from this rule is that the estimates for 
Poland are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in all columns. The 
estimated effect for Poland is about 1/5th the size of the effect estimated for East 
Germany. Since the largest group of expellees who settled in West Germany after 
1945 actually came from areas that are today part of Poland, these results suggest 
a possible additional effect of social ties to Poland on the investment behavior of 
West German firms.35 36 
33The district level standard deviation of the share of expellees via the Soviet sector is 0.022. 
34If firms from districts with a high fraction of expellees were merely good at capitalizing on 
new business opportunities, regardless of social ties, we might, for example, expect to see an 
effect on their holdings in other Eastern European countries following consecutive rounds of EU 
enlargement. 
35 However , the size of the coefficient for Poland is similar to that of some of the other, insignificant 
coefficients. 
36Table 16 in the appendix reports the outcomes of additional robustness checks, in which we 
repeat the same specifications as in panels A and B of Table 6, but now use the share of each firm's 
subsidiaries and branches operated in East Germany as the dependent variable. The results are 
again similar, indicating that firms which are headquartered in West German districts that have 
strong social ties to East Germany in 1989 also operate a larger share of their subsidiaries and 
branches in East Germany today. 
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1.6 Social Ties and Household Income 
Lastly, we explore how individual households may have profited from having ties 
to East Germany and how these ties may have affected regional economic growth. 
We use the German Socia-Economic Panel (SOEP) dataset and select households 
which were in the panel in 1985, located in West Germany in 1989 and remained in 
the panel at least until 1995. The 1991 wave of the panel contains several questions 
about contacts with friends and family in East Germany. Since the survey was 
conducted in the second year after the fall of the Berlin Wall and individuals had 
some time to renew ties with individuals in the other part of Germany, we choose 
not to rely on information about the intensity of contact to friends and relatives, 
although it is available.37 Instead, we base our work on the response to the simple 
factual question: "Do you have relatives in East Germany?" , and generate a dummy 
variable that is one if at least one member of the household responded with 'yes' and 
zero otherwise. A possible source of measurement error is that some West Germans 
may have migrated to East Germany directly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
before the conclusion ofthe 1991 wave ofthe survey. However, our data indicate that 
the flow of migrants from West to East in 1990 was not large enough to plausibly 
induce a quantitatively large bias. It is thus safe to assume that households which 
were based in West Germany in 1989 and report a relative in East Germany in 1991, 
also had a relative in East Germany in 1989. 
Table 8 gives summary statistics for the entire panel of 1911 households, and 
for the subsets of households which report and do not report any ties to relatives in 
East Germany. The households with ties to East Germany had slightly lower income 
in 1989 (DM 3219 versus DM 3491 per month in 1989) and the household heads 
of households with ties to East Germany tend to have had slightly less education 
(on average 12.12 years versus 12.42 years). However, the two subsets of households 
look very similar on other observable dimensions: they had about the same amount 
of capital income on average, and the proportion of households whose head was 
reported as entrepreneur was similar across the two subsets, as was the proportion 
reported as unemployed. 
Our basic household level regression estimates the growth in household income 
that results from having social ties to East Germany in 1989: 
1 ( Yi,t) f3hhT. hh 1 ' hh og -- = i + cf> OgYi,1989 + Zi( + Ci, Yi,1989 (4) 
where Yi,t is the income of household i in year t, Ii is a dummy variable indicating 
ties to East Germany and Zi is a vector of controls which contains a full set of district 
37 Our results are very similar if we use this information on friendships or condition on respondents 
indicating 'close' ties to their relatives or friends. 
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fixed effects, household income growth between 1985 and 1989, and the gender, age 
and age squared of the household head. The coefficient of interest is {3hh which 
estimates the effect of ties to relatives in East Germany on the growth in household 
income after 1989. 
Before estimating (4), Table 9 establishes the consistency of our household level 
and region level datasets. Column 1 reproduces the standard specification from 
Table 3 column 3, in which we related region-level income growth to the share of 
expellees in the district in 1961, regional average income in 1989, regional average 
income growth prior to 1989, and the distance of the region to the inner-German 
border. In column 2, we regress household level income growth on the same region 
level covariates, as well as on household level income in the base year and household 
level income growth between 1985 and 1989. The coefficient estimate on share 
expellees is insignificant, but remarkably similar to the one we obtained in the 
district level dataset, 2.777 (s.e.= 3.609). The fact that the estimate is statistically 
insignificant is not surprising as we are now using a sample of 1911 households, 
rather than district averages of 1% of the population. However, it is comforting 
that both datasets seem to have similar quantitative implications in this regard. 
In column 3 we drop the region level share of expellees variable and replace it with 
a household level dummy variable indicating ties to East Germany. The estimate 
is positive and highly statistically significant, 0.069 (s.e.= 0.025). However, our 
dummy variable indicating ties to East Germany is mechanically correlated with 
the average level of social ties in a given district. The coefficient estimate in column 
3 may therefore confound the direct (household) effect of having ties to the East 
with possible spill-over effects from other households in the same region having social 
ties. 
We therefore introduce a full set of region fixed effects in column 5, which absorb 
the region wide effect of a higher incidence of social ties. Additionally we control for 
gender, age and age squared of the household head (which are standard controls in 
the labor literature) and estimate the full model in (4). The coefficient of interest 
drops to 0.049 (s.e.= 0.023) and remains statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The point estimate indicates that households with ties to East Germany in 1989 
experienced on average a 5 percentage points higher income growth in the 6 years 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall relative to comparable households without such 
ties. 
For specification (4) to consistently estimate the coefficient of interest we require 
cov eli, Ci) = O. As social ties existing prior to 1989 must have been maintained for 
reasons unrelated to any expected economic benefit, this condition does not fail due 
to reverse causality. However, it may still fail if individuals with social ties have 
some omitted characteristics which affect income differently after 1989 as compared 
to before 1989 and are correlated with social ties. In particular, individuals with 
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social ties might somehow be more entrepreneurial or better educated, and therefore 
better able to seize the economic opportunities that present themselves after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall.38 The summary statistics in Table 8 suggest the opposite: the 
heads of households with social ties to the East were actually slightly less educated 
and were somewhat less likely to be an entrepreneur in 1989. We control for these 
observable characteristics in our robustness checks discussed below. 
In Table 10 we add a number of additional covariates (again this table only re-
ports the coefficient of interest and the coefficients on the variables that are added 
relative to the standard specification). Column 1 reproduces the standard specifi-
cation for comparison. Column 2 adds years of education and years of education 
squared of the household head in 1989, both of which remain statistically insignif-
icant. Column 3 adds the log of capital income in 1989 as a proxy for the house-
hold's ability to finance investments. The variable is positive and significant, but 
induces little change in the coefficient of interest which remains at 0.047 (s.e.= 
0.023). Column 4 introduces a dummy variable for whether the household head 
is an entrepreneur. Surprisingly, this variable remains insignificant, and again in-
duces almost no change in the coefficient of interest. Finally, in column 5 we add a 
dummy for household heads who are not in employment in 1989 and column 6 adds 
all of these additional covariates simultaneously. Throughout, the changes in the 
coefficient of interest are minor and it remains statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
In Figure 5 we explore the timing of the effect by again using the full panel 
structure of the data in a specification analogous to Table 14 column 1.39 We 
regress the income of each household in a given year on its income in 1985, a full 
set of year and district fixed effects, the interaction of year effects with the dummy 
variable indicating ties to East Germany in 1991, and controls from our standard 
specification (gender, age and age squared). The figure plots the interaction of 
year fixed effects with the dummy for ties to relatives in 1991, and identifies a 5% 
confidence interva1.4o These interactions measure the differential income growth of 
households with social ties to the East between 1985 and the indicated year. The 
pattern is striking: the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero until 
1989, when the estimates jump up and are mostly statistically significant at the 5% 
38 A second reason why the estimation might be inconsistent is that we include a lagged de-
pendent variable, which might be correlated with an auto-correlated error. We cannot perform 
Arellano-Bond style estimation as we do not have enough pre-1989 data. However, when running 
a specification in which we control for the household income in 1989, but not for the pre-existing 
growth trend, we can instrument for household income in 1989 with household income 1985. When 
running a specification equivalent to column 5 in Table 9, but without controlling for growth be-
tween 1985 and 1989, the coefficient of interest is estimated to be 0.049 (s.e.=0.023). When instru-
menting for household income in 1989 with household income in 1985 the coefficient of interest is 
estimated to be 0.038 (s.e.=0.022) and significant at the 10% level. 
39 Although we use a standard fixed effects estimator as all of our covariates are exogenous 
40The sample size is decreases monotonically from 1911 in 1995 to 1419 in 2001. 
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level until 1995. All coefficients after 1989 are statistically significant at the 10% 
level until the end of the sample in 2001. 
Lastly, we can check that our results are robust to potentially confounding resti-
tutions of assets from the East. The claimants who were likely to have received 
their assets by 1995, the year on which we focus in our analysis, are those whose 
claim related to a firm. If we re-run our standard specification in Column 5 of Table 
11, dropping all households that state not to own productive assets in 1989, but 
state to own productive assets in 1995, the coefficient drops only very slightly to 
0.047 (s.e.= 0.023).41 The household level results are thus robust to excluding the 
subgroup of observations that could plausibly have benefited from restitutions prior 
to 1995. This adds to the evidence presented in section 1.4.4 that restitutions are 
unlikely to drive our results. 
1.6.1 Cohort Heterogeneity 
Our sample contains only 596 households with ties to the East. Nevertheless, we 
are able to give some further evidence on why the income of individual households 
increased after 1989. In Table 11, we estimate our standard specification, but inter-
act the dummy for ties to East Germany with a fixed effect for the age quartile of 
the household head (and naturally also add fixed effects for each age quartile on the 
right hand side). The coefficient estimate for the youngest age quartile (those aged 
below 40 in 1989) is positive and significant at the 10% level, 0.092 (s.e.= 0.051). 
This is particularly interesting as it indicates that the effect we estimate is about 
knowing people and not about knowing places: the household heads in this group 
were younger than 11 years old at the time when the Berlin Wall was built and thus 
could not have had much personal experience of living in East Germany. However, 
they could easily have kept in contact with their relatives in East Germany. 
1.6.2 East German Households 
We have presented evidence on the returns to social ties accruing in West Germany. 
Naturally, we are interested in the corresponding effects in East Germany. Due to a 
lack of data on the settlement of expellees and on outcome variables prior to 1990, 
we cannot replicate our region level results for East Germany. However, we can 
replicate part of our standard specification in column 5 of Table 9 for households 
in East Germany. In particular, Table 17 shows results for a regression relating 
log income of East German households in the years after German reunification to 
a dummy variable indicating relatives in West Germany in 1991 and all household 
level covariates of column 5 in Table 9 other than income in 1989 and pre-1989 
41 A total of 57 households in our sample acquired productive assets between 1989 and 1995, 17 
of which had relatives in East Germany. 
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income growth. As we have no data on income before 1990 for East German house-
holds, this specification can only speak to differences in levels of income, rather 
than to differences in income growth. Nevertheless, we find that the estimate on the 
coefficient of interest is positive in all years between 1990 and 1995 and marginally 
significant in two of the six years (1992 and 1994). For example, the estimate for 
1995 is 0.057 (s.e.=0.040) suggesting that East German households with ties to the 
West tend to have higher income than those without ties to the West. 
1.6.3 Spill-over Effects 
The household level effect we estimated in this section is economically large. How-
ever, it is not large enough to account for the size of the entire region level effect of 
social ties estimated in section 1.4. Since the district level standard deviation of the 
share of households with social ties to the East is 0.10 (see Table 1), a one standard 
deviation rise is thus associated with at most a 0.7 percentage point rise in income 
per capita at the region level (Table 9, column 3). To the extent that the variation 
in the level of social ties in 1991 is driven by variation in the share of expellees (re-
call that the correlation between our two measures of social ties is very high), a one 
standard deviation rise in the share of households with relatives in East Germany 
corresponds to the same variation as a one standard deviation rise in the share of 
expellees in a district. However, a one standard deviation increase in the share of 
expellees in 1961 was associated with a 4.3 percentage point rise in district level 
income. The two estimates suggest a spill-over effect by which households without 
ties profit from living in a district with strong ties to the East. 
This spill-over is consistent with the view that firms which were based in regions 
with strong social ties had an advantage in investing in East Germany, which resulted 
in increased wage levels in those West German districts. The presence of spillovers 
might also imply that social ties have an economic value even at the second or third 
degree of separation, where a household (and entrepreneurs in particular) might 
profit from having a social tie to another household who has a social tie to East 
Germany. 42 
1.7 Understanding the Microeconomic Effects 
While we were able to provide a range of evidence suggesting that social ties fa-
cilitated regional economic growth by generating a rise in entrepreneurial activity, 
a deeper question is why social ties matter at the individual level. Two potential 
channels linking social ties to economic performance at the microeconomic level are 
that (i) social ties may reduce informational asymmetries (Granovetter (1973), Var-
42 A novel by Schulze (2005) presents an example of such interaction at the second degree of 
separation. 
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ian (1990), Stiglitz (1990)) and (ii) social ties may sustain a large range of credit 
contracts that would otherwise not be feasible (Besley and Coate (1995)). In our 
context, possible examples of these stories might be (i) a West German who hears 
from his East German cousin about the lack of second hand cars in East Germany 
and reacts by starting a local car dealership in the East or (ii) a wealthy West Ger-
man who lends his own money or acts as a guarantor for a East German relative 
who otherwise would not have access to funds. 
One way to gauge the relevance of the first mechanism is to test whether social 
ties are particularly beneficial for firms in sectors in which informational frictions 
are important. In Table 7 we return to the standard specification of our firm level 
analysis (Table 6, Panel B, column 3) and replace the share of expellees variable with 
its interaction with each of the four sectoral fixed effects included in the specification 
(instrumenting these variables with the interactions of the sectoral fixed effects and 
the share of housing destroyed in 1946). The estimated effects in the Primary, Gov-
ernment, and Manufacturing sectors are statistically insignificant, while the effect 
estimated for the Trade and Services sector is positive and statistically significant 
at the 5% level (0.962, s.e.= 0.449). We may interpret this as evidence that so-
cial ties were particularly important for firm investment in the Trade and Services 
sector, which is arguably the sector of the economy which is most susceptible to 
informational asymmetries and reliant on knowledge of local demand.43 
We may evaluate the relevance of the second channel by testing whether the 
West German households who had the highest ability to fund or act as guarantors 
for projects in the East were also the ones to benefit most from their social ties to the 
East. Column 1 of Table 12 replicates the standard specification of our household 
level results from Table 9, column 5 (again reporting only the coefficient of interest). 
In columns 2-4 we add a dummy which is one if the household's capital income in 
1989 is above the pth percentile (75th, 95th and 99th, respectively) as well as the 
interaction of this variable with our dummy for social ties. If the principal function 
of social ties was to enhance households' ability to enter into credit contracts we 
would expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be positive. In column 2 the 
point estimate on our social ties dummy drops marginally to 0.46 (s.e.=0.026) and 
remains significant at the 10% level. The dummy indicating top-quartile capital 
income in 1989 is estimated to have a positive, but insignificant significant effect 
on post reunification growth in household income (0.046, s.e.= 0.028). However, 
the interaction of social ties and the above-median wealth dummy is insignificant. 
Columns 3 and 4 show similar results, using the 95th and 99th percentile. This 
evidence suggests that West German households benefited from their ties to East 
Germans regardless of their wealth in 1989 and, consequently, that social ties may 
431t would be interesting to disaggregate this estimate for a finer partition of the trade and 
services sector. Unfortunately this is not possible with the data available. 
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have acted mainly as conduits for information rather than a form of 'social' collateral 
which would serve to sustain credit contracts. 
1.8 Discussion 
In this paper we used evidence from German reunification to establish a causal link 
between social ties and regional economic development. West German regions which, 
for idiosyncratic reasons, have strong social ties to East Germany at the time of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall exhibit substantially higher growth in income per capita in 
the early 1990s. This effect on regional economic growth appears to be driven both 
by a rise in the profits accruing to entrepreneurs and by an increase in the share of 
the population engaging in entrepreneurial activity. Consistent with these findings, 
we show that firms headquartered in a West German district which has strong ties 
to East Germany in 1989 are more likely to operate a subsidiary or a branch in East 
Germany today, suggesting that the pattern of social ties which existed in 1989 may 
thus have had a lasting effect on the pattern of economic activity in West Germany. 
We also show that West German households who have a relative in East Germany in 
1989 experience a persistent rise in their personal income after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall. While this rise is economically large, it accounts for only about one sixth of 
the rise in income per capita at the region level, suggesting positive spill-over effects, 
through which households living in regions with strong ties to the East experience 
rising incomes even if they themselves do not have direct personal ties to the East. 
Our findings appear robust to a wide range of plausible variations in the esti-
mation strategy and placebo treatments. However, while we interpret these results 
as implying that social ties affect regional economic development, this interpreta-
tion is subject to two important caveats. First, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that social ties merely served to re-distribute rents between regions with stronger 
and weaker social ties to the East, rather than increasing economic output at the 
country level. However, since our results suggest that there were positive spill-overs 
from households with social ties to those households without such ties at the re-
gional level, it is unclear why we should expect crowding out at higher levels of 
aggregation. Second, it is unclear how our findings generalize beyond the historical 
context of a large economic transition, such as the economic re-integration of Ger-
many. While our results may be informative about the economic effects of social ties 
maintained by migrants and diasporas in other parts of the world, social ties might 
be particularly useful in an environment in which markets are established rapidly 
and informational asymmetries are large. 
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A Appendix 
A.I Tables 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS (REGION AND FIRM LEVEL DATA) 
(1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A: Region Level Data All Low Destr. High Destr. 
Share Expellees (Soviet sector) '61 0.048 0.049 0.047 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.015) 
Share Expellees (Direct) '61 0.119 0.143 0.095 
(0.045) (0.041) (0.036) 
Share Ties to Relatives '91 0.223 0.235 0.211 
(0.100) (0.114) (0.085) 
Share Housing Destroyed '46 0.321 0.154 0.493 
(0.210) (0.108) (0.141) 
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) 0.090 0.037 0.144 
(0.070) (0.033) (0.056) 
Distance to East (l00km) 1.753 1.504 2.010 
(1.075) (1.071) (1.046) 
Income 1985 (OM, p.c.) 1598 1568 1628 
(126) (140) (104) 
Income 1989 (DM, p.c.) 1761 1747 1775 
(131) (147) (114) 
Income 1995 (OM, p.c.) 2222 2227 2218 
(154) (166) (143) 
Migration from East '91-'95 0.005 .006 0.004 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) 
N 71 35 36 
PANEL B: Firm Level Data All Low Destr. High Destr. 
S. & B. in West Germany (log) 0.443 0.437 0.450 
(0.742) (0.729) (0.756) 
Share of Total S. & B. in East Germany 0.026 0.028 0.024 
(0.103) (0.107) (0.098) 
S. & B. in East Germany (Dummy) 0.077 0.083 0.072 
(0.267) (0.275) (0.259) 
Share of Total S. & B. in Non-EU Countries 0.006 0.006 0.006 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
S. & B. in Non-EU Countries (Dummy) 0.Q18 0.018 0.017 
(0.131) (0.134) (0.129) 
N 19420 9726 9694 
Notes: The table presents means (and standard deviations). Variables in Panel A refer to our 
sample of regions used in Tables 2, 3, 4, 65, 14 and 15. Variables in Panel B refer to our sample 
of firms used in Tables 6, 7 and 16. Column 1 shows data for all observations. In Panel A, 
columns 2 and 3 show data for regions in which the share of housing stock destroyed was below 
the median and above median, respectively. In Panel B, columns 2 and 3 present means and 
standard deviations for firms headquartered in regions with share of housing stock destroyed 
above and below the median, respectively. Column 4 shows p-values of a t-test of equality of 
the means in column 2 and 3. The term 'S&B' stands for subsidiaries and branches which firms 
headquartered in a given West German region operate in the indicated location. Monetary values 
are given in nominal Deutsche Mark. See data appendix for details. 
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TABLE 2: WARTIME DESTRUCTION, SOCIAL TIES, AND INCOME GROWTH 
PANEL A: First Stage 
Share Housing Destroyed '46 
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) 
Distance to East (l00km) 
Income 1989 (p.c., log) 
Income '89/'85 (p.c., log) 
Migration from East '91-'95 
R2 
PANEL B: First Stage (altern.) 
Share Housing Destroyed '46 
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) 
PANEL C: Reduced Form 
Share Housing Destroyed '46 
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) 
N 
Distance Dummies 
Sector Controls 
(1) 
-0.019*** 
(0.004) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.042*** 
(0.012) 
0.918 
-0.099** 
(0.042) 
-0.042* 
(0.021) 
71 
no 
no 
(2) (3) (4) 
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.047*** 
(0.013) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
0.920 
-0.102** 
(0.043) 
-0.048** 
(0.020) 
71 
no 
no 
-0.021 *** 
(0.005) 
-0.044*** 
(0.013) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.043*** 0.046*** 
(0.014) (0.014) 
-0.020 -0.028 
(0.024) (0.026) 
0.905 0.989 
Share Ties to Relatives '91 
-0.095* 
(0.050) 
-0.161 
(0.146) 
Income '95/'89 (p.c., log) 
-0.060** 
(0.027) 
0.046 
(0.071) 
71 
no 
no 
-0.052** 
(0.020) 
71 
yes 
no 
(5) 
'61 
-0.021*** 
(0.004) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.025* 
(0.015) 
-0.029 
(0.026) 
0.931 
-0.102** 
(0.041) 
-0.058*** 
(0.020) 
71 
no 
yes 
48 
(6) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.047*** 
(0.013) 
-0.026 
(0.024) 
-0.006 
(0.212) 
0.920 
-0.101 ** 
(0.047) 
-0.047** 
(0.020) 
71 
no 
no 
Notes: Coefficient estimates from Ordinary Least Squares regressions at the regional level. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. The standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White correction to account for potential heteroscedasticity. 
The main variable of interest in all columns except column 3 is the share of the region's 1939 housing stock which was 
destroyed in 1946. In column 3 the main variable of interest in panel A and B is the amount of rubble per capita in the 
region in 1946. In column 3 of panel C both of these variables are included. The dependent variable in panel A is our main 
proxy for the intensity of social ties to East Germany - the share of the region's 1961 population which are expellees who 
had arrived from the Soviet sector. The dependent variable in panel B is our alternative measure of the intensity of social 
ties to the East: the share of the population which states in the 1991 SOEP survey to have relatives in East Germany. 
In Panel C the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the region's mean per capita income in 1995 and 1989. All 
regressions include 10 federal state fixed effects. All specifications in panel B and C include the same controls as show in 
panel A. The coefficient estimates on these are suppressed for expositional clarity. The additional control in column 4 is 
the share of the population working in manufacturing in 1989. The additional control in column 5 is the number surveyed 
individuals who migrated to the region in the years 1991, 1993 and 1995 from East Germany as a share the total surveyed 
population (we do not have data for 1992 and 1994). 
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TABLE 3: SOCIAL TIES AND INCOME GROWTH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(IV) (OLS) (IV) 
PANEL A: Main Results Income '95/'89 (p.c., log) 
Share Expellees (Sov. S.) '61 2.169** 1.963*** 2.442*** 2.453*** 2.526*** 2.772*** 2.366*** 
(0.947) (0.574) (0.880) (0.877) (0.885) (0.854) (0.878) 
Distance to East (100km) o.on** 0.008** o.on** o.on** 0.012*** 0.011** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Income 1989 (p.c., log) -0.267"** -0.189"** -0.209* .... -0.209 ...... -0.212 ...... -0.305*'" -0.206*** 
(0.068) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.072) (0.062) 
Income '89/'85 (p.c., log) -0.362*'" -0.355*'" -0.355*** -0.379"'* -0.278*'" -0.353 ... • 
(0.083) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.083) (0.087) 
Sh. Employed in Agricult. '89 -0.115 
(0.295) 
Sh. Employed in Manufact. '89 -0.301 
(0.283) 
Sh. Employed in Services '89 0.145 
(0.290) 
Sh. Employed in Governm. '89 -0.522 
(0.397) 
Migration from East '91-'95 0.349 
(1.130) 
R2 0.505 0.598 0.590 0.589 0.567 0.642 0.593 
PANEL B: Placebo Income '89/'85 (p.c., log) 
Share Expellees (Sov. S.) '61 0.656 0.560 0.557 0.672 0.443 0.790 
(0.602) (1.024) (1.029) (0.939) (1.100) (1.041) 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Distance Dummies no no no no yes no no 
Instruments Housing Housing Housing Housing Housing Housing 
& Rubble 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from instrumental variable regressions at the regional level in columns 1 and 
3 through 7. Column 2 reports results from an Ordinary Least Squares regression. Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
The standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White correction to account for potential heteroscedasticity. In Panel 
A the dependent variable is in all regressions the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1995 and 1989. In Panel B 
it is the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1989 and 1985. The main variable of interest in all columns is the 
share of the region's 1961 population which are expellees who had arrived from the Soviet sector. In column 1, 3, 5,6 and 
7 we have instrumented for this with the share of the region's 1939 housing stock which was destroyed in 1946. In column 
4 we use the amount of rubble per capita in 1946 as additional instrument. First stage results are shown in Table 2. All 
regressions include 10 federal state fixed effects. In Panel A all regressions control for the log of mean per capita income 
in 1989 and columns 2-7 include the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1989 and 1985 as control. In Panel 
B all regressions control for the log of per capita income in 1985. All regressions except column 5 control for a region's 
distance to the former East German border. Column 5 controls for 4 distance dummies, corresponding to the quartiles of 
the distance measure. The regression shown in column 6 controls for the share employed in four sectors in 1989 and the 
regression shown in column 7 controls for the number of regional immigrants from East Germany in the years 1991, 1993 
and 1995 (we do not have data for 1992 and 1994). In Panel B we do not report results for these covariates for expositional 
clarity. 
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TABLE 4: PLACEBO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PANEL A: Income '95/'89 (p.c., log) 
(OLS) (IV) 
Share Expellees (Sov. S.) '61 2.131 *** 2.150*** 2.039*** 3.422* 3.396* 2.943* 
(0.706) (0.727) (0.561) (1.809) (1.787) (1.738) 
Share Expellees (Direct) '61 -0.092 -0.099 -0.043 -0.350 -0.371 -0.065 
(0.150) (0.161) (0.155) (0.624) (0.660) (0.698) 
Sh. Employed in Agricult. '89 0.047 -0.028 0.139 -0.114 
(0.193) (0.304) (0.272) (0.297) 
Sh. Employed in Manufact. '89 -0.197 -0.316 
(0.252) (0.308) 
Sh. Employed in Services '89 0.240 0.121 
(0.253) (0.333) 
Sh. Employed in Governm. '89 -0.452 -0.535 
(0.429) (0.413) 
R2 0.600 0.600 0.664 0.557 0.561 0.640 
Instruments - - - Housing Housing Housing 
& Rubble & Rubble & Rubble 
PANEL B: First Stage Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) 0.002 0.001 -0.002 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
PANEL C: First Stage Share Expellees (Direct) '61 
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) 
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) -0.107** -0.106** -0.104** 
(0.046) (0.045) (0.051) 
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Standard Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: Panel A of the table reports coefficient estimates from instrumental variable regressions at the regional level in 
columns 4 through 6. Columns 1 through 3 report results from Ordinary Least Squares regressions. Standard errors 
are given in parentheses. The standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White correction to account for potential 
heteroscedasticity. In Panel A the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1995 and 1989. 
The main variables of interest are the share of the region's 1961 population which are expellees who had (i) arrived from the 
Soviet sector or (ii) came directly to West Germany. We instrument for these variables with the share of the region's 1939 
housing stock which was destroyed in 1946 and the amount of rubble per capita across the cities of a region in 1946. The 
first stage regressions corresponding to the instrumental variable regression in column 4-6 of Panel A are given in columns 
4-6 of Panel Band C. All regressions control for a region's distance to the former East German border, the log of mean 
per capita income in 1989 and the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1989 and 1985. All regressions include 10 
federal state fixed effects. Coefficient estimates for these controls are not shown for expositiona.I clarity. 
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TABLE 5: SOCIAL TIES AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY 
Share Expellees (Sov. S.) '61 
Income Entrepreneurs '89 (p.c., log) 
Income Non-Entrepreneurs '89 (p.c., log) 
Share Entrepreneurs '89 
R2 
N 
Standard Controls 
(1) (2) 
Income '95/'89 (p.c., log) 
Entrepreneurs I Non-Entrepreneurs 
4.008* 
(2.096) 
-0.657*** 
(0.194) 
0.578 
71 
yes 
1.755** 
(0.735) 
-1.940*** 
(0.535) 
0.662 
71 
yes 
51 
(3) 
Share 
Entrepreneur 1995 
0.322* 
(0.163) 
0.496*** 
(0.104) 
0.794 
71 
yes 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from instrumental variable regressions at the regional level. Standard errors 
are given in parentheses. The standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White correction to account for potential 
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of the ratio of mean per capita income of entrepreneurs in 
1995 and 1989. The dependent variable in column 2 is the log of the ratio of mean per capita income of non-entrepreneurs in 
1995 and 1989. The dependent variable in column 3 is the share of individuals who report in 1995 to be entrepreneur. The 
main variable of interest in all columns is the share of the region's 1961 population which are expellees who had arrived from 
the Soviet sector. We instrument for this with the share of the region's 1939 housing stock which was destroyed in 1946. 
First stage results are shown in Table 2. All regressions control for a region's distance to the former East German border, the 
log of mean per capita income in 1989 and the log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1989 and 1985. All regressions 
include 10 federal state fixed effects. Coefficient estimates on these controls are not reported for expositional clarity. For 
details on the construction of the variables see data appendix. When column (1) and (2) are estimated simultaneously, we 
reject the equality of the coefficients on the share of expellees via the Soviet sector (p-value= 0.034). 
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TABLE 6: SOCIAL TIES AND FIRM INVESTMENT 
PANEL A: Reduced Form 
Share Housing Destroyed '46 
S. & B. in West Germany (log) 
Distance to East (l00km) 
Income 1989 (p.c., log) 
Income '89/,85 (p.c., log) 
Sh. Employed in Manufact. '89 
Migration from East'91-'95 
PANEL B: Second Stage 
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 
PANEL C: Second Stage 
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 
PANEL D: Placebo 
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 
PANEL E: Placebo 
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 
PANEL F: Placebo 
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 
N 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
s. f3 B. in East Germany (Dummy) 
-0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.028*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
0.126 
-0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.001 0.004 0.Q17 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.031) 
0.127 
-0.016 -0.044 
(0.043) (0.048) 
0.127 
0.111 
(0.084) 
0.127 
1.579** 1.469** 1.556** 1.559** 
(0.714) (0.689) (0.654) (0.693) 
s. f3 B. in Poland (Dummy) 
0.281 ** 0.290** 0.289** 
(0.137) (0.133) (0.140) 
0.298** 
(0.145) 
s. f3 B. in Old EU Countries (Dummy) 
0.060 0.377 0.459 0.483 
(0.580) (0.527) (0.540) (0.546) 
s. f3 B. in New EU, exc. Poland (Dummy) 
0.188 0.185 0.182 0.182 
(0.206) (0.206) (0.218) (0.227) 
s. f3 B. in Non-EU Countries (Dummy) 
0.034 0.139 0.115 0.104 
(0.304) (0.276) (0.287) (0.292) 
19387 19387 19387 19387 
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(5) 
-0.031 *** 
(0.011) 
0.119*** 
(0.007) 
-0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.032) 
-0.008 
(0.044) 
-1.517 
(1.125) 
0.127 
1.616** 
(0.690) 
0.293** 
(0.137) 
0.409 
(0.534) 
0.213 
(0.213) 
0.114 
(0.277) 
19387 
Notes: All regression report firm level regression results, using our sample of firms which are headquartered in 
West Germany and have at least one subsidiary or branch in West Germany. The standard errors are clustered at 
district level to account for likely spatial correlation. Panel A reports results from firm level Ordinary Least Squares 
regressions. Panel B-F report firm level instrumental variable regression results. The main variable of interest in 
these is the district level share of expellees via the Soviet sector. We instrument for this with the share of the 
district's 1939 housing stock which was destroyed in 1946. First stage results are not reported. The dependent 
variable in panel A and B is a dummy indicating whether a firm has a subsidiary or branch in East Germany. The 
dependent variables in panels C-F indicate whether a firm has a subsidiary or branch in the specified location. All 
regressions include 10 federal state fixed effects and 4 sector fixed effects. We control for distance to the former 
East German border at the district level. Log of per capita income in 1989, log of the ratio of per capita income 
in 1989 and 1985, the share working in the manufacturing sector 1989 and the sum of migrants from the East in 
1991, 1993 and 1995 are regional level controls. All specifications in Panels B-E include the same controls as the 
respective specification in panel A. We do not report the results for expositional clarity. 
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TABLE 7: SECTOR SPECIFIC EFFECTS 
S. fj B. in East N 
Germany (Dummy) 
Expellees '61 x Agriculture 3.382 313 
(4.310) 
Expellees '61 x Services 2.142** 15521 
(0.993) 
Expellees '61 x Manufacturing 0.156 3225 
(1. 784) 
Expellees '61 x Government -2.552 361 
(2.447) 
N 19420 
Instrument Housing x Sector 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses from a firm level in-
strumental variables regression, using our sample of firms which are headquartered in West Germany 
and have at least one subsidiary or branch in West Germany. The standard errors are clustered at 
district level to account for likely spatial correlation. The main variable of interest is the interaction 
of 4 exhaustive sectorial dummies with the district level share of expellees via the Soviet sector. 
(The main effect of the share expellees via the Soviet sector is hence not included.) We instrument 
for these with the interaction of the sectorial dummies and the share of the district's 1939 housing 
stock which was destroyed in 1946. First stage results are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable 
is a dummy indicating whether a firm has a subsidiary or branch in East Germany. The regression 
includes 10 federal state fixed effects and 4 sector fixed effects. It also includes the same controls 
as the specifications in column 3 of Table 6. We do not report these results for expositional clarity. 
The second column shows the number of firms in each sector. 
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TABLE 8: HOUSEHOLD DATA 
(I) (2) (3) 
All Ties No Ties 
Age '90 51.2 51.5 50.4 
(14.6) (15.0) (13.6) 
Gender 0.29 0.33 0.22 
(0.46) (0.47) (0.41) 
Years of Education '89 12.21 12.12 12.42 
(1.84) (1.80) (1.91) 
Income 1989 (SOEP) 3304 3219 3492 
(1856) (1935) (1656) 
Capital Income '89 783 799 746 
(1729) (1867) (1378) 
Entrepreneur '89 0.046 0.045 0.047 
(0.209) (0.207) (0.212) 
Not Employed '89 0.075 0.079 0.065 
(0.263) (0.270) (0.247) 
N 1911 597 1314 
Notes: Columns 1-3 show means and standard deviations 
in parentheses for our sample of households from the SOEP 
pane\. We selected only households which were in the panel 
in all of 1985, 1989 and 1995. Income in 1989 and capital 
income in 1989 are reported in German Marks. The variables 
Entrepreneur '89 and Not Employed '89 are dummy variables 
indicating whether the household head is entrepreneur and not 
working, respectively. Column 1 shows data for all observa-
tions in our sample. Column 2 shows data for households with 
ties to relatives in East Germany. Column 3 shows data for 
households without ties to relatives in East Germany. Col-
umn 4 shows p-values of a t-test testing the equivalence of 
the means shown in column 2 and 3. See data appendix for 
details. 
54 
1 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOCIAL TIES 55 
TABLE 9: REGION AND HOUSEHOLD LEVEL INCOME 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Income '95/'89 (log) 
Level (Source) Aggregate (MZ) Household (SOEP) 
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 2.442*** 2.777 
(0.880) (3.609) 
Ties to Relatives '91 0.069*** 0.046** 0.049** 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) 
Income 1989 (p.c., log, MC) -0.209*** 0.166 0.267** 0.260* 
(0.060) (0.186) (0.126) (0.137) 
Income '89/,85 (p.c., log, MC) -0.355*** -0.649 -0.664 -0.798* 
(0.086) (0.446) (0.449) (0.450) 
Distance to East (l00km) 0.011** 0.001 -0.009 -0.008 
(0.004) (0.025) (0.016) (0.017) 
Income 1989 (log, SOEP) -0.242*** -0.248*** -0.340*** -0.338*** 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) 
Income '89/,85 (log, SOEP) -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.144*** -0.146*** 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029) 
Gender -0.157*** -0.162*** 
(0.024) (0.024) 
Age '90 -0.017*** -0.018*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
(Age '90}2 0.000** 0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.590 0.137 0.143 0.249 0.288 
N 71 1911 1911 1911 1911 
Fixed Effects State State State State Region 
Notes: Columns 1 shows results of a region level instrumental variable regression. Column 2-5 show results from 
household level regressions. In column 1 and 2 we instrument for the regional share of expellees via the Soviet sector 
with the share of the region's 1939 housing stock which was destroyed in 1946. First stage results are shown in Table 2. 
Columns 3-5 report results from Ordinary Least Squares regressions. The dependent variable in column 1 is the log of 
the ratio of per capita income in 1995 and 1989 at the regional level. The dependent variable in columns 2-5 is the log 
of the ratio of the household's income in 1995 and 1989. Columns 1 through 4 control for the same region level variables 
as column 3 in Table 3. Columns 2 through 5 control at the household level for the log of the household's income in 
1989 and the log of the ratio of the household's income in 1989 and 1985. Columns 4 and 5 control additionally for 
the gender, age and age squared of the household head. The specifications in columns 1 through 4 include 10 federal 
state fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered on the regional level, which for columns 1 through 4 coincides with 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Column 5 includes 71 region fixed effects. See data appendix for details on 
the construction of our variables. 
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TABLE 10: ROBUSTNESS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PANEL A: Full Sample Income '95/'89 (log) 
Ties to Relatives '91 0.049** 0.044** 0.047** 0.050** 0.049** 0.042* 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) 
Years of Education '89 0.043 0.032 
(0.061) (0.060) 
(Years of Education '89)2 0.000 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Capital Income '89 (log) 0.018*** 0.014*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Entrepreneur '89 0.058 0.025 
(0.071) (0.065) 
Not Employed '89 -0.028 -0.016 
(0.045) (0.043) 
R2 0.288 0.326 0.294 0.288 0.288 0.331 
N 1911 1911 1911 1911 1911 1911 
PANEL B: Restricted Sample Income '95/'89 (log) 
Ties to Relatives '91 0.055** 0.048* 0.054* 0.055** 0.055** 0.047* 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
R2 0.308 0.351 0.314 0.309 0.308 0.354 
N 1490 1490 1490 1490 1490 1490 
Household Level Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from weighted least squares regressions at the household level. 
Standard errors, clustered at the region level to account for spatial correlation, are given in parentheses. The 
inverse of the sampling probability provided by SOEP is used as weights. Columns 1 replicates the results from 
the household level regression in column 5 in Table 9. The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of household 
income in 1995 and 1989. All specifications include the same controls as the specification in column 5 in Table 
9, but we do not report results for expositional clarity. See data appendix for details on the construction of our 
variables. Panel A reports results using the full sample. In Panel B we replicate the regressions from Panel A 
using a restricted sample. In this sample we excluded households who did not have operational assets in 1989, 
but report to have such assets in 1995 as well as all households which report in either 1989 or 1995 to have 
income from renting out property. For expositional clarity we omit the results from co-variats. 
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TABLE 11: HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS BY AGE OF HH HEAD 
Income '95/'89 (log) N [with Tiesl 
Ties x Age Group below 40 0.092* 496 [153] 
(0.051) 
Ties x Age Group 40-51 -0.052 494 [1621 
(0.044) 
Ties x Age Group 52·62 0.108** 447 [151] 
(0.052) 
Ties x Age Group above 62 0.063* 474 [131] 
(0.037) 
R2 0.448 
N 1911 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from weighted least squares 
regressions at the household level. Standard errors, clustered at the region 
level to account for spatial correlation, are given in parentheses. The inverse of 
the sampling probability provided by SOEP is used as weights. The dependent 
variable is the log of the ratio of household income in 1995 and 1989. The 
explanatory variables of interest are the interactions of the dummy indicating 
ties to relatives in the East interacted with 4 exhaustive household head cohort 
dummies. The age quartiles are: 'below 40', 'between 40 and 51', 'between 52 
and 62' and 'above 62'. The second column shows the number of household 
heads in each cohort. The number of household heads with ties to relatives in 
East Germany is given in square brackets. The specification also includes the 
same controls as column 5 of Table 9, 80 amongst others a full set of regional 
control. We do not report results for expositional clarity. See data appendix 
for details on the construction of our variables. 
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TABLE 12: HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS BY INCOME 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income '95/'89 (log) 
Ties to Relatives '91 0.049** 0.046* 0.052** 0.050** 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) 
Ties x Capital Income '89 (75th percentile) 0.011 
(0.047) 
Capital Income '89 (75th percentile) 0.046 
(0.028) 
Ties x Capital Income '89 (95th percentile) -0.036 
(0.112) 
Capital Income '89 (95th percentile) 0.067 
(0.056) 
Ties x Capital Income '89 (99th percentile) -0.022 
(0.242) 
Capital Income '89 (99th percentile) 0.148 
(0.121) 
R2 0.288 0.290 0.288 0.289 
N 1911 1911 1911 1911 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from weighted least squares regressions at the household 
level. Standard errors, clustered at the region level to account for spatial correlation, are given in 
parentheses. The inverse of the sampling probability provided by SOEP is used as weights. The 
dependent variable in all specifications is the log of the ratio of household income in 1995 and 1989. All 
specifications use ties to relatives in East Germany as explanatory variable and control for the same set 
of covariates as the specification in column 5 of Table 9, including a full set of region dummies. We do 
not report results for expositional clarity. Column 3, 4 and 5 control for a dummy indicating whether 
the household has capital income above the 75, 95 and 99 percentile of the capital income distribution, 
respectively. The explanatory variable of interest is the respective interaction of the capital income 
dummy and the dummy indicating ties to relatives in East Germany. See data appendix for details on 
the construction of our variables. 
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A .2 Figures 
F IGURE 1: SHARE EXPELLEES AND SHARE HOUSING STOCK D ESTROYED (CONDITIONAL SCAT-
TERPLOT) 
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FIGURE 2: SHARE TIES TO RELATIVES AND S HARE EXPELLEEES 
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Notes: The figure is a .scatterplot of Ot;Ir t~o measures of social tie~ at the re9ionallevcl: the share of expellees and tho share 
of individuals responchng to have relatives In East Germany. The solid line depicts the estimated linear relations from an ordl-
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FIGURE 3: INCOME GROWTH AND SHARE HOUSING DESTROYED ( ONDIT IONAL S ATTEIlPLOT) 
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Results from this regression are presented In column 2 of panel C of table 2. The solid line depicts the estimated linear rclatlOl 
between the log of the ratio of per capita income in 1995 and 1969 and war destruction. 
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FIGURE 4: EFFECT OF WWII D ESTRUCTION ON POPULAT ION GROWTII 
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FIGURE 5: INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS OVER TIM E 
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A.3 Data 
TABLE 13 - DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES 
Variable Description Source 
PANEL A: Original variables 
Share Expellees (Sov. Sec- Share of the total region/district population 1961 Census 
tor) '61 in 1961 that is made up by expellees from 
the former Eastern territories of the German 
Reich who settled in the Soviet sector be-
fore arriving in Western Germany (the West-
ern sectors). The exact census definition of 
this group is given in Statistisches Bundesamt 
(1961), p.4. 
Share Expellees (Direct) '61 Share of the total region/district population 1961 Census 
in 1961 that is made up by expellees from the 
former Eastern territories of the German Re-
ich who did not settle in the Soviet sector be-
fore arriving in Western Germany (the West-
ern sectors). The exact census definition of 
this group is given in Statistisches Bundesamt 
(1961), p.4. 
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Share Ties to Relatives '91 The respondents were ask whether they had SOEP (1991) 
Subsidiaries and Branches in 
loca 
Share of Housing Destroyed 
'46 
Rubble '46 (m3 p.c.) 
Income t (p.c., log, MC) 
relatives in the other part of Germany. We 
calculated the share of people who responded 
affirmatively. 
Number of subsidiaries and branches regis-
tered in loe belonging to the firm. 
Dest~oyed flats in 1946 as a share of the stock 
of flats in 1939. 
Untreated rubble in 1946 in ccm per capita. 
Log of a region's individuals' average income 
in Deutsche Mark. This information is not 
publicly available on levels lower than federal 
state level. We have hence extracted it from 
the German Micro-Census, a yearly survey of 
a random 1% sample of the population. The 
question used asks for the households aver-
age income per household member and re-
spondent has to answer in which interval his 
household falls. We have taken the mean of 
the intervals as household income. 
Orbis (2007) 
German Associ-
ation of Cities 
(1949) 
German Associ-
ation of Cities 
(1949) 
German 
"Mikrozensus" 
(1985, 1987, 1989, 
1991, 1993, 1995) 
Continued on next page 
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TABLE 13 - CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE 
Variable Description Source 
Income Entrepreneurs t Log of region's individuals' average income in German 
(p.c., log) Deutsche Mark, for the subgroup of individ- " Mikrozensus" 
uals who indicated to be 'entrepreneur' (with (1989, 1995) 
or without employees). 
Income Non-Entrepreneurs t Log of region's individuals' average income in German 
(p.c., log) Deutsche Mark, for the subgroup of individu- " Mikrozensus" 
als who indicated to have an occupation other (1989, 1995) 
than being 'entrepreneur' (with or without 
employees). 
Share Entrepreneur t Regional share of individuals who indicate as German 
occupation to be entrepreneur (with or with- " Mikrozensus" 
out employees). (1989) 
Share Working in Manufac- Regional share of individuals who indicate to German 
turing '89 be working in manufacturing. " Mikrozensus" 
(1989) 
Distance to East (l00km) Closest distance from a region's centre to the - own calculations -
former GDR's border in 100 km. 
Migration from East '91-'95 Surveyed individuals who migrated to the re- German 
gion in the years 1991, 1993 and 1995 from " Mikrozensus" 
East Germany as a share the total surveyed (1991, 1993, 1995) 
population. 
Region The geocode of the 'spacial ordering unit', 
an agglomeration of on average 4.4 districts. 
This is the lowest level at which income data 
is made available in the German Micro Cen-
sus. 
Ties to Relatives '91 Dummy indicating whether household head German SOEP 
(Dummy) or another person in the same household had (1991) 
relatives in the other part of Germany in 
1991. 
Income t (log, SOEP) Log of income in German Mark of household German SOEP 
head in year t . 
Gender Gender of highest ranked individual in the German SOEP 
household for whom income data exists. Usu- (1990) 
ally this will be the household head. 
Age '90 Age of household head in 1990. German SOEP 
(1990) 
Years of Education '89 Years of education (including professional) of German SOEP 
highest ranked individual in the household for (1990) 
whom income data exists. Usually this will be 
the household head. 
Capital Income '89 Log of household capital income in 1989. German SOEP 
(1990) 
Continued on next page 
1 THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SOCIAL TIES 
TABLE 13 - CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE 
Variable 
Occupation '89 
Description Source 
We aggregated the occupations given in the German 
German SOEP to the 8 categories 'Not Em- (1990) 
ployed', 'Pensioner', 'In Education/Military 
Service', 'Worker', 'Farmer', 'White Collar', 
'Entrepreneur' and 'Civil Servant'. 
PANEL B: Generated variables 
Income tdto (p.c., log) Income tl (p.c., log) - Income to) (p.c., log). 
Share of Total Subsidiaries Number of subsidiaries and branches in loe 
and Branches in loea over the sum of this and the number of sub-
sidiaries and branches in West Germany. 
Subsidiaries and Branches in Dummy variable that indicates whether the 
loea (Dummy) firm operates at least one subsidiary or 
branch in loe. 
Subsidiaries and Branches in Logarithm of Subsidiaries and Branches in 
loea (log) loe. 
Income t (p.c., log, SOEP) Log of average income in the region, using the 
SOEP data. 
Income tdto (log, SOEP) Income tl (p.c., log, SOEP) - Income to) (p.c., 
log, SOEP) 
64 
SOEP 
a Where loe stands for East Germany, West Germany, 'New' EU Countries, 'Old' EU Countries, 
and Non-EU Countries. 
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A.4 Further Results 
TABLE 14: GMM USING PANEL STRUCTURE 
(1) (2) (3) 
Income (p.c., log) 
Share Expellees x 1995 2.813*** 2.871*** 2.538*** 
(1.023) (0.960) (0.916) 
Share Expellees x 1993 2.059** 2.117** 1.783* 
(1.022) (0.959) (0.915) 
Share Expellees x 1991 1.532 1.590* 1.257 
(1.022) (0.959) (0.916) 
Share Expellees x 1989 0.506 0.564 
(1.022) (0.961) 
Share Expellees x 1987 -0.329 
(1.023) 
Income 1985 (p.c., log) 0.864*** 
(0.030) 
Income 1987 (p.c., log) 0.859*** 
(0.030) 
Income '87/'85 (p.c., log) -0.487*** 
(0.059) 
Income 1989 (p.c., log) 0.871*** 
(0.031) 
Income '89/'85 (p.c., log) -0.445*** 
(0.055) 
Distance to East (lOOkm) 0.003 0.005** 0.004* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
N 563 492 421 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from an asymptotically ef-
ficient two-step GMM estimation. In the first step we applied the Bartlett 
kernel to estimate the covariances of the errors up to one lag. The de-
pendent variable is in all regressions the log of mean per capita income 
in year t. The main variable of interest in all columns is the share of the 
region's 1961 population which are expellees who had arrived from the 
Soviet sector. We interacted this with a full set of possible year dummies 
(different across columns) and hence the main effect is not included. We 
instrumented for this with the interaction of the same year dummies with 
the share of the region's 1939 housing stock which was destroyed in 1946. 
All regressions control for a region's distance to the former East German 
border and include federal state-year fixed effects. Column 1 controls for 
the log of the mean per capita income in 1985, column 2 controls for the 
log of the mean per capita income in 1987 and column 3 controls for the 
log of the mean per capita income in 1989. Column 2 controls as well for 
log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1987 and 1985. Column 2 
controls for log of the ratio of mean per capita income in 1989 and 1985. 
65 
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TABLE 15: SOVIET SECTOR AND DIRECT EXPELLEES 
(A) SUMMARY STATISTICS (EXPELLEES, CENSUS '71) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Ex. (Soviet Sector) Ex. (Direct) West Germans 
Years of Schooling '71 9.69 9.63 9.81 
(1.19) (1.11) (1.50) 
Entrepreneur '71 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Labour Force Participation '71 0.52 0.54 0.55 
Primary Sector '71 0.04 0.05 0.12 
Production and Construction '71 0.51 0.53 0.44 
Services and Trade '71 0.33 0.30 0.32 
Government '71 0.12 0.13 0.11 
N 10120 49638 322240 
(B) EXPELLEE SETTLEMENT AND REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS '89 
(1) (2) (3) 
Coefficient p-value 
Outcome Variable Ex. (Soviet Sector) Ex. (Direct) (Ho: Equality of Coeff.) 
Years of Schooling '89 -0.398 -0.538 0.956 
(2.108) (0.678) 
Share Entrepreneur '89 0,017 0.033 0.937 
(0.161 ) (0.047) 
Share Unemployed '89 -0.130 -0.036 0.509 
(0.121) (0.031) 
Sh. Employed in Agriculture '89 -0.406* 0.151 * 0.059 
(0.240) (0.081) 
Sh. Employed in Manufacturing '89 0.877 -0.022 0.350 
(0.806) (0.222) 
Sh. Employed in Services '89 0.447 -0.195 0.338 
(0.558) (0.162) 
Sh. Employed in Government '89 -0.323 0.005 0.395 
(0.355) (0.066) 
Notes: Table 15 shows means, standard deviations in parentheses and the number of observations in square brackets. 
Data is from the 1971 edition of the German Census. Column 2 shows summary statistics for expellees via Soviet sector. 
Column 3 shows summary statistics for direct expellees. Column 1 shows data for all remaining individuals excluding 
refugees. Income in 1971 is given in German Marks. All other variables except years of schools are shares. The labour 
force participation and entrepreneurial share are given relative to the entire population. The sectorial distribution is 
given relative to all working individuals. Part B presents results from Ordinary Least Square regressions of the outcome 
variable shown in the leftmost column on the share of expellees (Soviet Sector), the share of expellees (Direct) and 
the same controls as column (3) of table 3. Each row represents an independent regression and we only report the 
coefficient estimates on the shares of expellees in column (1) and column (2). Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
The standard errors are calculated using the Huber-White correction to account for potential heteroscedasticity. Column 
(3) gives the p-value of a t-test of the equality of the coefficients in column (1) and (2). 
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TABLE 16: FIRM LEVEL DATA (SHARE) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share of Total S. fj B. in East Germany 
PANEL A: Reduced Form 
Share Housing Destroyed '46 -0.012** -0.011** -0.012** -0.011 ** -0.013*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
S. & B. in West Germany (log) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Distance to East (l00km) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Income 1989 (p.c., log) -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.009 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Income '89/,85 (p.c., log) -0.004 -0.014 0.000 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
Sh. Employed in Manufact. '89 0.040 
(0.035) 
Migration from East'91-'95 -0.805 
(0.492) 
R2 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 
N 19387 19387 19387 19387 19387 
PANEL B: IV 
Share Expellees (Sov. Sector) '61 0.646** 0.587** 0.619** 0.622** \ 0.657** 
(0.298) (0.277) (0.292) (0.301) (0.294) 
Notes: All regression report firm level regression results, using our sample of firms which are headquartered in 
West Germany and have at least one subsidiary or branch in West Germany. The standard errors are clustered 
at district level to account for likely spatial correlation. Panel A reports results from firm level Ordinary Least 
Squares regressions. Panel B reports firm level instrumental variable regression results. The variable of interest 
in these is the district level share of expellees via the Soviet sector. We instrument for this with the share of the 
district's 1939 housing stock which was destroyed in 1946. First stage results are not reported. The dependent 
variable is the share of a firm's subsidiaries and branches located in East Germany. All regressions include 10 
federal state fixed effects and 4 sector fixed effects. We control for distance to the former East German border 
at the district level. Log of per capita income in 1989, log of the ratio of per capita income in 1989 and 1985, the 
share working in the manufacturing sector 1989 and the sum of migrants from the East in 1991, 1993 and 1995 
are regional level controls. All specifications in Panels B include the same controls as the respective specification 
in panel A. We do not report the results for expositional clarity. 
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TABLE 17: EAST GERMANY 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Income (log, SOEP) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Ties to Relatives '91 0.058 0.047 0.078* 0.046 0.068* 0.057 
(0.036) (0.041) (0.041) (0.032) (0.036) (0.040) 
Gender -0.130*** -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.130*** -0.129*** -0.139*** 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) 
Age '90 0.067*** 0.051 *** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
(Age '90)2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.399 0.283 0.255 0.260 0.221 0.228 
N 1506 1492 1473 1462 1474 1506 
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from weighted least squares regressions at the household level. It 
uses the sample of households located in East Germany in both 1990 and 1995. The inverse of the sampling 
probability provided by SOEP is used as weights. Standard errors, clustered at the region level to account for 
spatial correlation, are given in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of the household income in the 
specified year. The explanatory variable of interest is a dummy indicating ties to relatives in West Germany. 
All specifications include a full set of region fixed effects. See data appendix for details on the construction of 
our variables. 
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FIGURE 6: SHARE OF HOUSING DESTROYED 
Notes: The figure presents the level of housing destroyed in 1946 in West German regions. The 5 colors 
refer to the 5 quintiles of war destruction, with red indicating those regions worst destroyed and green indicati ng 
the least destroyed regions. The cut-off values for the quintiles of hous ing destroyed are 0.093, 0.267, 0.377 and 
0.526, respectively. The median level of housing destroyed in each quintile is 0.034, 0.189, 0.335, 0.406 and 0.591, 
respect ively. Grey areas indicate regions for which we do not have d a ta . 
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2 Language Heterogeneity and 
Structural Change 
2 .1 Introduction 
Linguistic heterogeneity is a widespread phenomenon in the developing world. At the 
same time, in many countries with strong linguistic heterogeneity a small fraction of 
the population is working in manufacturing and services. Figure 7 presents a scatter 
plot that documents these facts about the status quo. However, historically much 
of the now highly industrialized world was home to much greater linguistic variety, 
too. In France, for example, some 20 local languages were still widely used at the 
end of the 19th century, but their usage declined during the course of the early 
20th century (see Figure 8). These facts give rise to the sense that the evolution 
of language heterogeneity, economic growth and structural change in the economy 
might be connected. 
In fact, this is a pre-dominant theme amongst linguists, who guestimate some 
10% of the world's approximately 6000 languages to be endangered by economic 
forces. On the other hand, linguistic heterogeneity might be an important friction 
in the creation of joint productive activities and shape economic structures. This 
paper aims to provide a framework which helps to understand the two-way relation 
of language knowledge and the sectorial composition of the economy and economic 
growth. It uses this framework to answer two questions: How important is a common 
language for economic activity? and How important are economic incentives for 
language change? 
In order to think about the first question, I outline and formalise how the stock 
of language knowledge might restrict the set of feasible joint economic activities. 
Key to this explanation is the idea that specialization of workers is at the heart of 
structural change. And specialized labor requires - in contrast to subsistence work 
_ joint work and communication. In the absence of a common language economic 
agents cannot or only at a cost engage in joint economic activities and transactions 
- the stock of language knowledge hence shapes economic structures. The model 
presented in section 2.2 formalizes this notion. It is assumed that the ability to 
communicate is required for joint economic activities in a communication-intensive 
sector (referred to as 'manufacturing sector'), but no such requirement exists in a 
second sector (referred to as 'agricultural sector').44 The formation of joint economic 
activities in the manufacturing sector is modeled by a stylized matching mechanism 
44The idea that a common language allows for joint productive activities is obviously not new. It 
appears for example as early as in the story of the Tower of Babel in the Bible. Curiously enough, 
this story puts forward the idea that God created different languages with the only goal as to avoid 
such activites. 
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which allows for only a fraction of matches to be language-assortative. Speaking a 
common language hence plays the role of a matching friction in the formation of 
joint productive activities. The model clarifies what kind of 'language heterogeneity' 
we expect to be important and it yields testable predictions on the effect of the 
composition of language knowledge on both aggregate manufacturing growth and 
language group specific manufacturing growth. 
Second, potential economic benefits from a wider pool of potential productive 
partners provide incentives to acquire language knowledge. Understanding this pro-
cess is key to answering the second question. In section 2.3 I investigate the language 
learning decision. I propose a selection equation which depends on the potential 
economic benefits and on the heterogeneous (unobserved) net learning cost. Hetero-
geneity in the learning cost captures the differential abilities at learning a language 
and heterogeneity in the pleasure derived from this process. The benefit from lan-
guage learning crucially depends not only on the own language group's size, but as 
well on the language learning decisions in all other language groups. I first discuss 
the simple case of two languages to gain some understanding of the basic mech-
anisms at work. I then present the case of many languages and provide a result 
for equilibrium existence. Further I show how a special, but interesting equilibrium 
can be found numerically and how the equilibrium depends on both the potential 
benefits of language learning and the share of activities which allow for language 
assortative-matching. 
In order to think about the co-evolution of language knowledge and economic 
activities, section 2.4 endogenizes how the set of economic activities shape the in-
centives for language learning. In particular, it presents a competitive equilibrium 
model of consumption and production of two goods, produced by the two sectors. 
Amongst other things, it is an equilibrium outcome of the model that firms in the 
manufacturing sector have several employees, while in the agricultural sector firms 
are composed of a single worker only. This provides a micro-foundation for the 
assumption made in section 2.2, namely that one sector requires joint work, while 
the other does not. More importantly, this simple model clarifies how the sectorial 
composition determines the wage differential between the agricultural and manu-
facturing sector, and hence provides the missing link in the analysis of the joint 
determination of language knowledge and the sectorial composition of the economy. 
I then discuss the general equilibrium of language learning, the matching of workers 
into productive units, and the wage differential between the communication intensive 
and less communication intensive sectors. 
The model highlights two key structural parameters, which can be interpreted 
as answering the two questions outlined above. In section 2.5 I provide tentative 
estimate these two parameters. I use data from a 1999 French survey of over 300.000 
individuals, which allows to back out the language knowledge and change in French 
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departements over the course of the 20th century. First, I estimate the share of 
activities which allow for language assortative matching. The parameter estimates 
suggest that a significant fraction of matches is not language-assortative, i.e. re-
quires a common language for the feasibility of a joint economic activity. Secondly 
I estimate the mean language learning cost in units of the potential benefit of lan-
guage learning, where the language to be learnt is chosen optimally. The estimates 
suggests that the mean language learning cost is around one eighths of the potential 
benefit of acquiring knowledge of an additional language. 
To evaluate the general equilibrium model, I calibrate the remaining parameters 
of the model using its equations of state. I simulate the model and compare its 
predictions for the co-evolution of language knowledge and sectoral composition to 
the actual development from 1926 until 1946. I show that the model's predictions 
can explain at least 7% of the variation in the change of the agricultural share. 
This paper contributes to the economic literature on the effects of fractionalisi-
ation. These papers generally finds a negative association of measures of language 
fractionalisation and growth, investment or other economic variables (see Easterly 
and Levine (1997) for an early paper and Alesina and Ferrara (2005) for an excellent 
review paper). Much of this literature has interpreted these correlations as effects 
of ethnic fractionalisation on the functioning of markets, political institutions and 
conflict. This paper instead emphasises a possible direct effect of language diversity 
on economic growth. 
The initial literature used data on ethno-linguistic groups from the Atlas Naro-
dov Mira, which was compiled by Soviet researchers, to construct a Herfindahl-based 
index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF). Essentially this measures the prob-
ability of two randomly drawn individuals having their mother tongue in common.45 
Others proposed alternative ways to measure ethnic division, often referred to as 
'polarisation' measures (see Esteban and Ray (1994) and their subsequent papers).46 
These have been shown to better explain the onset of ethnic conflict, but do not 
account for the effect of ethno-linguistic diversity on growth (Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol, 2005b,a). This paper argues that this correlation might be driven by the 
simple fact, that linguistic diversity renders joint economic activities costly. The 
theory of this paper suggests how to measure the ease of communication. The mea-
sure proposed here explicitly accounts for bi- and multi-lingualism, which is key to 
understanding language change. 
In doing so it also contributes to and draws on the economic and linguistic 
literature on the individual level economic returns to language proficiency. Notably, 
Barry Chiswick wrote a series of papers presenting results from various countries 
45 Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) provided updated and rede-
fined versions of this data. 
46See Bossert, D'Ambrosio, and Ferrara (2010) for an alternative measure of fractionalisation. 
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(see e.g. Chiswick and Miller (1995)). These generally find strong positive returns 
to proficiency in the host countries main language amongst immigrants.47 
This literature also puts forward a second empirical fact: the probability of being 
proficient in speaking and reading the host countries main language is negatively 
correlated with the size of the own language group (Chiswick and Miller, 1999). This 
paper contributes to this literature by providing a formal framework to think of the 
language learning decisions of individuals. I will point out in subsequent chapters 
how the model presented in this paper helps to organise our thinking about this 
literature. The closest relative of the model of language learning presented here 
is Lazear (1999). In fact, Lazear's model is a special case of the model I present. 
He interprets the model to analyse language learning of immigrant groups and an 
impressive list of related questions. 
To the best of my knowledge this paper is the first analysis of the two-way relation 
of language learning and economic structures in a general equilibrium setting. An 
example of a linguists take on these issues is Coulmas (1992). 
2.2 Languages and Manufacturing Growth 
This section outlines a simple economic model to organize out thinking about (and 
estimate) the role of a common language for the formation of productive units. Key 
to this model is the assumption that if the labour force of a firm is greater than 1, 
workers need to be matched with a productive partner with whom they are able to 
communicate, i.e. with whom they have knowledge of a language in common.48 I 
derive testable implications of the model. 
2.2.1 The Environment 
Sectors Workers live for T periods in region d. At the beginning of period 1 
workers join one of two sectors in which they work for the remaining life time. 
Firms in these sectors produce goods f and m, respectively Assume free entry and 
exit of firms and competitive markets. 
The two sectors are distinguished by their production technology, represented 
by a cost function. In both sectors production requires a single factor, labour. 
Firms in the first sector have a constant marginal labour cost, denoted by 'Y~, and 
no fixed cost. Firms in the second sector have labour requirement for producing 
47See, for example, Chiswick (1998) for evidence from Israel, Chiswick and Miller (1999) for 
evidence from the US, Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) for evidence from the UK and Chiswick, 
Patrinos, and Hurst (2000) or Godoy, Reyes-Garcia, Seyfried, Huanca, Leonard, McDade, Tanner, 
and Vadez (2007) for evidence from Bolivia. 
48Note that this modelling assumption presumes that a common language is important for com-
mon work, but not for trading of goods. I belief this to be reasonable, as trading the goods might 
be done on an occasional basis. 
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x units of rT + ,Tx2 (i.e. rT are the fixed and ,Tx2 are the variable costS).49 
The parameters of the cost functions are heterogeneous across regions, indexed by 
d, capturing differences in the efficient production technology due to geographical, 
institutional or other factors. 
With free entry, the equilibrium output in the second sector is x· = (rT /'d)1/2 
and a firm's equilibrium labour demand is 2rT.50 The equilibrium size of a firm's 
labour force (measured in number of workers) is 2rT over the labour supply of each 
worker in the second sector. This is generally different from 1. (I endogenize the 
labour supply in section 2.4.1 and derive an explicit formula for the equilibrium 
firm size in the second sector.) Conversely, in the first sector there is no benefit to 
producing jointly with co-workers. In summary, workers in the first sector, sector j, 
are self-employed, while workers in the second sector, sector m, work in productive 
units composed by several workers. 
The model can be thought of as having one sector which generates increasing 
returns to scale by division of labour. This, in turn, requires groups of people to 
work together. We can think of the first sector as the 'agricultural' sector', producing 
'food', and we can think of the second sector as the 'modern' or 'manufacturing and 
services' sector, producing 'manufacturing goods'. This is consistent with data from 
the 1926 French census, where 61.5% of all individuals in the agricultural sectors 
were head of the firm (farm), i.e. a majority of individuals was self-employed. In 
the industrial and services sectors the respective numbers are only 9.0% and 27.0%, 
respectively. 51 
Occupational Choice Denote with pT and p~ the price of a unit of good m and j, 
respectively, in region d. Workers want to join the sector which offers the higher pay 
to each unit of labour supplied. The return to each unit of labour in the agricultural 
sector is p~/,~. Denote with wT the wage in the modern sector. For the moment 
make the following assumption (Wd and p~ will be endogenized in section 2.4): 
Assumption 1 Wd > p~/,~. 
This implies that each worker wants to work in sector m. 
Matching of Workers Crucially, to work in the modern sector, workers need 
to be matched with a co-worker with whom they can communicate. Workers can 
always choose to work in the agricultural sector where work is done individually. 
Assume the following matching process: Individuals joining the labour force at time 
t are matched randomly with another individual in region d joining the labour force. 
491 denote endogenous variables with Latin characters and exogenous parameters with Greek 
characters. 
50 Free entry implies that each firm produces where average costs are minimised. 
51 Data from volume II/III, p. 164 of Statistique Generale de la France (1931b). 
2 LANGUAGE HETEROGENEITY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 75 
Assume each worker is matched with probability a with a worker from his own 
language group, and with probability 1 - a with a worker from the region's full 
population. Hence a = 0 is equivalent to a fully random, non-assorlative matching 
process. Conversely, a = 1 can be thought of as a perfectly assorlative matching 
process. An estimate of a provides an answer to the question: How important are 
differences in language abilities for the formation of firms in the increasing returns 
to scale sector? 
Language Groups The number of languages in region d is denoted by nd and 
the indexed by I = 1,2, ... , nd· Any individual will speak one or several of these 
languages. At most there are Nd := (2n d - 1) different combinations of language 
abilities. Let each such combination be called a 'language group', indexed by j = 
1,2, ... , Nd, and characterised by the nd x 1 vector gdj, with element 1 equal to 
1 indicating knowledge of language 1 and 0 otherwise. The number of languages 
in common between any two individuals in language groups j and h is gdj' gdh. 
Hence those individuals are able to communicate if and only if gdj'gdh > O. Let 
the fraction of language group j amongst the population of workers joining the 
workforce at time t be denoted by sdj(t). Further define G d := [gd}, gd2,"" gdNdJ 
and Sd(t) := [Sdl(t), Sd2(t), ... , SdNAt)l'. 
2.2.2 Sectoral Growth 
For a member of language group j the probability of having a language in common 
with a matched worker is 
Pdj(t) := Pr('successful match'; Gd, Sd(t)) = a + (1 - a) .1(gdj'Gd )sd(t) (5) 
where 1 is the indicator function on a vector, 1 : No Nd --+ {O, I} Nd , taking value 
1 if the element of the vector is equal or greater than 1 (i.e. the two groups 
have at least one language in common) and 0 otherwise. Further, denote Pd(t) := 
[Pdl (t), Pd2 (t), ... ,PdNd (t) 1'. Then the fraction amongst the population joining the 
labour force in district d at time t which works in manufacturing is Sd(t)'Pd(t). 
Conversely, the fraction of the population joining the labour force which works in 
agriculture, denoted ad(t), is 
This simple model provides three economically meaningful testable implications. 52 
52 Obviously the fact that the agricultural share in the labour force alters, might effect both Wd 
and p~. This will be modelled explicitly in section 2.4.1. 
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2.2.3 From Theory to Empirics 
At the aggregate level, equation (6) predicts that the fraction of agricultural workers 
depends positively on language heterogeneity as measured by sd(t)'l(G/Gd)sd(t) 
(Testable Implication 1). This can be tested with a regression of the form 
(7) 
The coefficient estimate 'Yt measures the fraction of matches for which having a 
language in common is important. The regressor sd(t)'l(G/Gd)sd(t) corresponds 
to the probability that any two individuals have a language in common. 
Note that this can be understood as a generalised form of the Herfindahl-style 
index of mother-tongue linguistic fractionalisation which is frequently used in the 
literature on the economic effects of 'ethno-linguistic' fractionalisation. It is gener-
alised in the sense that it accounts for individuals who speak more than one lan-
guage.53 A simple example might serve to highlight the difference: Consider a region 
where some share z of the population speaks language 1 and 2, and the remaining 
population speaks language 2 only and suppose that for the first group language 1 
is classified as 'mother tongue' (some unique language needs is always classified as 
mother tongue when indices of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation are constructed!) A 
Herfindahl-style index of 'ethno-linguistic' fractionalisation would generally be dif-
ferent for two regions with different z, while the measure of 'ease of communication' 
which the simple theory in this paper suggests would 1 independent of z, since all 
individuals can communicate with each other. 
Equation (7) also makes precise how to estimate a and the conditions under 
which a is identified. In particular we require exogenous variation in sd(t)'l(GiGd)Sd(t). 
Estimating (7) requires data on the fraction of agricultural workers amongst those 
joining the labour force at time t. Where this is unavailable we can estimate a with 
data on the aggregate share of workers in the agricultural sector at time t. Denote 
this by Ad(t). The model implies Ad(t) = ~ E!=t-(T-l) ad(s) or 
53The simple form of this - where each individual is assumed to have a single mother tongue 
- has been a prominent proxy for ethnic fractionalisation in the empirical development literature. 
This literature typically presents cross-country results from Ordinary Least Squares regressions of 
equation (7) using some measure of aggregate growth as outcome variable. The model presented 
here makes precise the reasons why this estimation strategy might be problematic: (i) the proxy 
of ethnic fractionalisation used is (at face value) really a measure of linguistic fractionalisation, 
and the interpretation of the correlations found might be quite different from the channels empha-
sised in this literature; (ii) linguistic fractionalisation might depend on the economic incentives to 
language learning which might be influenced by the sectorial composition in region d, and might 
hence be correlated with the error f~; and (iii) the simple measure of mother-tongue linguistic 
fractionalisation does not capture that individuals might speak several languages (or be members 
of two ethnic groups, for that matter) and might hence fail to explain some essential heterogeneity 
where bi-lingualism is prevalent. 
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where I assume ad(t - T) = Ad(t - 1). Then Q can be equivalently estimated from 
a regression of the form 
(9) 
When T is unknown an estimate of Q is given by & = 1 + 8d(1 - 82). Alternatively 
when T is known this can be estimated as constrained regression with 62 = I-liT. 
The values 60 and 01 in regression (9) satisfy 60 + 61 = 0 (Testable Implication 
2). This hypothesis, if not rejected, implies that in a region where every worker 
can communicate with every other worker, i.e. sd(t)'l(GiGd)sd(t) = 1, all workers 
would start working in the manufacturing sector. (Rejecting this hypothesis would 
shed doubts on whether Assumption 1 - that all individuals would want to work in 
the manufacturing sector, if they are matched with an individual which whom they 
can communicate - holds in the data.) 
Thirdly, the model suggests some essential heterogeneity in the sectorial com-
position across language groups within regions. In particular, equation (5) implies 
that the probability of working in the manufacturing sector correlates negatively 
with the language group specific probability of having a language in common with a 
randomly matched worker, as measured by l(gd/Gd)sd(t) (Testable Implication 3). 
This can be tested with a regression 
(10) 
where adj(t) is the share of agricultural workers amongst member of group j from 
region d joining the labour force at time t and €dj is a normally distributed error 
with variance inversely proportional to Sdj .54 
When wages are higher in the manufacturing sector than in the agricultural sec-
tor55 , a simple corollary of this implication is that the average wage of members 
of a language group should increase with the group specific probability of being 
matched with a co-worker with whom he can communicate, 1 (gd/Gd)Sd(t). One 
version of this is that immigrants who are proficient in their host country's main 
language should earn higher wages. Indeed, Chiswick and Miller (1999) report that 
earnings among legalized aliens in the US are higher by about 8% for men and 17% 
for women who are proficient in both speaking and reading English, compared to 
those lacking both skills. Chiswick (1998) find similar - if not stronger - correla-
tions of income and proficiency in Hebrew and English amongst residents of Israel. 
And Godoy, Reyes-Garcia, Seyfried, Huanca, Leonard, McDade, Tanner, and Vadez 
(2007) report that fluency in spoken Spanish amongst the population of the Bolivian 
54This is optimally estimated with the Generalised Least Squares estimator which takes the 
information about the error structure into account. 
55This is assumed by Assumption 1. 
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Amazon was associated with 36.9-46.9% higher earnings compared with the earn-
ings of monolingual speakers of the local language Tsimane'. 56 While these results 
are consistent with the implications of the theory, they provide at best an average 
treatment effect. They fail to exploit the potential heterogeneous treatment effects 
across immigrant groups suggested by the theory: Learning the host countries lan-
guage is generally more beneficial for individuals of small immigrant groups that for 
members of very big immigrant groups. Neither do these papers report any evidence 
on the sectorial composition of labour across language groups. 
I provide estimates of 0: and evidence on the testable implications in section 2.5. 
2.3 Language Change 
The previous discussion was concerned with the sectoral growth and its dependence 
on a given stock of language knowledge, characterised by (Gd, Bd(t)). This section 
discusses the evolution of language knowledge over time, i.e. the path of Bd(t). A 
complete model of language change needs to explain (i) how language knowledge is 
acquired and (ii) how language knowledge disappears. I focus attention on the effect 
of economic incentives on language learning. Section 2.3.1 discusses how individu-
als optimally choose acquiring a new language in response to economic incentives, 
given the set of language abilities inherited from their parents. Section 2.3.2 derives 
testable implications. This paper does not aim to discuss how languages are passed 
on across generations. This is, to some extend, driven by the belief that economic 
incentives are not of first-order importance for this decision. 
2.3.1 Language Learning 
Let each worker have the chance to learn one language before joining the labour 
force. The worker will do so if his expected benefit is greater than his cost of 
learning a language. Let this be some linearly additive utility cost Cdi, which I take 
to be the realisation of a random variable with c.d.f. Fe, drawn independently and 
identically across individuals and regions. Assume Fc(z) > 0 for all z > 0 and 
Fc(O) = O. Subscript i refers to the individual worker. The cost is measuring net 
forgone utility when learning a language. The assumed heterogeneity is meant to 
capture both differential talent at learning a language and heterogeneous pleasure 
derived from learning a language - in the end, many people find it a beautiful thing 
to do. 
Denote with g~j the vector characterising the language ability of a person en-
dowed with language ability gdj after learning additionally language l. (This corre-
sponds to some gdh.) Then the optimal language to learn for members of group j, 
56Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) provide evidence suggesting that fluency in English increases the 
employment probability of black immigrants in the UK by about 22 percent points. 
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conditional on learning a language, is 
(11) 
where Gd and Sd(t) characterise the language abilities of the population joining the 
labour force. Optimally, the individual learns the language which increases most 
the probability of being successfully matched. Denote with Vdm and V j the indirect 
utilities of working in the manufacturing and agricultural sector, respectively, and 
define 1T := Vdm - vj, i.e. 1T is the gain in indirect utility from working in the man-
ufacturing sector over the agricultural sector. A worker decides to acquire language 
knowledge iff 
(12) 
Learning a language has a positive net pay-off only if both Wd > p~/'Y~ and learning 
a language increases the probability of being successfully matched sufficiently. 57 
The own language learning decision depends on the language learning of all other 
individuals of the same generation. Define an equilibrium as follows. 
Definition 1 A 'language learning equilibrium' is a vector Bd (t) with elements sdj (t) 
s.t. 
Intuitively, an equilibrium is a vector Bd(t) such that given this vector each individual 
takes his optimal language learning decision and these decisions result in aggregate 
in a language ability of the generation t characterised by Bd(t). This is different from 
the s~(t) which characterised the language ability this generation had been endowed 
with by its parents.58 
Generally there might be several language learning equilibria. I discuss results 
for two tractable cases: First, I present results for the case of two languages and 
Fe being the uniform distribution. In this case the equilibrium can be characterised 
in closed form. The discussion of this case will serve to gain some insights and 
57 Obviously language learning can have other than just wage pay-offs. For example it allows 
civic engagement, participation in social networks and access to education. 
58Mathematically, this can be understood as follows: The first line is the share of the population 
endowed with language ability j times the fraction of this population which learns another language, 
and is hence no longer characterised by j. The second line is the sum over all those groups, which 
after taking their optimal language learning decisions have language ability j. The quantity being 
summed up is the fraction of each such group that learns the language which gives them language 
ability j, times the share of the population that this group made up before the language learning. 
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intuitions of the basic mechanisms at work. Second, I consider the case of many 
languages, but focus on a particular equilibrium: one in which all individuals who do 
not speak the language of the biggest language group learn this group's language and 
all members of the biggest language group learn the language of the second biggest 
language group. This equilibrium arguably characterises the French situation, it 
can be found numerically and I will focus on this equilibrium when calibrating the 
model. 
Example 1: Two Languages Assume that only two languages exist in region 
d. Hence there axe three language groups, j E {I, 2, 3} and Gd = [~ ~ :]. The 
first group speaks only language 1, the second group speaks only language 2 and the 
third group speaks both languages. The decision which language to learn is trivial 
in this case. Any individual of language group 3 cannot learn a further language and 
any individual in group 1 or 2 would learn the language they do not speak. W.l.o.g. 
consider the language learning of an individual in group 1. He will learn language 2 
iff 
where we suppress the subscript d for notational simplicity. The term 1 - (81 + 83) 
measures the differential probability of being able to communicate with a randomly 
matched worker: If the individual did learn the second language, he can communi-
cate with workers from all language groups, whereas if he did not learn the other 
language, he can only communicate with individuals of language group 1 and 3. Ob-
viously 1- (81 + 83) = 82, so in this simple case the benefit from learning language 2 
is to be able to communicate with those who only speak this language, i.e. members 
of language group 2. 
Three points are captured by this decision rule: i) the incentive to learn the 
other group's language decreases with the fraction of the other group who speaks 
ones own language; ii) individuals of the smaller language group will find it, ceteris 
paribus, more beneficial to invest in language learning; iii) with a high fraction of 
job matches being assortative on language knowledge, i.e. a is high, the incentive 
to learn a language is small. 
An language learning equilibrium will be a vector s = {81' 82, 83} which solves 
simultaneously 
8j = 8J [1 - Fc((l - a)7f(l - (Sj + 83)))1 
for j = 1,2. Since 83 = 1 - 81 - 82 these are two equations in two unknowns. As-
suming c; f'oJ U(O, c) allows to find a closed form solution. The following proposition 
characterises all equilibria. 
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Proposition 1 Wlog assume s~ < sg. There are three types of equilibria: 
a. Iff sg < (1_cO)1I' an interior equilibrium exists. It is unique and stable. The 
equilibrium value is given by 
Sj -& - (1 - Q:)'rr(c/ sJ)s~sg 
sJ = & - (1 - a)27l'2s~sg 
b. Iff s~ < (1_(:0)11' < sg the unique equilibrium is (sr/ s?, 82/ sg) 
stable. 
(14) 
(0,1). It is 
c. Iff (1_(:0)11' < s~ then (Sl/S?,S2/Sg) = (1,0) and (Sr/S?,S2/Sg) = (0,1) are the 
only stable equilibria. (An unstable interior equilibrium exists.) 
The proposition highlights the role of the relative sizes of the groups, the poten-
tial benefit from learning a language and the possibility to match language assorta-
tively. Let us first understand what different relative sizes of language groups imply 
for language learning. 
If the two groups are similarly sized, cases a or c are likely to apply: either there 
is an interior equilibrium where a fraction of members of both groups learn the other 
group's language; or all members of one group learn the other group's language and 
nobody in the latter group does so, but both groups might be the one that learns the 
other group's language. In a loose sense, these are symmetric situations compared 
to case b, which is not suprising given that the groups are similarly sized. 
In the equilibrium of case c all members of a group, say those who only speak 
language 1, learn the other group's language. This obviously removes any incentive 
for the latter group to learn the former group's language. And if, given that nobody 
who only speaks language 2 learns a language, everybody who only speaks language 
1 has a sufficient incentive to learn language 2, this is an equilibrium. However, if 
(1 - a) or the wage differential at stake is not too high, the interior equilibrium in 
a emerges and is stable. 59 In an interior equilibrium we have sr/s~ < S2/Sg, i.e. in 
the smaller group a bigger fraction learns a second language. 
If the groups are of unequal size, the only equilibrium is one where all members 
of the smaller group learn the language of the bigger group and no one in the bigger 
group learns the smaller group's language, corresponding to case b. 
59Which of these types of equilibria emerges depends on the change in pay-off's when the other 
group's language learning changes. Say 82 falls by a small amount. If the effect on 81 is strong, 
then the share of bilinguals falls sharply, inducing 82 to fall further. An interior equilibrium would 
be unstable and only a boundary equilibrium as in c would be stable. The equilibrium condition 
captures precisely under which conditions the response of 81 to a small change in 82 is big: if the 
importance of a common language is high (0 is close to 0) or the wage differential at stake is high 
(1f' is big) the expected benefit of language skills for someone in who only speaks language 1 falls 
sharply as 82 falls and hence 81 rises strongly. The effect will as well be big if for the marginal 
worker the density of the distribution of language costs is high, so c is low. 
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The equilibria presented in Proposition 1 are partial equilibria, in the sense that 
they do not consider a potential effect of language learning on the wage differential. 
However, in situations where the effect of language knowledge on wages through the 
formation of manufacturing work relations is neglect able, this simple model might 
have predictive power or shed light on the empirical prevalence of bilingualism. 
Example 2: Many Languages Now consider the case with nd > 2 languages 
in region d (and omit subscript d again). Further assume that the initial language 
endowment characterised by SO is such that everyone speaks just one language. The 
following proposition gives an existence result for an interesting equilibrium. 
Proposition 2 An equilibrium s· exists such that all those member of language 
groups which are not the biggest language group learn, if they learn a language, the 
language of the biggest single language group. Any member of the biggest language 
group learns, if he learns a language, the language of the second biggest single lan-
guage group. (Proof in Appendix B.1.} 
Proposition 2 captures the intuition that when many groups come together who 
initially do not have a language in common, it is an equilibrium for members of all 
groups other than the biggest to learn the same language. One can think of this 
as a 'dominant language equilibrium'. This is not necessarily the only equilibrium. 
W.l.o.g. let the order of s and SO be such that the first n elements refer to the 
language groups which only speak one language and s~ > sg. > ... > s~, element 
Sn+1 refers to the language group speaking both language 1 and 2, and element 
Sn+j-l, j = 3,4, ... ,n, refers to the language group which speaks language 1 and j. 
Hence, by assumption, s~ = 0 for all j > n. A necessary condition for an equilibrium 
as postulated in Proposition 2 is the existence of a vector s· such that the following 
are satisfied: 
s· 1 s~[l - Fc((1 - a)7r(s;))] 
Nd 
s; - s~[l - Fc((l - Q)7r(s~ + L(s?n - s:n))] 
m=3 
(15) 
(16) 
sj - s~[1 - Fc((l - Q)7r(s~ + L (s?n - s:n))] Vj = 3,4, ... ,Nd• (17) 
m#l,j 
From these it is easy to show the following corollary which describes the hetero-
geneity in language learning across differently sized groups: 
Corollary 1 In a language learning equilibrium as described in proposition 2 we 
have si/ s~ > s;j sg > ... > s~/ s~. 
This corollary states that the intensity of language learning is inversely related to 
the initial language group's size. In fact, there is evidence suggesting that indeed 
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members of smaller immigrant groups learn the host countries language quicker and 
better. Chiswick and Miller (1999) report that the probability of being proficient 
in speaking and reading English is negatively correlated with the size of the own 
language group.60 His coefficient estimates from a linear regression of a dummy of 
being proficient in English on the share of the own language group - a number in 
the interval [0, 100] - range from -0.007 to -0.010 for males and from -0.006 to -0.013 
for females. These are well in line with the theory presented here: A coefficient 
estimate of -0.010 would suggest that only when the own language group would 
make up the whole population, nobody would learn English.61 
Further it is straight-forward to find the following corollary from the proof of 
Proposition 2. 
Corollary 2 Define a vector valued sequence s(n) where element sj(n), j = 1, ... ,n, 
is the share of single language group j if individuals in j would make their opti-
mal decisions taking s(n - 1) as the language shares in the economy. Further take 
s(O) = [0, sg, sg, ... ,s~]. Then s* is the limit of s(n) . 
Corollary 2 is interesting for two reasons: First, it shows that the equilibrium can be 
understood as the result of an dynamic, 'evolutionary' process. Second, it provides 
a converging, iterative method to find the equilibrium computationally. This will 
be useful when calibrating the model. 
Lastly, we can show that the equilibrium as defined in Proposition 2 and com-
puted in Corollary 2, satisfies two important comparative static properties: 
Proposition 3 For any rr > rr' the equilibrium computed in Corollary 2 satisfies 
s*(rr, a) ~ s*(rr',a). Similarly, for any a> a' we have s*(rr, a) ? s*(rr,a'). If at 
least one element sj(rr, a) E (0, s~), then these hold with strict inequality for at least 
one element, respectively. (Proof in Appendix B.1.) 
This result shows that with an increase in the potential benefit of working in the 
manufacturing sector (or an decrease in the fraction of the population who can match 
assortatively), a bigger fraction of each individual group would learn a language. In 
the case of an increaseed benefit of working in the manufacturing sector, this will 
imply that the probability of a successful match increases. This is not true for a 
change in a: while the amount of language learning increases, this might be offset 
by the higher probability of mismatches due to less assortative matching. 
60 As well Chiswick (1998) reports evidence from Israel that "Hebrew fluency increases with [ ... ] 
living in an area in which a smaller proportion speak one's mother tongue." 
610bviously these can hardly be interpreted as causal as various selection mechanisms might be 
at work. The point is that these facts are consistent with the model's implications. 
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2.3.2 From Theory to Empirics 
The model of language learning has several testable implications, and I have touched 
upon some of them in the previous section. Other implications are, for example, 
that equation (11) predicts which language will be learnt, conditional on a language 
being learnt. This prediction could be tested with a multinomial log it and one could 
compare the models predictive power against likely alternative models. Further, 
equation (12) gives rise to a selection equation, which potentially can be tested.62 
This paper will focus on an implication of the model which allows to estimate 
a parametrised version of the distribution Fe. This (a) allows to understand what 
language learning policies might be able to achieve and (b) provides an important 
structural parameter to calibrate the general equilibrium model in section 2.6. To 
this end, make the following assumption: 
Assumption 2 Assume the distribution of language learning costs is exponential, 
i.e. 
Fc(Cj,\) := Pr(cdi < Cj ,\) = 1 - e-AC • 
This distribution satisfies the assumption of positive support and Fe(c) < 1 for 
all C > O. The parameter to be estimated, '\, is the inverse of the mean language 
learning cost. Under Assumption 2, equation (15) can be rewritten as 
(18) 
This suggests that ,\ can be estimated within the linear regression framework. Both 
7fd and s; are endogenous. The system of simultaneous equations defined by (15)-
(17) suggests that S~2 is a suitable excluded instrument for 7f dSd2' Taken at face 
value, I can estimate ,\ from a regression of the form 
(19) 
where 7f dSd2 is the predicted value from the first stage. One can back out the estimate 
of,\ as ,\ = -(h/(1-a) where a is the estimate obtained in section 2.2.3. The model 
predicts that (}o = 1 and (h < 0 (Testable Implications 4 and 5). 
2.4 General Equilibrium 
2.4.1 A Simple Economy 
I now specify a simple two-sector model which pins down how different shares of 
manufacturing and agricultural workers map into wages and prices and hence eca-
62If an instrument for the cost of language learning is available, this equation can be used to 
estimate the marginal treatment effects as defined by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and for example 
calculate the treatment effects of different language policies. 
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nomic incentives to learn a language. Let individual preferences be represented by 
the utility function 
U = /3 log fdi + mdi - (1] /2)e~i (20) 
where fdi is the amount of food consumed, mdi is the amount of manufacturing goods 
consumed and edi is the labour time supplied. The first bit are standard log-linear 
preferences on consumption and the second bit is a convex effort cost of providing 
labour. /3 and 1] are preference parameters. 
I present the assumptions about the firms' production technologies in section 2.2. 
Assume free entry and exit, competitive markets and costless trade of manufacturing 
goods across and within regions, but agricultural goods can only be trades within 
regions. 
Choices 
Marshallian Demands: Given income Ydi the Marshallian demands for m and f 
are 
if Ydi < /3pT' 
otherwise. 
(21) 
The utility function hence represents preferences such that all income (in units of 
the manufacturing good) up to some critical income level is spend on food. Income 
above this level is spend on manufacturing goods. 
Labour Choice and Income: Denote with wd the income from one unit of labour 
in sector 8.63 Using the Marshallian demands we find the indirect utility V (Ydi , edi), 
given labour supply and income. The optimal labour supply, edi' is defined by the 
first order condition (applying the Envelope Theorem) 
(22) 
where the subindex 1 indicates the partial derivative with respect to the first argu-
ment. 
Food Supply: The supply of agricultural goods is perfectly elastic where p~ = 
w~,~. The amount a farmer produces depends on the marginal utility of income. 
The indirect utility of income given edi is 
63The un-superscripted w is hence the same as wm . 
if Ydi ~ /3pT' 
otherwise. 
(23) 
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For a self-employed farmer the wage income is the same as the value of his produce, 
i.e. Ydi = p~edd,r Given the indirect utility of a farmer in (23), there are two cases 
for the optimal individual labour choice edi as defined by (22). 
Case 1: Suppose that Ydi ::; (3Pd' Then we have edi = ((3/'f})!. This implies 
Yd(edi) = (p~/,~)((3/'f})!. For consistency we need that Yd(edi ) ::; (3Pd or (P~/Pd) ::; 
((3'f})!,{ This is the 'subsistence case', i.e. where farmers consume what they 
produce. There is no supply of food in this case. 
Case 2: Suppose that Ydi > (3Pd' Then edi = p~/(Pd,i'f}) and Yd(edi) = 
(p~/'Y~)P~/(Pd'Y~'f}). For consistency we need (P~/Pd) > ((3'f})~,i. In this case 
the excess supply of food by each farmer is Edi(J) = p~/(Pdb~)2'f}) - (3Pd /p~. 
The conditions for the cases to be internally consistent are exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive. Note however, that this presumes the existence of a well-defined price-
vector, which is not guaranteed in the subsistence case as no food is supplied to the 
market! This point will be further discussed below. 
Manufacturing Supply: Firms which produce manufacturing goods supply the 
quantity where price is equal to marginal cost as long as the price is bigger than 
minimal average costs. 
Equilibrium 
Equilibrium Prices: Given Ad (suppressing the time dependence for the mo-
ment), an equilibrium in the goods market is a price vector such that excess supply 
of food by farmers equals the demand for food by non-farmers (the second market 
will clear by Walras Law), or: 
(24) 
If Ad increases, total food production increases. For the markets to clear, P~/Pd has 
to fall, decreasing the production and increasing the demand of food. Note that for 
every Ad < 1 the condition for a non-subsistence equilibrium is always satisfied, i.e. 
given that some of the labour force works in manufacturing, the equilibrium price 
vector will be such that agricultural workers supply food to the market, i.e. there 
is an 'exchange equilibrium' .64 
64 However , this is only true when some of the labour force works in the manufacturing sector. 
If not, i.e. Ad = 1, the condition for the subsistence equilibrium is satisfied. This makes trivial 
sense, as all workers produce food with the same technology and consume what they produce as 
there are no gains from trade. Note that the interpretation of this when Ad is endogenous less 
trivial! Suppose a subsistence equilibrium exists. How does the transition to a market exchange 
equilibrium happen if individuals are price takers, but prices for 'new goods' do not yet exist? The 
model (and I imagine any model with perfect competition) has nothing to say on this. The answer 
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Equilibrium Wages: With free entry firms open/exit in the manufacturing sec-
tor, equilibrium wages are such that each firm produces where average costs are 
minimised, i.e. md = (r'd I,;F) 1/2 . The zero-profit condition (all income is labour 
income) pins down the equilibrium ratio of wages and the price of manufacturing 
goods: pTmd - wd [rT + 'dmd2] = O. As md = (r'd l'd)1/2 we have 
(25) 
Equilibrium Firm Size The equilibrium labour demand of a firm is r'd+'d(md)2 = 
2rT. We know that the labour supply of a worker in the manufacturing sector is 
ed = w;FI(p'd1])· Hence the equilibrium number of workers in a firm, firm size FSd , 
will be 
FSd = 2f'd (~~). 1]. (26) 
Think of technological progress as a change in the production function, which implies 
an optimal output expansion path such that r'd increases and ,;F decreases. This 
has two effects: There is a direct effect of r:r which increases labour demand and 
an indirect, ambiguous effect of r'd and 'd on P'd Iw'd which changes labour supply. 
Language Learning Incentives: We are now equipped to determine how the 
share of manufacturing workers, Ad, maps into the incentives to acquire new lan-
guage knowledge. The difference in utilities from working in the manufacturing and 
the agricultural sector is 65 
(27) 
Evidently, this is positive iff Wm > PII'/, or if the pay-off from one unit of labour for 
manufacturing work is higher than the pay-off from one unit of agricultural work.66 
Using the previous results we can express Vr -vj when markets are in equilibrium 
in terms of Ad and exogenous parameters only: 
(28) 
Hence Vdm - vi is increasing in Ad. 
would presumably require to think of entrepreneurs and how they form expectations about prices 
in a not yet existing equilibrium. 
65The income of a manufacturing worker is w;re:n. The indirect utility of a self-employed agri-
cultural worker (with w~ = p~h~) is calculated similarly. 
66Note that the difference in indirect utilities is a measure of the income difference in units of 
manufacturing goods. 
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2.4.2 The General Equilibrium 
A Benchmark As a benchmark, let us briefly discuss the equilibrium in this econ-
omy if no matching frictions existed in the formation of manufacturing units. Then 
workers flow in and out of the agricultural sector freely. At an interior equilibrium 
it needs to hold that Vdm - vi = O. This is satisfied at Ad := 4'Ymr m"l{3. For any 
Ad < Ad the pay-off from agricultural work is higher, and for Ad > Ad the pay-off 
from manufacturing work is higher, such that this is a stable equilibrium. Further 
Ad > 0, i.e. there will always be an agricultural sector. For a manufacturing sector 
to exist we need that Ad = 4'Y:rr'd"l{3 < 1. Hence manufacturing costs need to be 
low enough for a non-subsistence equilibrium to exists.67 68 
General Equilibrium Consider a region which is in a language learning equilib-
rium as characterised by Proposition 2. At time t the generation which retires has 
agricultural share ad(t - T). Define a general equilibrium of language learning and 
manufacturing growth as: 
Definition 2 (General Equilibrium) A General Equilibrium in region d is a vec-
tor 8d' an agricultural share Ad, and a utility differential7r such that equations (8), 
(15)-(17) and (28) are satisfied simultaneously, given 8~ and Ad(t - 1). 
We find that for the generation which joins the labour force there is a unique 
equilibrium of manufacturing growth and language learning. 
Proposition 4 There is a unique general equilibrium equilibrium. With Ad low 
enough, individuals strictly prefer working in the manufacturing sector conditional 
on being matched and a fraction of the population becomes bilingual. The fraction 
of the population which becomes bilingual is increasing in Ad(t - 1) - ad(t - T)jT 
and A. It is decreasing in {3 and 'Y:rr'd"l. 
The intuition of these results is simple: When Ad is lower than the current value 
of Ad, then individuals want to work in the manufacturing sector, since it has a 
higher pay-off. The reason that Ad is relatively high is that individuals cannot 
work in the manufacturing sector when not successfully matched with a co-worker 
with whom they have a language in common. The incentives for language learning 
are higher if fewer people are already working in manufacturing, i.e. the higher is 
the fraction of the population which remains in the workforce, that works in the 
67Incidentally, the condition implies that technological progress of the form that marginal costs 
decrease at the same proportional rate as fixed costs increase is not enough to 'escape' the subsis-
tence equilibrium. 
680bviously, food cannot weigh to highly in the utility function and the marginal cost of providing 
labour, TJ, should not be too high as this makes working in manufacturing unattractive. The same 
is true for working in agriculture obviously, but there increases in TJ are compensated for by a more 
favourable goods price ratio. 
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agricultural sector; if the manufacturing sector is more productive, i.e. rTr;; is 
lower; and if the relative appreciation of manufacturing goods is lower. A lower Ad 
directly translates into a higher GDP, as long as wages in the manufacturing sector 
are higher than in the agricultural sector. 
The fact that incentives for language learning are higher if fewer people are work-
ing in manufacturing has an interesting implications for the dynamics of language 
learning over time. Consider a situation where in each new generation a fraction 
Ad of the population becomes agricultural workers, there are no incentives for lan-
guage learning, and the remaining population can work in manufacturing without 
any language learning being undertaken. Now imagine a technological innovation 
such that Ad decreases. Then the incentives for language learning are highest in the 
first generation to join the labour force and decrease thereafter. Hence, we would 
expect technology driven language change to be strong initially, but with decreasing 
intensity later on. This is driven by the price mechanism, which lets the relative 
price of agricultural goods increase as fewer individuals work in agriculture. 
2.5 Estimation 
This section provides estimates of the structural parameters a and >. and tests the 
model's implications 1-5. Both parameters have a well-defined economic meaning. 
2.5.1 Data 
I use data from the survey 'Etude de l'Histoire Familiale', conducted in 1999 by the 
French statistical institute INSEE. This survey covers over 370.000 individuals and is 
linked to the French Census data. Amongst other things, the survey enquires about 
the history of an individual's language use with the following questions: 'Which 
language did/do you mainly speak with your r?' where r are all of 'mother', 'father', 
'children', and 'partner'. Similarly, it asked 'Which language did/do you occasionally 
speak with your r?' Individuals could give several answers to each question. I use 
data from individuals born between 1906 and 1926, roughly those individuals who 
join the labor force between 1926 and 1946. 
I use the data to construct the indicator vector gdi characterizing which language 
an individual i in departement d is able to speak. The nth element is 1 if individual 
i names language n in response to any of the above questions and 0 otherwise. 
Individuals with identical 9di form 'language group' j and Sdj is the share of the 
population that speaks only the language ( s) of group j. This allows to straight-
forwardly calculate the probability that any two randomly drawn individuals in a 
departement d have a language in common, sd(t)'1(GiGd)s;1(t), and the probability 
that a member of language group j in district d is matched with someone he can 
communicate with, l(gqj'Gd)sd(t). I refer to those as Aggregate Matching Probability 
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and Group Matching Probability. 
I construct from the data two other measures of language heterogeneity, both of 
which do not account for languages acquired after the childhood. The first repeats 
the calculation of the Aggregate Matching Probability but only considers language 
spoken 'mainly' with the parents. This is a measure of language knowledge and 
heterogeneity if no language learning took place subsequent to the childhood. I 
refer to it as Parent Tongue Matching Probability and take it to be the empirical 
counterpart of 8~(t)'1(GiGd)8~(t). The second measure repeats the calculation 
of the Aggregate Matching Probability but only considers the first language spoken 
'mainly' with the mother (or father if no data on the mother is available), referred to 
as Single Mother Tongue Matching Probability. This measure is the analogue of the 
commonly used Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index of 'ethno-linguistic fractionalization'. 
Further I construct two measures which are closer related to what people under-
stand as ethnic heterogeneity: I obtained data on the shares of foreign nation-
als, for each nationality, in the population of a departement in 1926. I calcu-
late from this the simple share of foreign nationals, Share Foreigners, as well as 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index for nationalities (including French), referred to as 
Hirschman-H erfindahl Nationalities. 
Lastly I use data on the share of the active working population with an occu-
pation in agriculture, forestry or fishing in 1926 and 1946 from the French Census 
(Share Agriculture t). I believe these correspond most closely to what character-
izes the 'agricultural' sector in the model, namely that little communication with 
co-workers is required during the work. As mentioned previously, this is also con-
sistent with data from the 1926 French census, where 61.5% of all individuals in the 
agricultural sectors were head of the firm (farm), i.e. a majority of individuals was 
self-employed while in the industrial and services sectors only 9.0% and 27.0%, re-
spectively, had this role.69 I obtained data on agricultural and manufacturing wages 
in 1929, as well as the distribution of firm sizes. The regional data covers 78 French 
departements in 22 regions. 
2.5.2 Language Heterogeneity and Sectorial Composition 
In order to estimate 0, Table 19 presents Ordinary Least Squares and instrumental 
variable regression results for the structural equation given by (9). The depen-
dent variable is Share Agriculture 1946. Column 1 of Table 19 presents coefficient 
estimates and standard errors from running a simple Ordinary Least Squares re-
gression. The coefficient estimate on the conditional matching probability is -0.108 
(s.e.= 0.049), negative and significant. Taken at face value the coefficient estimate 
implies 0 = 0.079. This suggests that some 8% of productive matches are language-
69Data from p. 164, volume II/III of Statistique Generale de la France (1931b). 
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assortative, i.e. individuals can search easily for a productive partner in their own 
language group. However, this calculation uses 82 = 0.882, which implies that 
T = 8.3. Given that one time period is 20 years, this clearly is unreasonably high. 
This points to the existence of some important factor shaping the persistence of the 
departement specific agricultural share, other than language heterogeneity. I assume 
for further calculations therefore T = 2, which implies 40 working years after joining 
the labour force. Obviously the fact that 82 is biased sheds doubts on whether our 
estimate of (h is as well unbiased. As a first check I constrain the coefficient estimate 
on the agricultural share to be 0.5, as implied by T = 2. Results from a constraint 
regression yield a coefficient estimate for 61 of -0.088 (s.e.=0.113), hence it is in a 
very similar ball-park as the unconstrained estimate. Assuming T = 2 implies an 
estimate of a, using the result for 61 from column 1, of 0.784. This implies that some 
21 % of workers need to find a productive partner with whom they can communicate 
from the region's entire population, i.e. can not match language assortatively. These 
individuals increase their probability to work in a communication-intensive sector 
by expanding the set of languages they speak. 
Columns 2 to 5 show that this effect is not simply a proxy for other heterogeneity 
measures associated with quite different interpretations, i.e. it does not just proxy 
for the role of being foreigner, being of the same nationality, or having a common 
mother-tongue. In column 2 I control for the simple share of foreign nationals in 
a district at the start of the period and in column 3 I control for the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of heterogeneity in nationalities. The coefficient estimate increases 
slightly in both cases and both coefficients remain significant at the 5% level. In 
column 4 and 5 I control for the probability of a successful random match if indi-
viduals would continue speaking only the language they spoke primarily with their 
mother70 (column 4) or only the language(s) they spoke primarily with their par-
ents. Both of these measures account not only for heterogeneity induced by foreign 
nationals, but as well heterogeneity induced by French nationals speaking a minority 
language. In both cases the point estimate changes remarkably little and the point 
estimate relating to the alternative measure is virtually O. However, the coefficient 
estimate of interest is no longer significant. The imprecision in the estimate is likely 
to be caused by the strong correlation of the the control variable with the main ex-
planatory variable of interest, the conditional matching probability. (The Pearson 
correlation coefficient is 0.831 and 0.835, respectively.) 
All of the regressions in column 1 through 5 are Ordinary Least Squares regres-
sions. Naturally, one should be concerned that the conditional matching probability 
is itself determined by economic incentives which in turn might be shaped by the 
sectorial composition of the labor force. In fact, I make precisely this argument in 
sections 2.3 and 2.4. However, the analysis suggests as well a possible instrumen-
7°This is the same as a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of mother-tongue heterogeneity. 
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tal variables strategy: In particular, it shows that the matching probability after 
language learning took place, sd(t)'l(GiGd )sd(t), is correlated with the matching 
probability implied by the set of languages inherited from the parental generation, 
s~(t)'l(GiGd)S~(t). For this to be a valid instrument, it needs to be uncorrelated 
with contemporaneous economic incentive for language learning. This will hold in 
the data to the extend that parents are non-strategic in the choice of the language 
they transmit to their children. Column 6 shows results from the corresponding 
instrumental variables regression. The size of the estimated effect of the matching 
probability (-0.120, s.e.= 0.050) remains almost unchanged, and it remains signif-
icant at the 90% confidence level. (The coefficient of interest in the first stage 
regression is 0.405 with standard errors equal to 0.026.) 
While none of these specifications might be ultimately convincing, the results 
are stable across specification. The results are consistent with the interpretation 
that the probability of two individuals having a language in common is important 
for the sectorial composition of individuals joining the labor force (and do not reject 
Testable Implication 1). 
The model implied that the share of workers joining the communication intensive 
sector would be 1 in case that at workers can communicate with each other, as long 
as the utility from working in the communication intensive sector is higher than in 
the agricultural sector. This will be true as long as the agricultural share is not 
too low, which I assume for the moment.71 This corresponds to the hypothesis that 
bo + bl = 0 in (7) or Testable Implication 2. A t-test on the estimation results from 
column 1 in Table 19 fails to reject this hypothesis at conventional significance levels 
(t-stat= 1.175, p-value= 0.253). 
Equation (10) makes precise how the sectorial composition is heterogeneous 
across language groups within the same district. Table 20 presents a number of 
regression specifications testing this implication. The dependent variable is the lan-
guage group specific share of manufacturing workers. First, column 1 presents results 
from a simple Ordinary Least Squares regression on the probability that a worker 
of this group has a language in common with a randomly chosen individual from 
the departement. The coefficient estimate of (1 is 0.087 (s.e.=0.022), significant at 
the 99% level. The specifications in column 2 and 3 control for a set of region and 
departement fixed effects, respectively. The coefficient estimate increases slightly to 
0.100 (s.e.= 0.022) and 0.097 (s.e.= 0.022), suggesting that the result is not driven 
by any region or departement specific characteristics. 
The analysis in section 2.2 suggests that the variance of the error term is inversely 
proportional to Sdj' Hence the generalised least square estimator which takes this 
information into account is the efficient estimation procedure for equation (10). 
71 If this assumption does not hold in the data, the power of a t-test is higher, i.e. performing a 
t-test is more powerful than we think. 
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Column 4 through 6 show equivalent specifications using Generalised Least Squares, 
where the variance of the error is modeled to be inversely related to the number of 
observations in the language group. The size of the coefficient estimate increases 
across specifications to in between 0.117 (when including departement fixed effects) 
and 0.124 (when including no fixed effects) and it remains significant at the 99% 
level throughout. Equation (10) suggests that 1- (1 is an alternative estimate of Q. 
Taking the last estimate, this implies (] = 0.883. 
Lastly, Figure 9 presents results which help to understand whether the simple 
model is sufficient to explain the role of language knowledge for the sectorial com-
position across groups. In particular, it presents coefficient estimates of (1 and 90% 
confidence intervals from 5 separate regressions. Each of them is equivalent to col-
umn 1 of Table 20, but uses data on the districts' 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th biggest 
language group only, respectively. The coefficient estimates are in the same ball 
park around 0.2 (corresponding to Q = 0.8). 
All coefficient estimates for Q - both from the group level and regional level data 
- are in the [0,1] interval, as suggested by the theory, and range from around 0.5 
to around 0.8. Hence this simple one-parameter model of language heterogeneity 
hence seems to have some traction to explain differences in the sectorial composi-
tion of the workforce both across departements and across language groups within 
departements. 
2.5.3 Language Learning and Wages Differentials 
I now present estimation results for A. Table 21 presents results from estimating 
equation (19). Column 1 presents results from a simple Ordinary Least Squares 
regression for reference. The explanatory variable uses information on 7r d, which 
measures the differential utility gain from working in the communication intensive 
sector. Equation (27) suggests how to calculate 7rd using information on the agricul-
tural and manufacturing wages, as well as information of fl. I calculate 7rd for each 
departement.72 As discussed in section 2.3.2, we have all reasons to belief that 7rSd2 
is endogenous in this regression. The theory suggests to use S~2 as instrument for 
7rSd2. Column 2 presents results from such an instrumental variable regression. The 
corresponding first stage regression is shown in column 3. The excluded instrument 
is highly significant in the first stage. The coefficient of interest in the instrumental 
variable regression is negative (Testable Implication 4) and significant at the 90% 
level (-0.050, s.e.=0.022). Recall that f)1 = -A(1 - Q). Based on our estimate of Q 
of 0.784 (see column 1 of Table 1) this implies the estimate of A to be 0.231. The 
size of this coefficient needs to be evaluated relative to 7r. The mean of 7r is 60.8 
(s.d.= 29.5). Hence the mean utility cost of learning another language (1/ ~ = 4.3) is 
72See section 2.6.1 for information on how I calibrate 71. 
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estimated to be 7% of the utility gain from working in the communication intensive 
sector. This estimate naturally needs to be interpreted in the context of the explicit 
French language learning policy, which essentially reduced the individual language 
learning cost. The estimate is a lower bound for the mean disutility of language 
learning in the absence of such a policy. 
Notably, the coefficient estimate for log S~l is not significantly different from 1 
(Testable Implication 5). This can be interpreted as changes in the language group's 
share being only depend on the other language groups' sizes, not the own group's 
size. 
2.6 Model Evaluation 
The coefficient estimates of a and ..\ obtained before can be used to simulate the 
general equilibrium model. Obviously, the model has more unknown parameters: 
{3 and "1, as well as the full set of r d and rd. I calibrate these using the model's 
equations of state. I then use these together with the estimates of a and ..\ to simulate 
the stock of language knowledge and sectorial composition in 1946. To evaluate the 
model I compare the model's predictions against the historical development. 
2.6.1 Calibration 
All of ad, Sd, Gd , w:I\ SFd, e and the share of expenditure on agricultural products 
are observable. The equations of state presented in section 2.4.1 imply how to 
estimate the unknown parameters "1, /3, r:r and rd' I assume that these parameters 
remain unchanged over time. Take consumption and work to be measured over a 
week, and working time and wages over days. 
Equation (21) states that /3 is the expenditure on agricultural goods in units 
of manufacturing goods. Note that we can normalize p:r (which by free trade in 
manufacturing goods is constant across regions) to 1 by a suitable choice of units 
of measurement of m. The parameter {3 can be calibrated from a simple aggregate 
statistic on prices and the consumption share of agriculture.73 I do not have data on 
730bviously this relies on the utility function specifying correctly preferences. We could test 
this, as (21) has two (closely linked) testable predictions: (i) For constant prices the amount spend 
on agricultural products is constant, and hence, in particular, independent of income. (ii) Changes 
in how much is spend on agricultural products should be predicted by changes in the relative price 
alone, and not, for example, total income. We can test these with cross-sectional data (in case that 
prices are constant across the data) and/or time-series data. I only have data on the consumption 
behaviour for the period from 1950 (Source: Consommation). Unfortunately the data published 
each year varies, and I cannot extract time-series data. In any case, it gives data for 1958 for 
16 different social groups. The amount spend on agricultural and non-agricultural products by 
each group is presented in Figure 11. This corresponds to test (i) mentioned above. This seems 
to be supportive of the idea that a constant f3 (in terms of manufacturing goods) is spend on 
agricultural goods. If one runs a regression, the slope coefficient is still significant. However, this 
might partly be because the prices which those different groups are exposed to are different 74, 
in which case the model does not imply that the expenditure on agricultural goods is the same. 
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the agricultural consumption share or prices in 1930. I use data from 1956, which 
I deflate to 1930 prices. The weekly consumption of agricultural goods was then 
84.65Fr, which is the estimate of {3. This is measured in Old Franc, as are 'fI, T:;\ 7r, 
r;r, wages and Cdi, but this will be immaterial to my analysis, since only ratios are 
of interest (which obviously means that a further normalisation could be done). 
Equation (22) suggests how to estimate 'fl. As Vy(Y, e*) = 1/Pm in the non-
subsistence case and by setting Pm = 1 or by using data on Pm, this implies that 'fI 
can be estimated from an individual level regression of observed wages on observed 
work hours.75 This would take the model very seriously. The estimate is likely to 
be biased, as for example 'pleasure in working' might influence both e* and w*. I 
do not have individual or departement specific data on working times. I take the 
average working time to be 6 days (per week). From the average daily wage we can 
calculate our estimate f] = 5.35Fr. 
Equation (26) links the equilibrium firm size to r;r. I obtained data on the 
departement average firm size in 1926 and departement average wages from the 1930 
French statistical yearbook. Together with f] I back out r;r for each departement. 
Given my estimates of rT, I use equation (25) to back out TT.76 
2.6.2 Simulation 
Conditional on the language endowments prior to language learning of the popula-
tion born between 1906 and 1926 in each departement, the parameters (0, A,~, f]) 
and the region-specific parameters CrT, iT), the general equilibrium of language 
learning, manufacturing share and income differential characterised in proposition 
4 can be calculated numerically. 
In order to map the data to the model, I take the 'Etude de I'Histoire Familiale', 
but consider only the information on the language spoken primarily with the mother 
(or father, if no information on the mother is available) to construct the departement 
specific shares of single-tongue language groups. These correspond to 8~ in equations 
(15)-(17). Equation (28) maps any Ad into 7r. Given any 7r, and using the estimate 
of A, Corollary 2 suggests how to find numerically equilibrium language learning 
decisions satisfying equations (15)-(17). Equation (8) maps these into the share of 
the cohort which works in agriculture/manufacturing. For this I use data on the 
existing agricultural share in 1926 for Ad(t -1) and assume T = 2. I perform a grid 
search over values of Ad to find the general equilibrium in each department d. 
Another thing is that the first two groups are agriculturalists and agricultural workers, which surely 
have some unreported self-consumption of their produce. The take-away is that the implication of 
the log-linear utility function does not look totally off. 
750r 1/'TJ when run the other way around, though this is not unbiased for 'TJ, even though 
everybody always does it. 
761f one had data on agricultural prices and productivity, one could use the equilibrium price 
equation (24) as a robustness check. Proxies of agricultural productivity might be output per area, 
rainfall or land gradient. 
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Figure 10 presents the results. Subfigure (a) compared the actual and the sim-
ulated change in the agricultural share from 1926 to 1946. Subfigure (b) presents 
the actual and simulated probability that two randomly matched individuals have 
a language in common for the cohort of individuals born between 1906 and 1926, 
i.e. roughly those who entered the labour market between 1926 and 1946. From 
these figures it is apparent that the model predicts a substantial fraction of the 
co-evolution of both language abilities and the sectorial composition between 1926 
and 1946. 
In order to test whether the model predicts a significant share of the variation 
in the data and to calculate which fraction of the variation is predicted correctly by 
the model, consider Table 22. All columns show Ordinary Least Squares regressions. 
In Panel A the dependent variable is the historical change in the agricultural share 
between 1926 and 1946. The main regression of interest, column 1, includes as 
explanatory a change in the agricultural share between 1926 and 1946 predicted by 
the simulation of the general equilibrium model. The coefficient of interest is positive 
and significant (0.179, s.e.= 0.032). Its size is significantly lower than 1, suggesting 
that the model over-predicts the real change in the agricultural sector. Since in all 
previous econometric specifications there is a concern, that there might be some 
omitted factor, which both drives language homogenisation and the decline of the 
share working in the agricultural sector, I include in column 2 the initial agricultural 
share in 1926. The coefficient of interest on the simulated change remains in the same 
ball park and is highly significant, while the coefficient on the initial agricultural 
share is insignificant. Further, the fraction of the explained variation in the data 
remains virtually unchanged (R2 increases from 0.339 to 0.346). Lastly, when only 
including the initial agricultural share in 1926 in column 3, the R2 drops to 0.270. 
Hence, compared to a simple model of mean reversion, the general equilibrium model 
of language heterogeneity, language change, and structural change explains some 
additional 7% of the variation in the data compared to a simple model of mean 
reversion. Obviously, this simple model of mean reversion might partly explain the 
data well, since it is correlates with the predictions of the general equilibrium model 
set out here - in a departement with high agricultural share we expect the wage 
differential to be big, language learning to be strong and hence the agricultural 
share to fall. Therefore, 7% is a lower bound on the share of the data's variation 
that the model explains. 
Panel B show similar results for the probability of two randomly chosen indi-
viduals in a district having a language in common. The coefficient on the model's 
prediction is positive and significant both when controlling for the mother-tongue 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index in column 2 and when not doing so in column 1. How-
ever, while the model alone predicts some 61.4% of the variation in the data, it 
does not add substantially over and above the predictive value of mother-tongue 
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heterogeneity. 
I interpret these results as the model explaining a substantial share of the vari-
ation in the speed of structural change across French departements, but to a lesser 
extend the language change. 
2.7 Discussion 
This paper aims to be a first step to understanding the relation of language he-
mogenisation and structural change. While there are potentially many mechanisms 
which might link these two processes, this paper focuses on one particular - and 
I think particularly relevant - channel: It analysis the role of a common language 
in the formation of joint productive units. Further it derives implications for the 
pattern of language change induced by incentives for language learning due to higher 
wages in the communication intensive sector. The paper provides a simple frame-
work to organise our thinking about these topics. 
The theoretical framework also highlights the key structural parameters and how 
these can be estimated. Using data from early 20th century France I estimate that 
some 21% of workers cannot match language assortatively (or have an occupation 
which does not allow them to). Hence language diversity might play an important 
role in the formation of joint productive units. Secondly, the mean utility cost of 
learning another language is estimated to be 7% of the utility gain from working in 
the communication intensive sector versus working in the agricultural sector. The 
estimation procedures might raise reasonable doubts, and none of the estimates 
might be convincing. However, they demonstrate how an empirical investigation of 
the model can be guided and tightly linked to the theoretical framework and where 
further work would be interesting. 
Lastly, I calibrate the remaining parameters of the general equilibrium model in 
order to simulate the model and derive prediction for the language homogenisation 
and structural change across French departements between 1926 and 1946. I com-
pare these predictions with the historical development. The general framework of 
the joint determination of language homogenisation and structural change set out 
in this paper explains at least 7% of the variation in the change of the agricultural 
share. However, it does not explain any substantial variation in the language he-
mogenisation. Naturally, the interpretation of these results needs to rest on the 
specific French context. In particular, France has had an explicit policy of language 
homogenisation since the French Revolution, and learning of French was not costly, 
and unavoidable when going to school. It might well be, that in another context 
economic incentives for language change are more important. 
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B Appendix 
B.1 Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1. The 'reaction functions' are given by 
S· ~ = max{min{(c - (1 - a)7rLj)/C, I}, O} 
Sj 
(29) 
where -j refers to group 1 if j = 2 and vice versa. Consider case a. Conjecture 
an interior equilibrium. Then these solve for (14). In this, when sg < c/((1 - a)7r) 
(and hence s~ < c/((1 - a)7r» the denominator and nominator are positive for 
j = 1,2 and the denominator is necessarily smaller than the denominator. Hence 
the interior equilibrium exists. It is unique since no boundary equilibrium exists. 
This is because for S_j = 0 we have Sj/ sJ = 1, but for Sj = sJ equation (29) implies 
S_j > 0, since sJ(I- a)7r < c. Similarly S_j = 1 cannot be an equilibrium. Consider 
case b. Again conjecture an interior equilibrium. Now (9) cannot be an equilibrium, 
since the denominator is positive for j = 2, but negative for j = 1, while the sign of 
the denominator is the same for j = 1,2. However, it needs to hold that SI, S2 ~ O. 
When SI = 0 equation (29) implies S2/ sg = 1. This implies SI = O. Hence this 
is an equilibrium. It is straight-forward to check that (S2' sd = (0, s?) is not an 
equilibrium. Lastly, consider case c. It is easy to check that (SI' S2) = (s?,O) and 
(SI' S2) = (0, sg) are equilibria as outlined before. The stability of equilibria is easily 
checked by comparing the slopes of the reaction functions. • 
Proof of Proposition 2. We first show that given the language learning decisions 
being as postulated in proposition 2, a vector 8* exists which satisfies (15), (16) and 
(17) (Part 1). We then show that the language learning decisions are optimal (Part 
2). 
Part 1: Define the following sequence 
SI(n + 1) .- s~ [1- Fc((1 - a)7r(s2(n»)] 
s2(n + 1) .- s~ [1- Fc((1- <»1r(s,(n) + j;<s::' - sm(n)))] 
sj(n + 1) .- sJ [1 - Fc((1 - a)7r(s~ + L. (s~ - sm(n»)] 'Vj = 3,4, ... , Nd 
{m:m~J,I} 
and denote s(n) := [sl(n), s2(n), s3(n), ... , sNd(n)l'. First note that sj(n) :::; sj(n-1) 
for all j = 2,3, ... , Nd and sl(n) ~ sI(n - 1) imply 8j(n + 1) :::; 8j(n) for all 
j = 2,3, ... , Nd and 81(n+l) ~ 81(n). This is true as Fc is monotonically increasing. 
Secondly, consider 8j(0) = sJ Vj = 2,3, ... , Nd and 81 (0) = O. Then as long as 
Fc(z) > 0 for any z > 0, together with a < 1 and 7r > 0, it holds that 8j(1) < 
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SJ = Sj{O) for all j = 2,3, ... , Nd and sl(1) > 0 = Sl{O). By induction, s{n) is 
a monotonic sequence, with the first element being monotonically increasing and 
element j > 1 being monotonically decreasing. 
Further it is true that sl(n) is bounded from above (by at most s~) and any sj(n), 
j = 2,3, ... ,Nd, is bounded from below (by at least 0). 
As s{n) is monotonic and bounded, by the monotone convergence theorem it is 
converging. The limit satisfies the condition for an equilibrium given by (15), (16) 
and (17). Hence an equilibrium exists and can be found as the limit of the sequence 
s(n). 
Part 2: It is trivial that a language learner from group j > 2 finds it optimal to 
learn the language of group 1. This is because 'rim > 1 it is true that s? > s~ and 
nobody learns the language of group j in equilibrium. For a member of group 2 to 
find it optimal to learn the language of group 1 it needs to hold in equilibrium that 
Nd 
s· + '"'(SO - s* ) > max SO 
1 ~ m m {m:m>2} m 
m=3 
We know by assumption maxm s~ = sg. As s~ - s:n ;::: 0 for all m > 3 it is 
sufficient to show that si > S3' This follows from (15) and (17) as s~ > sg and 
s; ~ sg < s~ ~ s~ + E{m:m;,i:j,l}(S~ - s:n) and Fe is monotonically increasing. 
For an individual from language group 1 to prefer learning the language of group 2 
over any other language, it needs to hold that 
s~;::: max s:n. {m:m>2} 
Suppose not, i.e. there exist an s~ with n > 2 such that s~ > s;. As by assumption 
sg > s~ it follows that sg - s; > s~ - s~. Write (17) as 
s; - sg[1 - Fc((1 - a)7r{si + (s~ - s~) + L (s~ - s:n))] 
{m:m;,i:l,2,n} 
s* 
- s~[1 - Fc((1 - a)7r(s~ + (sg - s;) + L (s~ - s:n))]. n 
{m:m#,2,n} 
But then sg > s~ together with s~ - s~ < sg - s; and si < s~ imply S2 > s~, a 
contradiction. -
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose there two groups j and h, j, h > 2, such that 
sJ > s~ and s; / sJ ~ s'h/ s~. Then as well (s; - s~) / s~ ~ (s'h - s~) / s~. Rewrite (17) 
as 
(s~ - sj)/ s~ = Fc((1 - a)7r(s~ - (Sh - s~)/ s~ . s~) + L (s~ - s:n)] 
m;,i:l,j,h 
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and similarly for group h. These then immediately imply (sj - sJ) / sJ > (sit - s~) / s~, 
a contradiction. The proof for groups 1 and 2 proceeds similarly. _ 
Proof of Proposition 3. First note that given any s(n) as defined in Corollary 
2, and 1f > 1f' and s(n)(1f) S s(n)(1f') , it will be true that s(n + 1)(7r) S s(n + 
1)(1f'). Further note that s(O)(1f) = s(O)(1f') = [0, sg, sg, ... ,sRrJ implies s(I)(1f) S 
s(I)(7r'). Secondly, let sd(1f') denote the limit of s(n)(1f'). Consider Sd(1f', 0). Given 
1f this is not an equilibrium, as at least one of (15), (16) and (17) would not be 
satisfied if some elements Sdj(1f',o:) E (0, S~j) and Fe is strictly increasing over the 
relevant range. As s (n) ( 7r) is monotonically below s (n ) (1f') and converges to a 
different limit, for the limit it needs to hold that sd(7r, 0) S sd(7r', 0). The proof for 
the a result is similar. -
Proof of Proposition 4. We know that Vdm - vi is increasing in Ad by (28). 
Further we know by Proposition 3 that Sd is monotonically decreasing in Vdm - vi 
which by the (6) implies that Ad is monotonically increasing. Hence there is a unique 
Ad such that (6) and (28) are simultaneously satisfied. -
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B.2 Tables 
TABLE 18: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Aggregate Matching Probability '06-'26 0.897 0.071 0.617 1.000 
Share Foreigners 1921 0.032 0.043 0.001 0.259 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Nationalities 1926 0.692 0.164 0.247 0.964 
Single Mother Tongue M. Prob. '06'26 0.913 0.086 0.491 0.998 
Parent Tongue Matching Prob. '06-'26 0.703 0.156 0.278 0.964 
Share Agriculture 1926 0.482 0.175 0.005 0.759 
Share Agriculture 1946 0.456 0.158 0.007 0.764 
sdl 0.720 0.204 0.133 0.974 
S~l 0.783 0.144 0.467 0.98 
sd2 0.057 0.087 0.000 0.408 
S~2 0.130 0.135 0.011 0.475 
7rd 61.7 30.4 -7.8 177.6 
Wage Agricultural Workers 1930 (Fr./day) 22.3 4.2 10.0 40.0 
Wage Industrial Workers 1930 (Fr./day) 34.6 4.8 27.0 53.8 
Average Number of Employees Industry 1926 2.8 1.4 1.4 9.4 
7rd 60.8 29.5 -7.8 177.6 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for variables used in Tables 19 through 22. Column 1 
presents the mean, column 2 the standard deviation, column 3 the minimum and column 4 the maximum. 
For details on the variables' definitions and data sources see Table 23. 
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TABLE 19: LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE AND SECTORIAL COMPOSITION: AGGREGATE LEVEL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(OLS) (IV) 
Share Agriculture 1946, (Ad) 
Aggregate Matching P. '06-'26 -0.108** -0.129** -0.135** -0.088 -0.074 -0.120*+ 
(0.086) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049) (0.083) 
Share of Foreigners 1921 -0.126 
(0.085) 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Nat. 1926 0.076 
: 
(0.045) 
Single Mother Tongue M. P. '06-'26 -0.011 
(0.040) 
Parent Tongue Matching P. '06-'26 -0.018 
(0.042) 
Share Agriculture 1926 0.882*** 0.866* ...... 0.859* ...... 0.880*** 0.878*** 0.883*** 
(0.030) (0.040) (0.040) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) 
Constant 0.131+** 0.162*** 0.097** 0.121 ** 0.116 ...... 0.142*** 
(0.040) (0.046) (0.041) (0.053) (0.054) (0.042) 
R2 0.957 0.958 0.958 0.957 0.958 0.957 
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Notes: Columns 1 through 5 present results from simple Ordinary Least Squares regressions at the departement level; 
column 6 presents results an instrumental variables regression. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The dependent 
variable in all regressions in the departement level share of the active population working in agriculture in 1946. The 
main explanatory variable of interest is the department level probability that any two randomly matched individuals have 
a language in common. Notably this measure accounts for knowledge of several languages. In column 6 I instrument for 
this measure with the probability that any two randomly chosen individuals have a language in common - when using only 
language knowledge with was transferred by the parents, i.e. not considering language abilities which have been acquired 
later in life. In the first stage the coefficient on the excluded instrument is 0.405 (s.e.= 0.026). The standard errors are 
clustered on regional level (not departement) to account for spacial correlation. 
TABLE 20: LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE AND SECTORIAL COMPOSITION: GROUP LEVEL 
(1) (2) (3) 
I 
(4) (5) (6) 
(OLS) (GLS) 
Share Manufacturing, (1 - A .) 
Group Matching Probability '06-'26 0.087*** 0.100*+* 0.097*** 0.124*** 0.121*** 0.117*** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) 
FE Region District Region District 
R2 0.013 0.036 0.090 0.031 0.259 0.442 
N 1495 1495 1495 1495 1495 1495 
Notes: Column 1 through 3 present results from Ordinary Least Squares regressions. Column 4 through 6 present results 
from Generalised Least Squares regressions. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The dependent variable in all 
regressions is the departement specific share of members of a language group who do work, but not in the agricultural 
sector. The explanatory variable in all regressions is the probability that a member of the language group has a language in 
common with a randomly drawn individual from the departement. In columns 4 through 6 these the variance of the error 
term is taken to be inversely proportional to the language groups size. In column 2 and 5 a full set of 22 region fixed effects 
are included, in columns 3 and 6 a full set of departement fixed effects are included. All regressions also include a constant 
term. The coefficients are not reported for expositional clarity. The standard errors in columns 1 through 3 are calculated 
using the Huber-White correction to account for potential heteroscedasticity. 
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TABLE 21: LANGUAGE LEARNING COST 
PANEL A: 
N 
(1) 
(OL8) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
1.456*** 
(0.127) 
76 
PANEL B: (First Stage) 
N 
(2) 
(IV) 
-0.050** 
(0.023) 
0.926*** 
(0.304) 
76 
25.133*** 
(6.392) 
0.745 
(3.611) 
76 
Notes: The table presents regression results, 
standard errors are given in parentheses. In 
Panel A column 1 presents results from an Or-
dinary Least Squares regression, and column 
2 present results from an instrumental vari-
able regression. The regressions in Panel A 
do not include a constant term; see equation 
(18). Column 2 in Panel B presents the cor-
responding first stage regression, where 8~2 is 
used as excluded instrument, as suggested by 
equation (19). The standard errors are cal-
culated using the Huber-White correction to 
account for potential heteroscedasticity. For 
definitions of the variables see Table 23. 
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TABLE 22: MODEL EVALUATION 
(1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A: Change in Agricultural Share '26-'46 
Simulated Change Agri. Share '26-'46 0.179*"'* 0.143*** 
(0.032) (0.052) 
Agricultural Share '26 -0.032 -0.114*** 
(0.035) (0.023) 
Constant -0.017*** -0.003 0.031** 
(0.004) (0.017) (0.012) 
R2 0.339 0.346 0.270 
N 78 78 78 
PANEL B: Aggregate M. Prob. '06- '26 Cohort 
Simulated Matching Prob. '06-'26 Cohort 0.377*** 0.115* 
(0.040) (0.066) 
Single Mother Tongue M. Prob. '06-'26 Cohort 0.238*"'* 0.318*** 
(0.050) (0.027) 
Constant 0.625*** 0.652*** 0.680*** 
(0.033) (0.030) (0.022) 
R2 0.614 0.699 0.686 
N 78 78 78 
Notes: The table presents results from Ordinary Least Squares regressions at the department level. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. In Panel A the dependent variable is the change in the share 
of the working population in agriculture between 1926 and 1946. In Panel B the dependent variable 
is the Aggregate Matching Probability amongst the cohort of individuals born between 1906 and 1926. 
The explanatory variables 'Simulated Change Agri. Share 026-046' and 'Simulated Matching Prob. 
006-026 Cohort' are predicted values from the simulation of the general equilibrium model as described 
in section 2.6.2. For definitions of the other variables see Table 23. The standard errors are calculated 
using the Huber-White correction to account for potential heteroscedasticity. 
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B .3 Figures 
FIGURE 7: LANGUAGE DIVERSITY AND SECTORIAL COMPOSIT ION 
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Notes: The figure is a scatterplot of na tional I vel data on language div rsity in 2009 (Sour e: Ethnologue 2009) , 
a standard Hirschman-Herfindahl index of mother-ton gue diversity, a nd the share f industry and s rvi es in 2005 
GOP (Source: World Development Indicators 2005). Countries with GDI b low the average p r capita DP (in 
2005 PPP, corresponding to 11.588$) are depicted in red , other countri - in blue. S I ted ountri a r lab lied . 
The raw correlation between the GOP measure and languag divers ity is -0.259, and the corr la tion b tw n th 
industry and services share in GOP and the diversity index is -0.464. (N = 158) 
F IGURE 8: 20TH CENTURY MOTIIER TONGUES IN FRAN E 
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Notes: The figure presents data on the share of mother tongues - defined as the language mai nly spoken with the 
mother (or father, if no data on the mother is available) - in France by birth ohort. The first ohort was born 
between 1900 and 1909, the second cohort from 1910 until 1919 and so on. T he French local la nguages which a !" 
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recognised in the database are ' franc;ais', 'alsacien', 'breton', 'catalan', ' pla tt moselan ', 'basque', 'corse', ' francontois', 
'franco provenc;al', 'Aamand langues d 'Occ', , langues d 'Oil', ' franco-provencal' , 'crool s it bas fran<;aise'. (Source: 
lnstitut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (1999)) 
FIGURE 9: MATCHING PROBABILITY AND MANUPACTU RING WORK 
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Notes: The fi gure presents regression coeffi cient estim ates a nd confidence interva ls. Th timat s a rc the co ffi cients 
from three separate group level regressions of the 'Share in Manufacturing' on the 'Group Matching Probability 
'06-'26'. These correspond to the regression shown in column 1 of Tabl 20. How v r, while thos r ult us th 
pooled data for a ll language groups, here I run separa te regressions for th 2nd , 3rd or 4th biggest language groups, 
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FIGURE 10: SIMULATION VERSUS H ISTORI AL !l ANG E 
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Notes: The figures presents departement level historical hanges togeth r with the predictions from the simulat ion 
of the model as outlines in section 2.6.2. Subfigure (a) is a scatter plot of th historical and imulated change of the 
share of workers employed in agriculture between 1926 and 1946. Subfigur (b) is a scatterplot of th simulat d 
probability of any two individuals having a language in common and the observed aggr gate matching probability. 
For the variable definitions and data sources see Appendix B.4. 
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FIGURE 11: FOOD CONSUMPTION SHARE, 1956 (BY SOCI AL GROUPS) 
a 
~ _ Total Consumption 
_ Food Consumption 
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Notes: The figure present the weekly per ca pita total expenditure a nd xp -nditure on food ac ross Prance in 1956. 
All amounts are in French Fra nc. The data is disaggregated by 15 social groups . The first 6 group a re, from I ft to 
right, 'agricultural workers ' , ' unskilled workers' , 'self-employed agricuILura l',' holise work rs ', ' not activ " ' workers' . 
For det a ils see Centre de Recherches et de Documenta tion sllr la onsommation (195 ) . 
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B.4 Data Description and Sources 
Variable 
Aggregate Match-
ing Probability '06-
'26 
Single Mother 
Tongue M. Prob. 
'06'26 
Parent 
Matching 
'06-'26 
Share 
1921 
Tongue 
Prob. 
Foreigners 
TABLE 23: DATA DESCRIPTION & SOURCES 
Description 
The variable is constructed from individual level 
data gathered along the census in 1999. Out of 
370072 individuals, I use data from individuals 
born between 1906 and 1926 (N=32606), since 
Source 
Institut National 
de la Statistique 
et des Etudes 
Economiques 
those are roughly those individuals who join the (1999) 
labor force between 1926 and 1946. The respon-
dents were asked: 'Which language did/do you 
mainly speak with your r?' where r are all of 
'mother', 'father', 'children', and 'partner'. Sim-
ilarly, they were asked 'Which language did/do 
you occasionally speak with your r?' Individ-
uals could give several answers to each ques-
tion. For each individual I construct a vector 9di 
(with the length of all languages which appear 
in the data) with element equal to 1 if the re-
spondent answers to have spoken that language 
frequently or occasionally with someone. From 
these I calculate all existing language groups and 
their department specific share. Then I compute 
sd(t)'l( Gi Gd)Sd(t). 
This measure is calculated analogously to 'Aggre-
gate Matching Probability '06-'26'. The only dif-
ference is, that in the vector 9di only one element 
is set to 1, which is the language which is reported 
to have been spoken mainly with the mother. If 
several languages are reported, only the first one 
is considered only. If no information on the main 
language spoken with the mother is available, in-
formation on the language spoken with the father 
is used, if available. 
This measure is calculated analogously to 'Ag-
gregate Matching Probability '06- '26'. The only 
difference is, that in the vector 9di only element 
are set to 1, where the individual reports that he 
Institut National 
de la Statistique 
et des Etudes 
Economiques 
(1999) 
Institut National 
de la Statistique 
et des Etudes 
Economiques 
used mainly this language when talking to either (1999) 
his mother or his father. 
This is the departemental share of foreigners in 
1921. 
Institut 
de la 
et des 
National 
Statistique 
Etudes 
Economiques 
(1949, pp. 355-356) 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
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Variable 
Hirschman-
Herfindahl Na-
tionalities 1926 
Share Agriculture 
1926, 1946 
Share Manufactur-
ing 
TABLE 23 - CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE 
Description 
I use departemental data on the number of in-
dividuals with non-French nationality, for the 30 
nationalities reported in the 1926 census (of which 
one is 'other nationalities') together with data on 
the departemental population in 1926 (reported 
in the 1968 census). I calculate the share of each 
nationality (including French) and compute the 
departemental Hischman-Herfindahl index. 
Departemental share of the active working pop-
ulation which is working in agriculture, forestry 
and fishery. 
This measures the fraction of the respondents in 
each department and language group which work, 
but do not work in agriculture. 
Source 
Statistique 
Generale de la 
France (1931b, 
pp. 230-233), 
Institut National 
de la Statistique 
et des Etudes 
Economiques 
(1968, pp. 1152-
1155) 
Statistique 
Generale de la 
France (1931a, pp. 
145-146) Statis-
tique Generale de 
la France (1951, p. 
73) 
Institut National 
de la Statistique 
et des Etudes 
:Economiques 
(1999) 
Group Match- This variable is calculated similarly to 'Aggre- Institut National 
ing Probability 
006-026 
Wage Agricultural 
Workers 1930 
(Fr./day) 
gate Matching Probability '06- '26', however in 
the last step the department-language group spe-
cific l(gd/Gd)Sd(t) is calculated. 
Departemental average daily wage of male agri-
cultural workers in 1930. 
Wage Industrial Departemental average daily wage of male work-
Workers 1930 ers in the departmental capital in 1930. Where 
(Fr./day) no data for 1930 is available, I used inflation ad-
justed (7.382%) wage data from 1929. 
de la Statistique 
et des Etudes 
Economiques 
(1999) 
Statistique 
Generale de la 
France (1931a, p. 
249) 
Statistique 
Generale de la 
France (1931a, p. 
248) 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
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Variable 
Average N um-
ber of Employees 
Ind ustry 1926 
TABLE 23 - CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE 
Description 
The statistical yearbook reports data on the 
France-wide number of firms in different size cat-
egories (no employee, 1 to 5, 6 to 20, 21 to 100 
and more than 100 employees), split up by sec-
tors. It as well reports the number of persons 
working in firms of a certain size and sector. I 
uses this data to construct the average number 
of workers in non-agricultural (agriculture, fish-
ery, forestry) firms, for each category. For ex-
ample, non-agricultural firms with 1-5 employ-
ees have on average 1. 787 workers. I then use 
departemental data on the distribution of firms 
across these categories (for example, I know that 
in Ain 24150 firms exist with 1 to 5 employees) 
together with the average number of workers in 
non-agricultural firms in this category to calcu-
late the average non-agricultural firm size. 
Source 
Statistique 
Generale de la 
France (1931a, pp. 
144, 147) 
This is calculated using equation (27), where Pm own calculations 
is normalised to 1, 11 is calibrated in section 2.6.1, 
and 'Wage Industrial Workers 1930 (Fr./day), 
and 'Wage Agricultural Workers 1930 (Fr./day)' 
are used for w:r and p~h~· 
This data is constructed like 'Parent Tongue M. 
Prob. '06'26', however the data for the size of 
each language group is preserved in this format 
(Le. not aggregated to a departemental index). 
The subindices refer to the biggest and second-
biggest language groups. 
This data is constructed like S~l' S~2' however not 
only languages spoken usually with the parents, 
but also languages usually spoken with the chil-
Institut National 
de la Statistique 
et des Etudes 
:Economiques 
(1999) 
Institut National 
de la Statistique 
et des Etudes 
dren and friends are considered. The subindices Economiques 
refer to the same language groups as those of S~l' (1999) 
o 
sd2' 
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3 Out Of Your Mind: Eliciting Individ-
ual Reasoning in One Shot Games77 
3.1 Introduction 
Equilibrium concepts have proven to be a powerful tool in economics, political sci-
ence, international relations and other fields when trying to understand and predict 
strategic behaviour of individuals, firms, countries, and other entities. However, 
manifold experimental studies of human behaviour have shown that the equilibrium 
concept does poorly in predicting outcomes of one shot games, even when a unique 
equilibrium exists (see for example Nagel, 1995, Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller, 
1996 or Camerer, 2003 for an overview). This class of games reflects strategic situa-
tions without precedent which are faced, for example, by consumers who - otherwise 
price-takers - buy a house and bargain with the seller about its price. 
A leading explanation for the failure of equilibrium concepts to explain and 
predict behaviour in one shot games is that players may not believe that other players 
choose an equilibrium strategy. This explanation appears particularly pertinent in 
unprecedented strategic situations, where learning cannot cause a convergence of 
beliefs and strategies to equilibrium. 78 The level-k model of reasoning, as first 
proposed by Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995), postulates the following 
alternative belief structure: There exist so-called level-O players, who do not play 
strategically. The model defines level-1 players to best respond to what they believe 
level-O players do. Level-2 players form a belief about the fractions and strategies 
of lower level players and best respond to this. This process continues for higher 
level players. Hence the model assumes a hierarchy of types who best respond to 
non-equilibrium beliefs, referred to as levels. They distinguish themselves by the 
number of iterated best responses to the distribution of level-O actions.79 
Although there is extensive empirical work in support of the level-k model, little 
is known about its anchoring elements: Do non-strategic level-O players exist? How 
do they choose their actions? And do strategic players correctly anticipate the 
actions of non-strategic players? Answers to these questions are required for the 
77The work in this chapter was carried out jointly with equal share by Stefan P. Penczynski and 
me. 
78 A distinct explanation could be that players fail to choose the best response to their belief 
about the other players' strategies. This is the idea behind the Quantal Response Equilibrium 
(QRE) proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) in which actions of higher expected payoff are 
more likely. 
79 Applications of the level-k model include dominance solvable games (Nagel, 1995; Costa-
Gomes and Crawford, 2006), normal-form games (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, 
and Broseta, 2(01), two-person zero-sum games with non-neutral framing (Crawford and Iriberri, 
2007a) , common-value auctions (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007b), and coordination games (Craw-
ford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich, 2008). For a more complete overview see Camerer, Ho, and Chong 
(2004) and Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2010). 
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model to have predictive power. 
The lack of empirical evidence is no coincidence. Firstly, the prominent theo-
retical papers typically assume level-O actions to be uniformly distributed over the 
action space and the beliefs of higher level players to be non-heterogeneous and 
consistent with the actions of level-O players. These assumptions naturally exclude 
any investigation of the level-O actions and beliefs. We generalise standard versions 
of the level-k model by allowing for (i) a non-uniform level-O action distribution, (ii) 
heterogeneous level-O beliefs and (iii) the distribution of level-O beliefs to be inde-
pendent of the distribution of level-O actions. These are necessary generalisations 
to answer the questions of interest. To fix ideas, we present a formal version of this 
generalised model in Section 3.2. 
Secondly, there are important empirical obstacles to investigating these ques-
tions: choice data alone can typically be explained by various reasoning patterns 
_ different levels of reasoning and associated level-O beliefs or actions - and hence 
are not informative. In particular, non-strategic behaviour cannot be robustly iden-
tified and the level-O beliefs are difficult to uncover. Moreover, in repeated games 
individuals are undergoing a learning process, which renders the use of a sequence 
of observations difficult. 
We present two methods which allow to investigate the above questions. Both 
rely on an experimental design that give access to incentivised written accounts of 
individual reasoning which are stated at the time of the decision-making. These 
accounts are obtained through a particular team communication protocol which can 
be applied to anyone shot game. We played a standard 'beauty contest' game: each 
participant is asked to state a number between 0 and 100 and the participant whose 
number is closest to 2/3 of the average of all numbers wins a prize. The unique 
Nash equilibrium of this game is to play 0 for all participants. 
The first empirical strategy is to obtain a non-parametric estimate of the distri-
bution of level-O beliefs and level-O actions from the written accounts of reasoning. 
We detect non-strategic reasoners and obtain an estimate of the distribution of level-
o actions. We find that at least 20% of the participants play non-strategically, in 
the sense of not attempting to best respond to any belief. The mode and median of 
the actions of these players are close to 60, and the mean is significantly higher than 
50. This is consistent with the interpretation that salience due to the multiplier of 
2/3 shapes the actions of non-strategic players. It suggests that level-O players can 
be understood as having no stronger reasons for choice other than salience. Further, 
we analyse stated level-O beliefs of higher level players. While the majority of them 
starts their reasoning at exactly 50, there is substantial heterogeneity. We cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the beliefs are, on average, correctly anticipating the mean 
of the level-O actions. 
The second empirical strategy is to estimate the structural parameters of our 
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generalised level-k model with a maximum likelihood estimation. In the estimation 
we make use of information about the players' sophistication from the written ac-
counts. We estimate about one third of participants to be playing non-strategically. 
The distributions of level-O actions and beliefs have an estimated mean of 58 and 
54, respectively. These are close to the non-parametric estimates obtained with the 
first empirical strategy. The belief distribution is more concentrated than the action 
distribution. However, it still has substantial variance. The estimation of these 
structural parameters is only possible under the generalised version of the model. 
Therefore, acknowledging heterogeneity in the beliefs does not only seem correct, 
but it as well enables novel estimations of the level-k model's structural parameters. 
The two empirical strategies provide consistent evidence on the questions this 
paper seeks to answer. We show that around one third of the participants play non-
strategically. The non-strategic level-O actions are not uniformly distributed. They 
might be shaped by salience considerations. Higher level players correctly anticipate 
the non-uniform distribution of non-strategic actions. 
After presenting the generalised level-k model in the next section, this paper 
proceeds as follows: In section 3.3 we discuss the existing empirical literature on the 
level-k model. We then present the experimental design and procedures in sections 
3.4. Results from the two empirical strategies are presented in sections 3.5 and 3.6. 
The final section offers concluding comments. 
3.2 Generalised Level-k Model 
Consider a game in which N players simultaneously choose an action x EX. Level-k 
type models deviate from equilibrium models in that they allow for heterogeneity 
in the belief about other players' actions. A player is characterised by a level of 
reasoning k, k = 0,1,2,3, .... Denote the fraction of level-k types in the population 
with lk and define l := {1o, 11, l2' ... }'. Level-O players are defined as playing non-
strategically in the sense that their action does not depend on a belief over other 
players' actions. We denote the distribution of their actions by gO(x 18°), where 
80 is a parameter vector characterising the distribution, and refer to it as 'level-O 
distribution'. Players of a higher level of reasoning (k ~ 1) are thought to best 
respond to the actions of lower level players. The belief about the distribution of 
those actions is derived from (i) a belief about the level-O distribution and (ii) a 
belief about the relative proportions of lower-level players. We refer to the belief 
about the level-O distribution as 'level-O belief'. Note that in most games, the player 
only needs to form a belief about one or several statistics of the level-O distribution, 
in the sense that conditional on knowledge of these statistics, information about 
other aspects of the level-O distribution leaves the best response unchanged. For 
example in the 'beauty contest' game a level-k player, k ~ 1, only needs to form a 
3 ELICITING INDIVIDUAL REASONING IN ONE SHOT GAMES 114 
belief about the mean of the level-O distribution. We allow the level-O belief about 
the vector of statistics d to be heterogeneous across individuals. Let its distribution 
be characterised by the probability density function gb(d lOb), where Ob is again a 
vector of parameters. Denote the belief of a level-k player with k ;::: 1 about the 
proportion of level-i players in the population as bk(i), i :::; k - 1. Given this belief 
a level-2 player can calculate the distribution of actions of lower level players and 
best respond to it. Higher level players find their best response analogously.8o In 
conclusion, the strategy of a level-k player, k ;::: 1, is found as probability distribution 
over 
(30) 
Given an assumption on the anchoring level-O distribution, the level-O belief, the 
true level-k distribution, and a specification for bk ( .), the level-k model makes a 
probabilistic prediction about the frequencies of actions. 
This general level-k model nests the models by Nagel (1995), Stahl and Wil-
son (1995), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001), Camerer, Ho, and Chong 
(2004) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) as special cases.81 All of these models 
assume that the level-O actions are uniformly distributed over the action space, that 
higher level players' level-O beliefs are non-heterogeneous and that they correctly 
anticipate the actions of level-O players. 
SONote that for players with k 2: 2 higher-order beliefs need to be specified. In particular, a player 
needs to form a belief over the lower-level players' beliefs of the level-O distribution. Similarly, a 
k 2: 3 player needs to form a belief about the population beliefs of player i, 2 =5 i =5 k - 1, 
i. e. a level-3 player needs to know what a level-2 player believes the relative proportions of level-O 
and level-1 players are. Here and in the literature, these higher-order beliefs are assumed to be 
consistent with the beliefs of the lower-level player. 
81Nagel (1995) assumes the players' population beliefs for k > 0 to be degenerate on k - 1: 
bk(i) = 1 if i = k - 1 and bk(i) = 0 otherwise. She assumes - as all later versions of the level-k 
model - the level-O distribution to be uniform and every player's level-O belief to be consistent, 
which makes lO degenerate. Stahl and Wilson (1995) study normal form games and present a 
version of the level-k model where best responses are calculated with error. The uniform level-
o distribution, gOO, reflects a fully imprecise best-response. Levels 1 and 2 best respond with 
error, playing actions with a higher expected payoff with a higher probability. Higher levels than 
k = 2 are not considered and the population distribution belief is not restricted to be degenerate. 
Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) and and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) model the 
level-k types in a similar fashion as Nagel (1995), but assume level-O players not to exist. Further 
they consider 'equilibrium' types that play the Nash equilibrium strategy and call 'sophisticated' 
types those players that best respond to the actual distribution of others' responses. Camerer, 
Ho, and Chong (2004) introduced the 'cognitive hierarchy' model where the players' beliefs reflect 
the true relative frequencies of lower level types and the true distribution of types l(k) follows 
a poisson distribution with parameter T. Formally, for all k > 0, bk(i) = l(i; T)/ 2:~-:0 l(m; T), 
where l(k; T) = Tke- T /(k!). 
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3.3 Literature 
The paper relates to an extensive empirical literature on the level-k model of reason-
ing. Most of this literature is concerned with estimating the distribution of level-k 
types in a given population. For example, Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) use a 
GMM estimator, essentially choosing the parameter of a one-parameter version of 
the level-k model (as well referred to as 'cognitive hierarchy model') to match the 
mean of the action data. This is an elegant methodology to estimate the level-k 
distribution that assumes certain level-O action and belief distributions. An ap-
proach which does not rely on a structural model is proposed in Bosch-Domenech, 
Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra (2004), who use a large dataset to fit a set of normal 
distributions to action data from various 'beauty contest' games. Some of the super-
imposed normal distributions are then associated to underlying levels of reasoning, 
which provides both estimates of the type distribution and the choices for individual 
types. 
In contrast, we estimate the various parameters of a structural model using max-
imum likelihood estimation in our second empirical strategy. This is typically not 
possible, since the level-k model makes stark choice predictions when the distribu-
tion of beliefs is assumed to be non-heterogeneous. For example, a uniform level-O 
distribution in the 'beauty contest' game, together with non-heterogeneous, consis-
tent beliefs about the mean of level-O actions, imply a degenerate belief at 50. Any 
action slightly off 33, 22, etc. will be attributed to level-O play. A maximum likeli-
hood estimation then typically yields almost all players to be level-O players and fits 
the level-O distribution to the full-sample action distribution. We instead explicitly 
model heterogeneity in the level-O belief, which causes heterogeneity in actions of 
players of the same level-k, k > 0, and allows us to separate this from level-O play. 
In this sense the generalisation of the model is key to our estimation strategy. 
A central challenge faced by the empirical literature is that the level-k model can 
typically explain a given action in a one-shot game with several reasoning patterns.82 
Like we do, other studies try to circumvent this problem by obtaining additional 
information which allows to conclude about the underlying reasoning. Costa-Gomes, 
Crawford, and Broseta (2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) obtain for each 
player multiple choices made in subsequently played variants of a game without 
feedback. Under the assumption of a constant reasoning level, they then match a 
player's sequence of choices to a typical 'fingerprint' of, say, a level-1 player. This 
provides estimates of individual levels of reasoning. In addition to the 'fingerprint', 
82For example, a player who chooses 33 in the standard 'beauty-contest' game might do so 
because he is a level-l reasoner who believes that level-O reasoners play on average 50. But he 
might just was well be a level-O reasoner who has chosen the number at random or a level-2 reasoner 
who beliefs that the population is composed of a combination of level-l and level-O reasoners who 
on average choose 50. 
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they used information search data to identify types of players.83 Tracking both 
choices and response times, Rubinstein (2007) associates longer response times with 
more cognitive effort, differentiating between cognitive, instinctive and reasonless 
choices. In a similar vein, Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman (2010) incentivise and 
observe provisional choices over time in order to get insights in the choice process, 
including initial naive considerations. In her original study, Nagel (1994) asked 
the participants after the experiment to verbally state the reason for their chosen 
action and then classified and analysed comments of participants. A descriptive 
analysis of optionally given verbal comments received in the context of a newspaper 
experiment is presented by Bosch-Domenech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra (2002). 
These studies do not analyse the non-strategic actions and beliefs thereof. 
Our experimental design analyses written accounts of reasoning. We carefully 
ensure that these are written during the actual thinking period and provide an 
incentive to the participants to state their reasoning fully and clearly.84 This is 
central to our empirical strategy, since only with such incentives we can be sure that 
the reasoning process is fully represented in the written accounts. In the absence of 
such incentives one is likely to underestimate the level of reasoning. 
At the heart of our experimental design lies the use of team communication as 
a means of observing individual reasoning. The experimental literature has used 
team setups on various occasions to obtain insights into the reasoning process of 
participants and to investigate the performance of teams as opposed to individuals. 
In this respect, our experimental design is related to the innovative study by Cooper 
and Kagel (2005) who were the first to let team players communicate via an instant 
messenger, allowing the experimenters to observe the speed of learning in strategic 
play. We use a communication protocol in which the message is written prior to any 
team interaction, so that it purely reflects individual reasoning in a one-shot game. 
3.4 Observing Individual Reasoning 
We present two strategies to estimate the distribution of level-O actions and beliefs 
thereof. Both empirical strategies rely on an experimental design which allows us 
to obtain incentivised accounts of individual reasoning. This section explains our 
design. It emphasises how our design ensures that individual participants have an 
incentive to state their reasoning fully and clearly. It as well describes how we extract 
information from these written accounts by classifying the reasoning pattern along 
the lines of a general level-k model. We corroborate the robustness of our findings 
83This method was introduced by Camerer, Johnson, Sen, and Rymon (1993). 
84Indeed, the standard theme in protocol analysis, the research field in psychology concerned with 
methods of eliciting verbal accounts from participants, is that "[t]he cl<>&est connection between 
thinking and verbal reports should be found when participants were instructed to focus on the 
task while verbalising their ongoing thoughts" (Ericsson, 2002, p. 983). 
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and the replicability of the classification procedure. 
3.4.1 Experimental Design 
In order to elicit the reasoning underlying a player's action, we designed the following 
game structure: Individuals are randomly assigned in teams of two players. Their 
payoff in the game depends on a joint 'team action'. To determine this, both players 
are given the chance to choose an action - which we call the 'final decision'. Then one 
player's decision is chosen randomly, with probability one half as the team action. 
Consequently, each player faces a 50% chance of having her partner's final decision 
determining the team action. The players hence have an incentive to ensure that 
their team partner's final decision is as sound as possible. Importantly, the players 
are given the possibility to convince their partner of the optimal team action. In 
particular, players are allowed to write one message to their team partner, which 
consists of a 'suggested decision' and a justifying text. This text is unlimited in size 
and its writing is not limited in time. The messages are exchanged simultaneously 
once both players have entered their message, and thereafter the players take their 
final decision individually. 
The simultaneous exchange of a single message ensures that every explanatory 
statement and suggested decision in the first round is written without any previous 
communication with the team partner, hence reflecting an individual's reasoning. It 
is therefore this first message and suggested decision which we will analyse in this 
paper in order to understand individual decision making in situations of strategic 
interaction.85 Importantly, under the reasonable assumption that the best way to 
convince one's team partner is by explaining him the own reasoning, this design gives 
an incentive to write down the reasoning process as fully and clearly as possible. It 
is generally applicable in one shot games and we believe it constitutes an important 
methodological contribution of our paper. 
The design has two potential caveats. First, the suggested decision is taken 
while knowing that the opponents are teams of 2 players. This leads, if anything, 
to a population belief with more weight on higher levels due to the team reasoning. 
Second, the decision is taken while justifying it in a message. This might lead to 
a more thoughtful decision. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that the 
requirement to explain one's decision can cause stress, leading to a lower level of 
reasoning. In any case, if these distortions were present, this should show up in the 
action data. It is comforting that the distribution of suggested decisions is similar 
to other non-communication treatments in the literature, e. g. Nagel (1995). 
85The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-'free (Fischbacher, 2007). 
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3.4.2 Experimental Procedures 
We conducted the experiment in the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the 
Department of Economics in Royal Holloway (University of London). In 6 sessions 
we played three rounds of the 'beauty-contest' game. Since in this paper we are 
interested in individual reasoning, we only analyse the first round suggested decision 
and the accompanying first message, i. e. with the activities that took place before 
any interaction of the team players. 
At the start of each session the participants were made familiar with the structure 
of the experiment and the messaging system in two practice rounds. We used the 
same software as above for the practice rounds, but asked the teams to find the 
answer to two unrelated questions. Since we wanted to avoid any pre-treatment 
sensitisation to strategic considerations, we asked them to provide the year of two 
historic events. The questions in the test round were chosen to be relatively difficult 
to stimulate the use of the messaging system. The participants of the experiment 
were paid a show-up fee of £5 and the winning team won a prize of £20 (£10 per 
team player). 
A total of 84 individuals participated in our experiment. Sessions had 12, 14 
or 16 participants. The participants were mainly undergraduate students in Royal 
Holloway and all of them were recruited by the host institution. Out of the 84 
students 15 were studying Economics, 13 of them being in their first year of studies, 
one in the second year, one being in the third year. 16 of the 84 students had 
received some form of training in game theory, but only 5 had been confronted 
with the 'beauty contest' game. The majority of students had participated in an 
economic experiment before. 
3.4.3 Classification of Communication Transcripts 
We use the information elicited on individual reasoning in the following way: First, 
we identify the cases in which no level-k type of reasoning is undertaken. Then, 
conditional on a level-k reasoning being applied by the player, which includes non-
strategic play, we uncover two sets of data: (a) the maximum and minimum number 
of steps of reasoning which can be interpreted into the message, including possibly 
0, and (b) the level-O belief which a player states, if any. 
In particular, two research assistants read the messages and classified the type 
of reasoning with the following procedure: 
1. To investigate the prevalence of reasoning patterns different from level-k rea-
soning we asked the RAs to indicate whether the player puts forward equilib-
rium reasoning. For this it was not necessary that the player actually played 
the unique equilibrium strategy.86 The RAs were further instructed to denote 
86We call a player a 'sophisticated' type, if she recognised the equilibrium, but played an action 
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whether the player applied an iterated elimination of dominated strategies. For 
this it is necessary that first some actions are excluded and then a strategy is 
formed for the remaining action space. 87 
2a. If any level-k reasoning was explained in the message, we asked the RAs to 
indicate if the argument contained a belief about others' play that served as 
a starting point for best responses, but was in itself not derived by choosing a 
best response. If so, we asked them to denote this level-O belief.88 
2b. Lastly, we were interested in how many steps of reasoning the player applies. 
When designing the classification procedure we were worried that in some cases 
it might not be possible to identify from the communication exactly how many 
steps of reasoning were applied.89 We therefore asked the classifiers to only 
indicate the lowest level of reasoning which is clearly stated and the highest 
level of reasoning which could possibly be interpreted into the messages. 90 We 
refer to these as 'lower bound' and 'upper bound', respectively. We instructed 
the classifiers to consider as level-O a player whose message does not exhibit 
"any strategic reasoning whatsoever". This might arise as a result of choosing 
a number randomly or based on non-strategic considerations such as taste. We 
emphasised that for this classification to be chosen, it was important that the 
player was not in any way best responding to what he thought others would 
play. 
When designing the classification procedure we intended to avoid two poten-
tial concerns: First, the classifiers might try to extract more information than the 
messages actually contain. We therefore instructed the classifiers to only enter infor-
mation when it was clearly contained in the message.91 Second, we were concerned 
that in the 'beauty-contest' game in the case of an ambiguous statement relatively 
low suggested decisions might lead the classifiers to indicate a higher lower-bound 
different from the unique equilibrium action. 
87For example the statement "Everybody plays on average 50 so I should not play higher than 
34" is not an iterated elimination of dominated strategies. 
88For completeness, we also asked whether an argument revealed a population belief distribution. 
If so, the classifiers were asked to indicate whether it was degenerate or non-degenerate. 
89Think for example of the imaginary statement: "I presume everybody else will play 33, so let 
us play 22." This clearly exhibits one step of reasoning. But it seems possible, too, that the player 
skipped the first step of his reasoning when writing down his argument. 
90The instructions specified that the classifiers, after writing down the lower bounds should be 
able to say to themselves: "It seems impossible that the players' level of reasoning is below this 
number!", and after writing down the upper bounds: "Although maybe not clearly communicated, 
this statement could be an expression of this level. If the player reasoned higher than this number, 
this was not expressed in the statement!" 
91The instructions were self-contained and were not complemented by verbal comments. The 
instructions were written by the two authors, of whom one had taken a look at the communication 
transcripts beforehand. The instructions can be obtained from the authors upon request. Remain-
ing questions were- answered via an e-mail list that included all four persons involved and which 
can be obtained from the authors. 
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on the level of reasoning than was clearly exhibited. In contrast when indicating the 
upper-bound, knowing about low choices should, if anything, lead the classifiers to 
indicate a higher upper-bound. We therefore split the classification of the messages 
into two parts. We did not reveal the choice data to the classifiers when asking for 
the lower-bound but revealed it subsequently when asking for the upper bound.92 
The classification was undertaken by two Ph.D. students in the Department of 
Economics at LSE. First they classified the transcripts individually. After this phase 
their classification of the lower bound coincided for 77% of all participants and the 
classification of the upper bound coincided in 76% of all cases. Then the two RAs 
met to reconcile their judgements and provide a joint classification, if possible. We 
only use data on which they could agree in the reconciliation. 
Later we asked further 6 RAs to again classify the lower bounds. Table 29 in 
appendix C.7 shows that for 70 out of 78 messages (",90%), 6 or more of the 8 
classifiers agreed on exactly one level.93 We take this as comforting evidence that 
our method of classification is robust, provides informative insights about individual 
reasoning and can easily be replicated. 
3.5 Experimental Results 
3.5.1 Action Data 
Table 24 presents aggregate summary statistics for all 6 sessions. Figure 12 shows 
histograms of the suggested decision and the final decisions aggregated over all 
sessions. The suggested decision is comparable to the first period's decision of other 
experiments with individual participants. However, the final decision is not, since the 
participants have, at the time of taking this decision, already received a message from 
their team partner. For the subsequent analysis and classification of the individual 
reasoning we will exclusively use the suggested decision. 
The data on the suggested decision is similar to data generated in other compa-
rable experiments in having similar means and a high fraction of choices between 20 
and 50. The original study by Nagel (1995) had an average of 36.6, which is slightly 
lower than ourS.94 A concern with our design is that having to communicate to the 
team partner might increase the participants' level of reasoning, e. g. because the 
participants would examine the task at hand more thoroughly in order to state sen-
sible arguments in the communication. The fact that our data exhibits - if anything 
920ther studies applying a classification use a similar procedure in order to avoid any unconscious 
alignment of the classification with the choice data that might result from implicit assumptions 
(for example Rydval, Ortmann, and Ostatnicky, 2009). 
93The 6 subjects that did not write a message are dropped from this exposition. 
94The spike at 40 might be unusual. The communication data reveals that this arises mainly as 
a result of two factors: some level-O players chose 40 and some level-l players chose 40 as they held 
the belief that the level-O mean would equal 60. This insight shows how relaxing the dependence 
on action data allows for an analysis of the structural characteristics of reasoning. 
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TABLE 24: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. N 
PANEL A: Full Sample 
Suggested Decision 43.93 21.14 40 a 100 84 
Final Decision 39.73 18.75 35 a 100 84 
Team Actiona 40.02 18.98 35.5 16 100 84 
PANEL B: Level-O players 
Level-O Action 62.35 22.39 60 16 100 17 
PANEL C: Non-Ievel-O players with stated belief 
Level-O Belief 55.26 12.33 50 40 100 36 
Notes: a The team action is a random draw of the two final decisions. 
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FIGURE 12: INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS IN THE EXPERIMENT 
_ slightly higher action choices is reassuring in this respect. 
The final decision of the participants has a lower mean and m di n than th 
suggested decision. This supports the intuition that the group-d cision making 
process increases the level of reasoning and hence, in the 'beauty cont t' gam ,1 ads 
to lower chosen numbers on average. Moreover the standard deviation of d cisi ns 
acrosS participants decreases after the exchange of the messag and outli f S b com 
fewer, consistent with the idea that level-O players who potentially ho th utli fS, 
become fewer. 95 
3.5.2 Level-k Bounds 
Table 25 presents the lower and upper bounds on the level of r asoning of individ-
uals. For 70 participants both a lower and an upper bound was indicat d. Eight 
participants have a non-classified upper bound. Another 6 participants did not mak 
any statement and could therefore not be classified. 
For 50 of the 84 participants the lower and the upper bounds oincid (~60%) 
95 An analysis of this process of persuasion is presented in Penczynski (2010b). 
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TABLE 25: LEVEL CLASSIFICATION RESULTS 
Level upper bounds 
0 1 2 3 NA Total 
0 17 11 1 0 6 35 
Level 1 26 3 0 2 31 
lower 2 6 5 0 11 
bounds 3 1 0 1 
NA 6 6 
Total 17 37 10 6 14 84 
and hence the classification fully determines their level of reasoning. These are 17 
level-O, 26 level-I, 6 level-2 and 1 level-3 players, corresponding to the diagonal of 
Table 25. For further 20 players the classification restricts the level of reasoning to 
be one of two possibilities. Only for one participant we have an interval between 
o and 2. None of those participants for whom both a lower and upper bound is 
indicated was classified as potentially reasoning higher than level 3.96 
Two players identified the Nash equilibrium, one of them being an 'equilibrium'-
type that suggested playing 0, another one being 'sophisticated' in the sense that 
she imitated a level-2 player and suggested 20. No upper bound was assigned to 
those players who identified the equilibrium. Further two participants were found 
to apply elimination of dominated strategies. 
For our purposes, the main take-away from the data is that at least 20% of the 
subjects are non-strategic reasoners, since 17 out of 84 participants are identified 
as level-O reasoners. This is, however, only a lower bound on the fraction of level-O 
reasoners, since for an additional 24 participants we cannot exclude the possibility 
that they are level-O reasoners. When estimating the level-k model, we estimate 
over one third of the population to be level-O reasoners (37%, see section 3.6.3). 
3.5.3 Level-O Action 
We analyse the actions chosen by those with a lower and upper bound of 0 in order 
to provide an estimate of the distribution of level-O play. Panel B of table 24 shows 
summary statistics of the suggested decisions of level-O players and figure 13 presents 
the corresponding histogram. A one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggests that 
the distribution is significantly different from uniform (p-value= 0.038). Level-O 
players choose on average 62 and their median choice is 60. The hypothesis that the 
mean of their choices is equal to 50 is rejected when tested against the alternative 
hypothesis of a higher mean (t-test, p-value= 0.019). 
We find a higher frequency of level-O actions around 50, 66 and 100. These 
can be seen as focal points in the spirit of Schelling (1960): 50 and 100 are focal 
due to the action space being integers between 0 and 100 and 66 may be focal due 
96The data by subject can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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to the multiplier in the game being 2/3. This adds t th I y 
Bacharach and Stahl (2000) and Crawford and Irib rri (2007a), wh 
salience considerations importantly shape th a tion distributi n f n n- r 
players.97 However, the games they analyse display purp s ly fr m d 
is not true for the 'beauty contest' game. Th fa t th twill find n 
distribution markedly different from uniform and nt r d r und 
is consistent with an idea presented by L wis (19 
he hypothesises that individuals ''tend to pick th 
have no stronger ground for choice." Level-O play rs 
no stronger reasons for choice than salienc . 
having 
.. 
! 
20 00 100 
FIGURE 13: SUGGESTED DECISIONS OF LEY ' L- O LAY ' RS 
3.5.4 Level-O Beliefs 
The analysis of the written accounts of individu 1 r oning furth r 11 w u t 
analyse the players' beliefs about the average a tion f 1 v 1-0 1 y rs. In 3 
messages the players stated a non-derived b li f ab ut th av r g ti n f 
players. Table 24 shows summary statistics of th tat d 1 v 1-0 Ii f . 
belief is significantly higher than 50 (one-Sid d t-t t , p-v lu = . 7) . 
presents the distribution of the level-O beli fs . 
More than 20 participants started reasoning with a 1 Y 1-0 b li f f xa tly 50. 
However, 11 players have a level-O beli f b tw n 55 and 
evidence that level-O beliefs are indeed het rog n u. This pr vid 
linked to the distribution of level-O actions. In p rti ul r, th h 
same salience considerations which ar found in th 1 v 1-0 ti n . r h r, w fcc il 
to reject the hypothesis that the mean of th lev 1-0- ti n nd - 1i f di tri uti 11 
as shown in figures 13 and 14 are the same (tw mpl t-t t wi hun qu 1 v rian 
p-value: 0.235) . 
97Penczynski (2010a) uses the present paper's m thod to illumin t 
belief in the context of the 'hide and seek' game. 
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FIGURE 14: LEVEL-O BELIEFS FROM OMMUN! ATI N TRANS RIPTS 
3.6 Estimation Of Structural Level-k Mod I 
This section discusses how a generalised 1 v l-k m d 1, whi h 
neous level-O beliefs, can be estimated. W will us th sugg st d d i i n 
with the upper and lower bounds obtained from th 1 ifi ti n t im 
model's structural parameters, in particular the distributi n f 1 v l-k yp . 
distributions of level-O actions and beliefs. Among oth r thi 11 w u t 
the fraction of level-O players. 
3.6.1 An Estimable Model 
The level-k model outlined in section 3.2 mak pro bili t i 
the observed actions. Let fj(x I OJ) d not the pr b bility m 
actions of a level j player. Then the unconditional pr bability m 
action of some player i can be written as 
k 
P(Xi; 1/;) = Lldj(Xi I OJ) 
j = l 
th r 
th 
nd th 
tima 
( 1) 
where 1/; = (l, 01 , O2 , .. . , ,On), lj ;::: 0 for all j and L:;=llj = l. Thi i a ny ' 
combination of component densiti s denot d in th t ti ti lit r tur 'fini 
mixture distribution'. The ij's give the wight f i lri uti 11 , 
and the OJ's are the parameters which charact riz li ' ri uti n . 
The distribution of all actions is hence a finit mixtur i tribu i liS 
of level-O, level-I, level-2 players and so on. W will outlin in n .. 2 h w 
to consistently estimate the param t r vector 1/;. In h f 11 wing w will fir 
describe which form iJ(x I OJ) takes, how it d p nd n th 1 y 1-0 ti n and Ii f 
distributions and how we parameteris th s . 
Action distributions in the level-k mod 1 Th ti n di tribu i n flY 1-
player, fo(x I 0o), is simply the level-O distribution gO(x I 0°) . h i ns f high r 
level players, iJ(x IOj) with j ;::: 1, are deriv d from th i1' 1 v 1-0 Ii f, gb(. I f)b) , 
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taking into account the players' population belief. As the level-O belief is a ran-
dom variable, the action distribution of a level-k player can be understood as the 
distribution of a transformed random variable.98 
For a general form of population beliefs, this might be a complicated trans-
formation. This is simplified by the fact that we predominantly found degenerate 
population beliefs in the messages. We will therefore assume degenerate popUlation 
beliefs throughout.99 The action of a level-k player then follows from his level-O 
belief, say b*, as rib* or in our case (2j3)kb*. 
Parametric assumptions We parameterise gO(x 18°) as bounded normal distri-
bution defined on the interval [0, 100] and characterised by the mean and standard 
deviation (j10, (TO) = 0°. This allows for a concentration of the level-O actions as 
well as an approximate uniform distribution when (To is large. We parameterise the 
distribution of the level-O belief as well as bounded normal defined on the interval 
[0,100] and characterised by the mean and standard deviation (j1b, (Tb) = (Jb. As a 
special case this allows for the level-O belief to be concentrated on the mean of the 
level-O action distribution. To find the action distribution of level-k players that 
follows from this level-O belief distribution, Lemma 1 in the appendix is useful. It 
states that a random variable which is distributed as bounded normal on [0,100] 
with parameters (j1, u) will - when applying a multiplicative transformation using a 
factor a - be distributed as bounded normal with parameters (aj1, au) and support 
[O,alOO]. Therefore we find the action distribution A(x 18k), k ~ 1, as a bounded 
normal distribution with Ok = (2j3)kOb and support [0, (2j3)klOO].lOO 
We estimate the fraction of level reasoners for levels 0 to 3. No parametric 
structure is imposed on the distribution of level-reasoners, but we assume the highest 
level of reasoning observed to be 3. We do not find any communication that hints 
to a level of reasoning higher than that. 
3.6.2 Estimator and Identification 
Likelihood Function Given the probability mass function in equation 31 for the 
action of a player of unknown level, we can write the log-likelihood of the data as 
n 
L(x; 1/;) = L logp(xi; 1/;) (32) 
i=l 
98Note that a non-degenerate level-O belief distribution will imply a non-degenerate action distri-
bution for higher levels. This is in contrast to other models, where only if a player exactly matches 
the point prediction of the level-k model he would be classified as a higher level player. 
999 out of 12 players exhibited a degenerate population belief. 
lOONote that in equation 31 the component density I; is indexed, allowing for the possibility 
that they are of different parametric families. In the case of the 'beauty contest' we can omit the 
subscript. 
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where x is the vector of actions observed. We use the information on the bounds by 
imposing lj = 0 in P(Xi; 1/1) when the classification information is such that individual 
i is certainly not of level j. 
Identification For the model to be identified, the mixture densities need to be lin-
early independent for all mixture probabilities lj =f O. In the 'beauty contest' game 
with a parameterisation of the level-O action and belief distribution as bounded 
normal this will necessarily be satisfied, irrespective of how many levels are esti-
mated.1OI 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator We estimate the parameter vector 1/1 with 
the maximum-likelihood estimator, denoted ~MLE. The log-likelihood function is 
thrice differentiable and the expectation of the third partial derivative is finite. We 
are unable to calculate the true information matrix, but we calculate an estimate 
of it and verify that it is positive definite. The MLE for this estimation problem 
is hence consistent, asymptotically normal and with asymptotic variance given by 
the inverse of the Fisher information matrix. We find the global maximiser of the 
log-likelihood function numerically, since the likelihood equations cannot be solved 
analytically. Details of this procedure are given in appendix C.2. 
In order to ensure that the estimator is unbiased in a small sample, we ran Monte 
Carlo studies of sample size N = 84. For these we have generated data with the 
model given in equation 31, using "fJMLE for 1/1. The results give no reason to believe 
that our estimator is biased. Details are given in appendix C.4. 
3.6.3 Estimation Results 
Level-k distribution Table 26 shows the estimation results for the level-k distri-
bution. We estimate 47% of the participants to be level-1 reasoners, and 15% to be 
level-2 reasoners. We estimate only 1% of the participants to be level-3 reasoners. 
This is similar to the classification results in section 3.5.2.102 Crucially, we estimate 
that more than one third of the players (37%) are level-O players. 
The estimates in Table 26 on the relative frequencies of level-k reasoners, condi-
tional on k 2:: 1, resemble the relative fractions of level-I, level-2 and level-3 reasoners 
found in the literature for various games (see Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004), Costa-
Gomes and Crawford (2006), Crawford and Iriberri (2007a) etc.). This is reassuring 
and adds to the earlier evidence that the level-k model can have predictive power 
for the distribution of actions as a function of population and game characteristics. 
101Unless in the special case where 00 = {2/3)k(Jb for some k ~ 1. For for any non-zero levcl-O 
action mean, this will not be true if the mean of the level-O belief is at the mean of the level-O 
action. 
102For computational reasons, the maximum level in the 'beauty contest' estimation is level-3. 
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TABLE 26: ESTIMATED LEYEL-k DISTRIBUTION 
Parameter 
Estimate 
lo 
0.37 
(0.057) 
0.47 
(0.058) 
0.15 
(0.042) 
0.01 
(0.016) 
Notes: The table presents the results from a maximum likelihood 
estimation of the structural model as outlined in section 3.6.1. This 
table only presents the results for the level-k distribution, but the 
level-O action and belief distribution were estimated simultaneously. 
Those results are reported in table 27. Bootstrapped standard errors 
are given in brackets. These are obtained from 200 iterations of our 
estimation when sampling 84 observations from our data. 
However, our estimate of the fraction of non-strategic reasoners is substantially 
higher than previously estimated. Nagel (1995) associates certain actions with leyel-
o play and estimates between 2% and 17% of the population to be level-O reasoners. 
Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) parameterise the type distribution as Poisson and 
estimate the mean to be roughly 1.5, corresponding to roughly 22% non-strategic 
play. Note that our estimation procedure does not conflate level-O play and errors 
of higher-level players, since we de-couple the level-O action and belief distribution. 
Another way of interpreting the heterogeneity in the level-O beliefs in the estimation 
is to think of it as errors of higher level players. 103 
Some of the level-k literature suggests that level-O players only exist in the heads 
of other players. The evidence presented here sheds substantial doubts on this 
assumption. Of course, studies differ in the amount of testing that is done before 
the experiment, which might influence the capability of players to play strategically. 
In our study, we took care not to train or hint towards any strategic consideration. 
In our view, this should be the approach for studying one shot games. 
Level-O actions and beliefs Table 27 presents our estimates of the parameters 
characterising the distribution of actions of level-O players and the beliefs of higher 
level players regarding their play. 
TABLE 27: ESTIMATED LEYEL-O ACTIONS AND BELIEFS 
Parameter 
Estimate 
/-to 
58.38 
(7.09) 
19.73 
(3.45) 
54.01 
(2.49) 
16.28 
(2.41) 
Notes: The table presents the results from a maximum likeli-
hood estimation of the structural model as outlined in section 
3.6.1. This table only presents the results for the level-O action 
and belief distribution, but the level-k distribution was esti-
mated simultaneously. Those results are reported in table 26. 
Bootstrapped standard errors are given in brackets. These are 
obtained from 200 iterations of our estimation when sampling 
84 observations from our data. 
We estimate the mean of the level-O action distribution to be 58.38 and the mean 
l03However, we want to emphasise, that we indeed find substantial heterogeneity in the stated 
level-O beliefs in the classification procedure. 
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of the level-O belief distribution to be 54.01. These are close to the estimates we 
obtained non-parametrically in Section 3.5. We estimate the level-O action distribu-
tion to have a variance of 19.73 and the level-O belief distribution to have a variance 
of 16.28. These are as well similar to the non-parametric estimates obtained before. 
Hence, we again find the belief distribution to be more concentrated than the action 
distribution, but - in contrast to the assumption made in the literature104 - we 
estimate the belief distribution to have substantial variance. 105 
3.6.4 Quantifying the Classification Information 
We can quantify the benefit of the additional information from our design by com-
paring the variance of our estimator with the variance of the equivalent estimator 
which does not use classification information.106 Under suitable regularity conditions 
the maximum-likelihood estimator "pMLE will have an asymptotic distribution with 
variance matrix I-I, where I is the Fisher information matrix. The finite sample 
distribution then has an approximate variance matrix I-I In. Let 101 denote the 
information matrix of the estimator using unclassified data and 1;1 the information 
matrix of our estimator which uses the partly classified data. Then 101 In and 1;1 In 
are the approximate finite variance matrices of these estimators, respectively. We 
can calculate how many more unclassified data points one would need to achieve the 
same efficiency as our design. As the variances are matrices, one needs to choose 
some real-valued summary statistic of the matrix to calculate an exact ratio. It is 
a common procedure in the literature on optimal experimental design to compare 
the traces of the variance matrices, also known as the 'total sum of variances'. As 
a bottom line, to estimate J-L0 , aO, ,i and ab with the same sum of variances, one 
would need 13 times as many choice observations as we have classified observations. 
Furthermore to estimate the lj's with the same precision one would need 17 times 
as many observations. In our case, this would correspond to more than 1000 and 
1400 observations respectively.107 
3.7 Concluding Comments 
In this study we present a novel experimental design which allows to investigate the 
anchoring element of the level-k model, the level-O actions and beliefs. In a standard 
'beauty contest' game, we find that one third of the participants are playing non-
strategically. The level-O beliefs are mostly 50, but significant upward deviations 
l04Recall that the literature assumes the level-O action to be uniformly distributed and the level-O 
belief to be degenerate at 50. 
l05When estimating the level-O action distribution with a beta distribution that nests the uniform 
distribution, the estimated distribution is very similar in shape to the one found here. 
106For references on the literature of optimal experimental design with mixture densities check 
for example Hosmer and Dick {1977}. ' 
107 Appendix C.5 gives details on the estimation and estimates of 101 and 1; 1. 
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occur. On average, the beliefs are consistent with the non-uniform level-O actions, 
which are concentrated around points 50, 66 and 100. These numbers suggest that 
one plausible determinant for level-O actions is salience. 
The novel features of our design are that the participants state their individual 
reasoning, (i) in close temporal proximity to the reasoning process itself, and (ii) 
are supplied an incentive to state their reasoning as fully and clearly as possible. 
The written accounts provide an immediate insight into the individual's rea-
soning in addition to the participant's action in the game. This relaxes the need 
to make assumptions on aspects of the reasoning in order to interpret the player's 
action. The level of reasoning, for example, can be determined without particular 
assumptions on the level-O belief or population belief distributions. In addition, it is 
possible to directly observe level-O play or level-O beliefs without any preconception 
of their distributions. 
Obtaining an incentivised written account of individual reasoning also relaxes the 
need to design complex games with a view to drawing inference from actions alone. 
It allows us to learn about individual reasoning in games which are economically 
interesting even when actions alone are not informative. The design is generally 
applicable to one shot games and we believe can prove useful for other purposes in 
experimental economics. 
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C Appendix 
C.1 Transformation of Bounded Normal 
Lemma 1 A random variable which is distributed as bounded normal on [0,100J 
with parameters (j-l, a) will still be distributed as bounded normal when applying a 
multiplicative transformation with a factor a, with parameters (aj-l, aa) and support 
[0, alDOJ. 
Proof. For a monotonic, differentiable transformation of a random variable B, say 
X = g(B), the distribution of X is found as fx{x) = fB(g-l(X)) . Ig-1' (x)1 where 
the support needs to be suitably changed. In our case g(b) = pkb, g-l(X) = x/pk 
and g-l'(x) = l/pk 
iub4>(x/pk; 9b) p"~b4>(y;pk9b) 
f(x;e) = <P(100;9b) _ <p(0;9b) - <P(pklOO;pk9b) - <p(0;pk9b) 
where the equality of the nominators follows by straight-forward manipulation of 
4>0 and the denominator follows from 
after a change of variable w = pk z. • 
C.2 Details of the Numerical Estimation 
In order to find the maximum likelihood estimates, we numerically maximise the 
log-likelihood. We start out searching over a grid covering the the full range of 
parameter values. lOB Once the vector of parameter values is found which gives the 
highest likelihood, a new, finer grid is defined around this set. The new grid includes 
the parameter values that were neighbors of the maximising set in the previous, 
coarser grid. The calculation is iterated until the mesh size is sufficiently small. 
C.3 Bootstrapping 
The standard errors for the maximum likelihood estimates have been bootstrapped. 
Estimating 200 samples that consist of 84 draws with replacement from the original 
dataset, we obtain a measure of the estimates's variance. Figure 15 shows the 
histograms of the 200 estimates for the 8 estimated parameters. 
108 All sets of possible parameter values are bounded except for the standard deviation of the 
bounded normal distribution. Using a beta distribution allows us to cover distribution shapes that 
are equivalent to standard deviations up to infinity in the bounded normal case. 
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C.4 Monte Carlo Studies 
We use Monte Carlo studies in order to analyse the properties of our maximum 
likelihood estimators. We use the estimable model outlined in section 3.6.1 to gen-
erate data for 84 participants, reflecting the number of data points in the 'beauty 
contest' game. By design, the Monte Carlo results are specific to the parameters for 
which data is generated. We use the parameter estimates presented in section 3.6 
as parameters in the data generating process. 
From the generated levels of reasoning we generate level bounds. Firstly, there 
are participants whose communication does not lend itself to any classification. We 
reflect this by not giving bounds for 17% of the generated observations, making this 
value comparable to the 16.7% in the experiment. For the remaining data points 
we generate an upper bound which is one above the true level with probability 0.2 
and similarly ( and independently) for the lower bound. In our sample, 27.1 % of the 
level classifications have an interval of two possible level values and 1.4% of three 
possible levels. The above data generating process gives comparable, but slightly 
less precise values of 32% and 4%, respectively. 
Table 28 presents the results based on 50 runs. The average estimate from the 
Me studies is very close to the data generating parameter and the data generating 
parameter is always well within one standard deviation of estimates from the MC 
studies. 
TABLE 28: MONTE CARLO RESULTS 'BEAUTY CONTEST'. 
i Level i Level-O belief i Level-O actio7l 
0 1 2 3 mean st.dev. mean st.dev. 
true DCP 0.36 0.47 0.15 0.02 50.00 13.16 60.00 21.00 
mean of MC estimates 0.39 0.46 0.14 0.01 50.13 13.07 56.45 21.17 
st. dev. of MC estimates 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.01 1.95 1.68 5.45 4.80 
C.5 Estimators of the Information Matrices 
We estimate the Fisher information matrices with the outer-product of the score 
vector estimator introduced by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974). Recall 
that 1/J = (lo, ll' l2' 11-0, aO, /-Lb, ab) and let Zi be a vector of dimension 1 x 4 with 
element Zij generally equal to 1 and set to 0 if the classification information is such 
that individual i is certainly not of level j. We outline below only the estimation of 
Ie. The estimator of 10 is obtained similarly by setting all elements of %i equal to 
1. Define Vi ( 1/J) = V 'l/Jp( Xi; 1/J, Zi). Then the estimator of the information matrix Ie 
is L-i Vi (1/J )Vi (1/J)'. The score vector Vi (1/J) has elements 
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OPi 
-Olo 
OPi 
-Oll 
°Pi 
-012 
°Pi 
-Op,o 
8Pi 
-00-0 
OPi 
-OJ..Lb 
°Pi 
-80-b 
We find 
8f(x; a6) 
8J..L 
~¢(x, a6) [~[~(a100; a6) - ~(O; a8)]- ~[¢(O; a8) - ¢(a100, a8)J] 
[~(a100; a6) - ~(O; a8))2 
_ f(x; aO)! [x - aJ-t + ao-(f(a100; aO) - f(O; ao))] 0- ao-
where the second step follows by the definition of f(x; aO). Secondly we find 
of(x;a6)_ a*:~,a8) ~¢(x,aO)~ 
00- - [<I>(a100; aO) - <1>(0; aO)] [<I>(a100; aO) - <1>(0; aO)]2 
where 3 0 = ~(a100; aO) - <1>(0; aO). We can calculate 
and 
0[<I>(a100; aO) - 4>(0; aO)] 
017 
8 Joaloo ~¢(x; aO)dx 
80-
_ riOO 8;}q¢(x; aO) dx 
Jo 80-
- --¢(x; aO) ~ ar - 1 dx l aloo 1 1 [(X)2] o 0- ao- a 0-
1 r iOO (x - aJ-t)2 1 1 
- -;; 10 (ao-)2 ao- ¢(x; aO)dx - ; [4>(a100; aO) - 4>(0; aO)] 
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Divide by <I>(alOO; aO) - <1>(0; aO) to find 
- (x2 - 2aJ-lx + a2J-l2)f(x; aO)dx - -1 l aloo 1 
0"3a2 ° 0" 
1 laloo 2aJ-l lalOo a2 J.L21a1oo 1 
- 32 x2 f(x; aO)dx -3"2 xf(x; aO)dx +3"2 f(x; afJ)dx --
O"a ° O"a ° O"a 0 (J 
, ...,. , , ¥ ' " .... ., 
=1 
where 3 1 and 3 2 are the first and second central moments of the bounded normal. 
From the m.g.f. of the bounded normal they are found as 
¢(al00; afJ) - ¢(O; afJ) 3 1 - aJ-l-aO"~--~~-=~~ <I> (a 100; aO) - <1>(0; afJ) 
2 2 2 2 2 2¢'(a100; afJ) - ¢'(O; afJ) 2 2 ¢(alOOj afJ) - ¢(O; aO) 3 2 - a J-l + a 0" + a 0" - a J.LO" ~-:-:-~-::7----:"'~~ <1>( alOOj afJ) - <I>(Oj aO) <1>( alOOj afJ) - <1>(0. afJ) 
Note that ¢'(al00;aO) = _alO~;al'¢(alOOjafJ) and ¢'(OjafJ) = _0:'4¢(OjafJ). Col. 
lecting terms we find 
8 [<I>(alOO; aO) - <1>(0; aO)] /80" 1 al~QIJ¢(aI00j afJ) - ~¢(Oj afJ) 
<I> (alOO; aO) - <1>(0; aO) = -'U <I>(a100; aO) - <1>(0; aO) 
Collecting terms and substituting in f(x; aO) we can write 
8f(x; aO) = f(x; aO).!. [(X - aJ.L)2 - 1 + (a100 - aJ.L) . f(alOO. afJ) - (0 - aJt) . 1(0 afJ)] 
80" 0" aO" ' 
C.6 Estimates of Information Matrices 
Our estimate of the information matrix when not using information on the upp(~r 
and lower bounds of reasoning is 
0.428 -0.595 0.049 -29.234 17.102 6.466 -12.630 
-0.595 0.896 -0.127 41.296 -25.289 -11.914 17.787 
0.049 -0.127 0.064 -3.800 3.095 3.129 -1.504 
10 = -29.234 41.296 -3.800 2041.117 -1184.958 -469.305 869.482 
17.102 -25.289 3.095 -1184.958 751.216 334.845 -515.823 
6.466 -11.914 3.129 -469.305 334.845 241.982 
-200.424 
-12.630 17.787 -1.504 869.482 -515.823 -200.424 382.519 
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and our estimate of the information matrix when using this information is 
0.018 -0.007 -0.004 -0.684 0.341 -0.309 -0.064 
-0.007 0.021 -O.OlD 0.417 -0.148 -0.021 0.096 
-0.004 -0.010 0.042 0.162 -0.136 0.191 0.030 
ie = -0.684 0.417 0.162 116.136 -17.443 15.078 3.438 
0.341 -0.148 -0.136 -17.443 83.307 2.554 3.215 
-0.309 -0.021 0.191 15.078 2.554 40.129 9.249 
-0.064 0.096 0.030 3.438 3.215 9.249 8.512 
C.7 Classification Agreement 
Table 29: CLASSIFICATION AGREEMENT 
Subject Level-O Level-l Level-2 Level- Coinciding 
9 
1 8 8 
2 8 8 
3 8 8 
4 8 8 
5 8 8 
6 8 8 
7 8 8 
8 8 8 
9 8 8 
lD 8 8 
11 8 8 
12 8 8 
13 8 8 
14 8 8 
15 8 8 
16 8 8 
17 8 8 
18 8 8 
19 8 8 
20 8 8 
21 8 8 
22 8 8 
23 8 8 
24 8 8 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
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Table 29 - CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE 
Subject Level-O Level-l Level-2 Level- Coinciding 
3 
25 8 8 
26 8 8 
27 8 8 
28 8 8 
29 8 8 
30 8 8 
31 8 8 
32 8 8 
33 8 8 
34 8 8 
35 8 8 
36 8 8 
37 8 8 
38 8 8 
39 8 8 
40 8 8 
41 1 7 7 
42 7 1 7 
43 1 7 7 
44 7 1 7 
45 7 1 7 
46 7 1 7 
47 7 1 7 
48 7 1 7 
49 7 1 7 
50 7 1 7 
51 1 7 7 
52 1 7 7 
53 1 7 7 
54 7 1 7 
55 1 7 7 
56 6 2 6 
57 2 6 6 
58 6 2 6 
59 6 2 6 
60 6 2 6 
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE 
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Table 29 - CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE 
Subject Level-O Level-l Level-2 Level- Coinciding 
3 
61 6 2 6 
62 6 2 6 
63 6 2 6 
64 6 2 6 
65 2 6 6 
66 6 2 6 
67 2 6 6 
68 6 1 1 6 
69 1 6 1 6 
70 1 6 1 6 
71 3 5 5 
72 1 5 2 5 
73 1 5 2 5 
74 4 4 4 
75 4 4 4 
76 4 4 4 
77 4 2 2 4 
78 1 2 4 1 4 
Notes: The table presents the number of classifiers (out of 8 classifiers) who picked the 
indicated lower bound, by subject. The subjects are ordered by the maximum number of 
coinciding choices. 
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